Taylor v. Horton
| Decision Date | 14 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:19-cv-188 |
| Parties | MICHAEL A. TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. CONNIE HORTON, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether "it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must be dismissed because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.
Petitioner Michael A. Taylor is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. Following a jury trial in the Macomb County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of five counts of armed robbery under Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.529, two counts of conspiracy to commit armed robbery under Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.529 and 750.157a, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b. On August 2, 2017, the court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent prison terms of 25 to 26 years for each robbery conviction, to run consecutively with a sentence of 2 years for the firearm conviction.
On September 16, 2019, Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, the application is deemed filed when handed to prison authorities for mailing to the federal court. Cook v. Stegall, 295 F.3d 517, 521 (6th Cir. 2002). Petitioner signed his application on September 16, 2019. (Pet., ECF No. 1-1, PageID.16.) The petition was received by the Court on September 19, 2019. For purposes of this Opinion, the Court has given Petitioner the benefit of the earliest possible filing date. See Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 2008) () (citing Goins v. Saunders, 206 F. App'x 497, 498 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006)).
The petition raises three grounds for relief, as follows:
This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). The AEDPA "prevents federal habeas 'retrials'" and ensures that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is "intentionally difficult to meet." Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (internal quotation omitted).
The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This Court may consider only the holdings, and not the dicta, of the Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Bailey v. Mitchell, 271 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir. 2001). In determining whether federal law is clearly established, the Court may not consider the decisions of lower federal courts. Lopez v. Smith, 574 U.S. 1, 4 (2014); Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 64 (2013); Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 48-49 (2012); Williams, 529 U.S. at 381-82; Miller v. Straub, 299 F.3d 570, 578-79 (6th Cir. 2002). Moreover, "clearlyestablished Federal law" does not include decisions of the Supreme Court announced after the last adjudication of the merits in state court. Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 37-38 (2011). Thus, the inquiry is limited to an examination of the legal landscape as it would have appeared to the Michigan state courts in light of Supreme Court precedent at the time of the state-court adjudication on the merits. Miller v. Stovall, 742 F.3d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Greene, 565 U.S. at 38).
A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the "contrary to" clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court's cases, or if it decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). "To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to 'show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1376 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). In other words, "[w]here the precise contours of the right remain unclear, state courts enjoy broad discretion in their adjudication of a prisoner's claims." White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 424 (2014) (internal quotations omitted).
The AEDPA requires heightened respect for state factual findings. Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1998). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Davis v. Lafler, 658 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2003); Bailey, 271 F.3d at 656. Thispresumption of correctness is accorded to findings of state appellate courts, as well as the trial court. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546 (1981); Smith v. Jago, 888 F.2d 399, 407 n.4 (6th Cir. 1989).
Petitioner contends that his convictions should be vacated alleging that police unreasonably seized his shoes in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) The United States Supreme Court has clearly articulated that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976). Thus, although the Supreme Court has adopted the exclusionary rule for violations of the Fourth Amendment, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-60 (1961), it is merely a prudential doctrine. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). The Fourth Amendment "says nothing about suppressing evidence" nor does the Amendment require it. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011). To rephrase, "[e]xclusion of evidence under the rule 'is not a personal constitutional right.'" United States v. Moorehead, 912 F.3d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 426 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)).
Here, the trial court held a hearing on Petitioner's motion to suppress the shoes. People v. Taylor, No. 339721 at 3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2019), http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20190205_c339721_54_339721.opn.pdf. Petitioner further challenged the introduction of his shoes on appeal, but the Michigan Court of Appeals determined that discovery of the shoes was inevitable. Id. at 4-5; see also Nix v. Williams,467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). Petitioner had his Fourth Amendment suppression arguments heard by both the state trial and appellate courts. The state courts used reasoned analysis to conclude that Petitioner's shoes were not subject to suppression. Moreover, Petitioner proffers no basis why the state courts failed to provide an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate his claim.
Thus, Petitioner's claim of an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not subject to review in this proceeding. Accordingly, Petitioner's first ground for habeas relief is denied.
Petitioner claims the trial court abused its discretion when it denied a separate trial from his co-defendant, thus depriving Petitioner of due process and a fair trial. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) Petitioner asserts that severance was warranted because "no physical evidence or identification . . . connect[ed] him to the Domino's Pizza robbery." (Id.)
"[A] state trial court's alleged abuse of discretion, without more, is not a constitutional violation." Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442, 459 (6th Cir. 2001). Severance is governed by Michigan state law. See Mich. Ct. R. 6.120, 6.121; Hutchison v. Bell, 303 F.3d 720, 731 (6th Cir. 2002). As a state-law issue, the Court will not grant habeas relief "unless the 'error rises to the level of depriving the defendant of fundamental fairness in the trial process.'" Hutchison, 303 F.3d at 731 (quoting Serra v. Dep't of Corr.,...
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