Taylor v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 01 August 1994 |
| Citation | 164 Pa.Cmwlth. 482,643 A.2d 771 |
| Parties | Valerie A. TAYLOR, Robert Taylor and Peggy Taylor v. Monte L. JACKSON, Sharkey Transportation, Chester Ray Watley, Jr., C. Stransky Trucking Company, Action Trailer Rental, Inc., Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania--Pennsylvania State Police, Gerald A. Franz, Joseph J. Questore, Montgomery Wholesale Liquidators, Inc., Montgomery Auction Exchange, Inc. and Shippers Rental Company v. Diane L. KLOPP. Appeal of Monte L. JACKSON, Sharkey Transportation and Shippers Rental Company, Appellants. Valerie A. TAYLOR, Robert Taylor and Peggy Taylor v. Monte L. JACKSON, Sharkey Transportation, Chester Ray Watley, Jr., C. Stransky Trucking Company, Action Trailer Rental, Inc., Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania--Pennsylvania State Police, Gerald A. Franz, Joseph J. Questore, Montgomery Wholesale Liquidators, Inc., Montgomery Auction Exchange, Inc. and Shippers Rental Company v. Diane L. KLOPP. Appeal of Valerie TAYLOR, Robert Taylor and Peggy Taylor, Appellants. Joan D. LINDOW and Myron G. Lindow, Appellants, v. Monte L. JACKSON, Sharkey Transportation, Chester Ray Watley, Jr., C. Stransky Trucking Company, Action Trailer Rental, Inc., Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, Gerald A. Franz, Joseph J. Questore, Montgomery Wholesale Liquidators, Inc., Montgomery Auction Exchange, Inc. v. Diane L. KLOPP and Shippers Rental Company. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Thomas Arthur James, Jr., for appellants Valerie, Robert and Peggy Taylor.
Daniel L. Sullivan, for appellants Joan D. and Myron G. Lindow.
Patricia M. Osterhout, for appellee Diane L. Klopp.
Robert P. Wilkison, for appellees Chester Ray Watley, Jr., C. Stransky Trucking Co. and Action Rental, Inc.
William A. Slotter, Sr. Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee Com. of PA, PA State Police.
Marianne J. Gilmartin, for appellee PA Power & Light Co.
Before COLINS and NEWMAN, JJ., and KELTON, Senior Judge.
In these consolidated actions, Valerie Taylor (Taylor) and her parents, Robert and Peggy Taylor, and Joan D. Lindow and her husband, Myron G. Lindow (Lindows), appeal from orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County (trial court) granting appellees' 1 motions for summary judgment. In a related action, Monte L. Jackson (Jackson), Sharkey Transportation (Sharkey), and Shippers Rental Company (Shippers) appeal from an order of the trial court that granted the motion for summary judgment of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State Police (PSP). We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.
On the evening of July 30, 1988, at approximately 6:15 p.m., Diane L. Klopp (Klopp) was driving her motor vehicle in one of the two westbound lanes of Interstate 80, when she either slowed down or stopped on the roadway due to a sudden, heavy rainstorm. Consequently, Jackson, 2 who was following Klopp in his tractor-trailer, jackknifed his vehicle in an attempt to stop so that he would not collide with her vehicle; this incident occurred at mile post number 227.1 of the highway. As a result, the jackknifed vehicle blocked both westbound lanes of the highway.
Traffic immediately began to accumulate behind the disabled vehicle. Two tractor-trailers, driven by John Barrett (Barrett) and Carol Porter (Porter), respectively, were the first vehicles to queue behind Jackson's jackknifed tractor-trailer. Minutes after the accident, an electric utility line owned by Pennsylvania Power and Light Company (PPL), which had been strung across Interstate Route 80, sagged or fell for unknown reasons. The line came to rest on the ground across the eastbound lanes of traffic At approximately 6:20 p.m. a second motor vehicle accident occurred as vehicles were coming to a stop behind Jackson's tractor-trailer. At mile post number 227.6, one-half mile from the initial accident, the tractor-trailer of Chester Ray Watley, Jr. (Watley) 3, struck the rear of a car operated by Mirita Shroff (Shroff) in the right-hand westbound lane of the highway. After impacting with Shroff's vehicle, Watley's tractor-trailer jackknifed and came to rest against a guard rail at the north side of the right-hand berm.
and on top of Barrett's and Porter's vehicles in the westbound lanes.
At 7:05 p.m., State Police Trooper William Nice arrived to detour traffic at Exit 34 of the highway which was approximately 4.5 miles east of the second accident site. Trooper Nice set up flares across the westbound lanes of the highway and remained at the westbound exit ramp directing traffic until approximately 12:30 a.m. At approximately 7:20 p.m., two PPL employees, Carl Nevious and Bradley Smithgall, were at the scene of the first accident and attempted to remove the electrical wire from the road.
It was about 8:15 p.m. when the Lindows came to a stop near mile post number 228.1, one half mile from the second accident scene. Following the Lindows' vehicle was the vehicle of Gerald A. Franz (Franz) along with his passenger, Taylor. A third motor vehicle accident occurred when Joseph J. Questore (Questore) drove his delivery truck 4 into the rear of the Franz vehicle, propelling it eighty-seven feet. Questore's truck also struck, inter alia, the rear of the Lindows' vehicle. Because of these collisions, Taylor and the Lindows suffered serious injuries.
Taylor commenced a negligence action against, inter alia, appellees and the PSP in Luzerne County. A separate action against the appellees was started by the Lindows in Northumberland County. The Taylor action was later transferred and consolidated with the Lindows action in Northumberland County. After extensive discovery, appellees along with the PSP filed motions for summary judgment in both cases. After briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted the motions for summary judgment of appellees and the PSP.
Taylor and the Lindows filed appeals from the trial court's orders with the Superior Court. 5 Jackson, Sharkey and Shippers filed an appeal from the trial court's order with our court, and contended that the PSP should not be considered immune from suit. 6 A petition to transfer the Superior Court appeals to our court was granted by per curiam order of that court on September 24, 1993. Thus, the present consolidated appeals.
Taylor and the Lindows raise the same issues, namely: 1) whether the trial court erred in concluding that the passage of two hours between the initial accident and the injuries suffered by Taylor and the Lindows rendered any negligent conduct on the part of appellees not continuous and not active; and 2) whether the trial court erred in concluding that Questore's conduct was a superseding and intervening cause of the injuries suffered by Taylor and the Lindows.
Jackson, Sharkey and Shippers raise the following issue: whether the trial court erred in concluding that sovereign immunity barred suit against the PSP.
Our scope of review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is limited to
determining whether the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Salerno v. LaBarr, 159 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 99, 632 A.2d 1002 (1993). Summary judgment should only be granted in a clear case, and the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no material issue of fact remains. Id. The record must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
Taylor and the Lindows contend that the trial court improperly invaded the province of the jury in determining that the conduct of the various appellees was not a substantial factor in causing their injuries, and in holding that Questore's conduct was "highly extraordinary" such that it formed a superseding and intervening cause of their damages.
With respect to the first issue, the relevant law on the issue is not disputed. In trying to recover for an action in negligence, a party must prove four elements. They are:
1. A duty or obligation recognized by law.
2. A breach of the duty.
3. Causal connection between the actor's breach of the duty and the resulting injury.
4. Actual loss or damage suffered by complainant.
Reilly v. Tiergarten, et al., 430 Pa.Superior Ct. 10, 633 A.2d 208 (1993).
It is beyond question that the mere existence of negligence and the occurrence of injury are insufficient to impose liability upon anyone as there remains to be proved the link of causation. Cuthbert v. City of Philadelphia, 417 Pa. 610, 209 A.2d 261 (1965). Furthermore, our supreme court has stated that "... even when it is established that the defendant breached some duty of care owed the plaintiff, it is incumbent on a plaintiff to establish a causal connection between defendant's conduct, and it must be shown to have been the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury." Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 264, 392 A.2d 1280, 1284 (1978).
In determining whether a party's negligence was the proximate or legal cause of another's injury, we have adopted the "substantial factor" test. This test, set forth in Section 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, provides that:
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and
(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 431 (1965); See Henry v. McCrudden, 133 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 231, 575 A.2d 666, petition for allowance of appeal denied, 526 Pa. 651, 585 A.2d 470 (1990).
Section 433 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets...
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