Taylor v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs.

• Decision Date: 05 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–1571.,14–1571.
• Citation: 870 N.W.2d 262
• Parties: Michael TAYLOR, Petitioner–Appellant, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

870 N.W.2d 262

Michael TAYLOR, Petitioner–Appellant

v.IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 14–1571.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Aug. 5, 2015.

Steven P. DeVolder of The DeVolder Law Firm, Norwalk, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathryn K. Lang and Mary K. Wickman, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

Heard by VOGEL, P.J., and POTTERFIELD and MULLINS, JJ.

Opinion

MULLINS, J.

Michael Taylor appeals from a district court ruling on judicial review affirming the Iowa Department of Human Services's (DHS) classification of a reported incident of child abuse as founded. Taylor contends the district court erred in concluding (1) the agency's findings were supported by substantial evidence and (2) the agency was not acting irrationally, illogically, unjustifiably, and without authority when it placed Taylor on the abuse registry. Giving due deference to the agency, we conclude substantial evidence supports its factual finding that Taylor assaulted the child's mother, C.E. On the child abuse issue, however, we conclude the agency's application of law to the facts was “irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable” when it failed to apply the proper law and administrative rule. We therefore reverse the decision that Taylor should be placed on the registry based on a finding that he committed child abuse by denying critical care and remand to the district court to enter an order reversing and remanding to the agency for further determinations consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUNDS FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.

The following evidence was presented at the administrative hearing on this matter:

C.E. testified she has two children, A.T. and G.T. Their father is Michael Taylor. C.E. and Taylor lived together off-and-on between 2003 and 2012. There was no formal custody order regarding the children or order of child support. C.E. testified that in May 2013, Taylor was not living with her but came over a few times a week to stay with the children while she worked a night shift. Taylor came over at about 4:00 p.m. on May 9. C.E. was in the home with G.T., who was then two-and-a-half years old. A.T. was at C.E.'s mother's house. C.E., Taylor, and G.T. were in the first-floor living room area, adjacent to the kitchen.

C.E. and Taylor started arguing about money. C.E. testified Taylor was raising his voice and getting agitated. She asked him to leave repeatedly, and he refused. C.E. was sitting in a recliner chair. She picked up her cellular telephone from an end table. C.E. testified Taylor took the phone from her hand and threw it away from her, but the record is unclear as to where he threw it or with what force. Then, Taylor pulled C.E. out of the recliner and dragged her toward the entryway of the kitchen. She testified she was on the floor with Taylor behind her, with Taylor holding her so she could not move. He had one arm wrapped around her neck and the other arm pressed tightly against her jaw and mouth. C.E. testified G.T. was standing close by, in front of the doorway to the kitchen and that he started crying and screaming, “Mama and Daddy.” C.E. testified Taylor said to her, “If you make a sound, I will snap your neck.”

C.E. stated Taylor then released her, and she sat back on the recliner. G.T. walked to stand in front of her on the recliner, and she attempted to calm him down by saying, “No, it's okay. We were just playing.” G.T. calmed down and went back to playing with his toys. C.E. testified the attack happened quickly and she did not know where G.T. was when Taylor pulled her out of the recliner but knew he was somewhere in the room. After the incident, A.T. came home from visiting C.E.'s mother. C.E. left the residence with A.T. and went to her mother's home, leaving G.T. in Taylor's care. C.E. testified that after she left the house, Taylor called her repeatedly, about every half hour. She spoke with G.T. a couple times during these calls. C.E.'s mother encouraged her to make a police report. At about 9:00 p.m., C.E. went to the police station and filed a report. However, no charges were filed. The police officer did not identify any physical injuries on C.E. She told the police officer she had a cut on the inside of her mouth, but he did not examine it. After she made her report, a law enforcement officer accompanied C.E. back to the home and asked Taylor to vacate the home.

C.E. testified she went to the courthouse the next day to request a no-contact order but was unable to do so because she arrived too late in the day and the judge was about to leave. She intended to go back the following Monday but testified she was too scared to follow through. She did later obtain a no-contact order in July 2013. The no-contact order did not include the children. In July or August 2013, C.E. filed an action against Taylor for a custody order seeking primary physical care of the children and child support. That action was ongoing at the time of the administrative hearing.

After C.E. made the May 2013 police report, the police department notified DHS that a child was involved, and DHS opened an investigation. A social worker visited the home and interviewed C.E. The worker filed a child abuse report concluding the allegation of child abuse, based on a failure to provide adequate supervision, was founded and listed Taylor as the perpetrator. Taylor told the social worker the incident did not happen but refused to be interviewed for the report.

At the administrative hearing, the social worker testified that children suffer emotional harm when they see domestic violence and that this often remains with them as they get older. She also testified the closer the physical proximity of the child to the incident, the greater the chance of emotional and also physical harm. Further, younger children who are less mobile or unable to protect themselves are more vulnerable to emotional and physical harm. She testified G.T. was too young to protect himself in the situation.

Taylor also testified at the administrative hearing. He testified that at the time of the incident, he was living in the home with C.E. and the children. He stated that on the afternoon of May 9 he and C.E. had a verbal argument. A.T. returned home at that time. C.E. then left to run errands, taking A.T. with her. Taylor testified he remained at home with G.T. for several hours. Then, when C.E. came back three-and-a-half to four hours later, there was a police officer escorting her. He testified the police officer informed him C.E. felt unsafe and wanted him to leave. Taylor said, “That's fine.” He packed a few personal items and left.

Police Detective David Baylock also testified on behalf of Taylor. He testified that it is state law and police department policy that in domestic violence situations, the aggressor is arrested if there is “probable cause.” He defined “probable cause” as “reasonable suspicion that I believe a criminal activity is afoot.” On cross-examination, the officer stated that even in domestic violence cases where no charges are filed, if children are involved, the report is sent to DHS because there may still be child protective issues. He agreed that he was not involved in either the criminal or the child protective aspects of this case.

The administrative law judge (ALJ) found Taylor had assaulted C.E. consistent with her testimony. The ALJ specifically found C.E. was credible, and Taylor was not credible. The ALJ further found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Taylor's conduct constituted child abuse. The ALJ's proposed decision concluded Taylor should be placed on the central child abuse registry due to Taylor having had one prior founded child abuse assessment. Taylor filed for judicial review. The district court found substantial evidence supported the agency's factual conclusions and affirmed the report and Taylor's placement on the child abuse registry. Taylor appeals.

II. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW.

We apply the standards of judicial review set forth in the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, Iowa Code chapter 17A, in our review of the agency's findings concerning child abuse reports. See Iowa Code § 235A.19(3) ; Mauk v. Iowa Dep't Human Servs., 617 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa 2000). We review the district court's decision to see if we reach the same conclusions. Burton v. Hilltop Care Ctr., 813 N.W.2d 250, 255–56 (Iowa 2012).

When the claimed error lies with the agency's findings of fact, we ask whether substantial evidence supports those findings when the record is viewed as a whole. Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 2006). Substantial evidence is defined statutorily as:

the quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.

Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1). Where the evidence is in conflict or where reasonable minds might disagree about the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence, the court must give appropriate deference to the agency's findings. Freeland v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 492 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Iowa 1992). It is the agency's duty as the trier of fact, not the reviewing court, to determine the credibility of witnesses, to weigh the evidence, and to decide the facts in issue. Arndt v. City of LeClaire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394–95 (Iowa 2007).

[C]ourts should broadly and liberally apply those findings to uphold rather than to defeat the agency's decision. Evidence is not insubstantial merely because it would have supported contrary inferences. It is substantial when a reasonable mind could accept it as adequate to reach the same findings. The determining factor is not whether the evidence supports a different finding but whether the evidence supports the finding actually made.

IBP, Inc. v. Al–Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 632 (Iowa 2000) (internal citations omitted). We give significant deference to...