Taylor v. Local No. 7, Inter. U. of Journeymen Horseshoers
| Decision Date | 16 October 1963 |
| Docket Number | 14524.,Civ. A. No. 14426 |
| Citation | 222 F. Supp. 812 |
| Parties | A. Irwin TAYLOR et al., Plaintiffs, v. LOCAL NO. 7, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF JOURNEYMEN HORSESHOERS OF the UNITED STATES AND CANADA (AFL-CIO), et al., Defendants. A. Irwin TAYLOR et al., Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF JOURNEYMEN HORSESHOERS OF the UNITED STATES AND CANADA (AFL-CIO), Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
H. Raymond Cluster, Cook & Cluster, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiffs.
Jacob J. Edelman, Marshall A. Levin, Bernard W. Rubenstein, Baltimore, Md., Robert C. Mayer, Associate Gen. Counsel, AFL-CIO, for defendants.
In Civil No. 14426, plaintiffs, a group of horse trainers and owners, some of whom are citizens of the Dominion of Canada, sue, inter alia, to enjoin defendants, all of whom are horseshoers at thoroughbred flat race tracks in Maryland and elsewhere, and the local of the union of which defendants are members, and its officers, from engaging in price-fixing and from refusing to shoe certain plaintiffs' horses unless the plaintiffs agreed to use exclusively union horseshoers wherever available when they race their horses in the United States and the Dominion of Canada. Plaintiffs allege that such actions are in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 and 2, and are instituted pursuant to §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15 and 26. Coupled with their claim for injunctive relief, plaintiffs pray, also, for declaratory judgments and money damages. In Civil No. 14524 the International Union with which Local No. 7, one of the defendants in Civil No. 14426, is affiliated, is also sued for the same reasons. The cases were consolidated. A preliminary hearing on plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order was held, at which affidavits and testimony were presented. At the conclusion of the hearing, defendants agreed to discontinue their boycott of the plaintiffs pending final adjudication of the case, and no order was entered. The matter was then set for hearing on permanent injunction, evidence taken, and the case briefed, argued and submitted.
The evidence fairly showed that plaintiffs were trainers, and some were owners, of thoroughbred race horses, and that they race their horses at Pimlico, Bowie, and Laurel flat tracks in Maryland, and elsewhere, including other states and the Dominion of Canada. The individual defendants were all horseshoers and were licensed to perform, and did perform, horseshoeing services at the Maryland tracks and elsewhere. In order to perform horseshoeing services at a Maryland race track, a person must be the holder of a farrier's license issued by the Maryland Racing Commission. In order to obtain such a license for a flat track (but not a harness racing track), other than by a grandfather grant, the applicant must successfully pass an examination testing his skill of performance administered by persons, all of whom are members of defendant, Local No. 7. All farriers at Maryland flat tracks are members of defendant, Local No. 7.
The individual defendants, acting individually and as officers of defendant, Local No. 7, and Local No. 7, fix minimum prices for the performance of horseshoeing services at Maryland flat tracks. A trainer or owner cannot have his horses shod at a price less than this minimum. Failure to charge the minimum price by a member of Local No. 7 would subject the member to disciplinary action and possible expulsion from the union.
Plaintiffs, A. Irwin Taylor, Carl F. Chapman and William F. Edmiston (hereafter called "Canadian plaintiffs") are all residents of the Dominion of Canada and regularly race horses at various race tracks in Canada and the United States. The Canadian plaintiffs have been requested in Canada, where not all race track farriers are union members, to enter into agreements to employ only farriers who are union members in Canada and elsewhere where they race. The request has been made by persons who are members and representatives of Local No. 20, an affiliate of defendant, International Union of Journeymen Horseshoers of the United States and Canada (AFL-CIO) and a sister local to defendant, Local No. 7. The Canadian plaintiffs have refused to enter into such an agreement. Local No. 20 thereupon requested Local No. 7 to withhold services to the Canadian plaintiffs when the latter raced horses at tracks within the geographical jurisdiction of Local No. 7. After consideration, Local No. 7 acceded to the request and, beginning with the Maryland racing season in the fall of 1962, and continuing until the voluntary lifting of the boycott in this case, the Canadian plaintiffs, except Carl F. Chapman, could not obtain horseshoeing services at Maryland race tracks, except by arranging to have their horses trained and run, at least nominally, under the name of another trainer, against whom Local No. 7 was not conducting a boycott. Mr. Chapman, after initially being refused horseshoeing services, signed the requested agreement, and one of the members of Local No. 7 resumed shoeing Mr. Chapman's horses.
There is little question but that the activities of the defendants, both in price fixing and in conducting a boycott, violate the federal antitrust laws unless the defendants' activities are otherwise exempt.1 Price-fixing has long been held to be per se an unreasonable restraint of trade and, therefore, a violation of the Sherman Act, United States v. McKesson & Robbins, 351 U.S. 305, 76 S.Ct. 937, 100 L.Ed. 1209 (1956); United States v. National Assoc. of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 70 S.Ct. 711, 94 L.Ed. 1007 (1950); and United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940). Similarly, a refusal to deal and group boycotts violate the Sherman Act, Los Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 83 S.Ct. 162, 9 L.Ed.2d 150 (1962); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 79 S.Ct. 705, 3 L.Ed.2d 741 (1959); Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 514, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958); Columbia River Co. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 62 S.Ct. 520, 86 L.Ed. 750 (1942).
Defendants contend that such egregious conduct on their part is exempt from federal antitrust prohibitions. They point to § 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 17, which states:
and § 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 52, which limits the granting of injunctive relief.2 Additionally, defendants invoke the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq., which removed from courts of the United States juristo issue restraining orders or temporary or permanent injunctions in cases involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except under certain prescribed conditions. Specifically removed from jurisdiction are the acts set forth in § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S. C.A. § 104, as follows:
Since the decision in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 61 S.Ct. 463, 85 L.Ed. 788 (1941), the law has been settled that the provisions of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act must be considered together in determining the scope of the exemption of union activities from antitrust prohibitions, with the result that activities with regard to which the Norris-LaGuardia Act removes jurisdiction to enjoin are rendered substantively valid under the Sherman Act. To the same effect, see Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 65 S.Ct. 1545, 89 L.Ed. 1954 (1945); Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, 325 U.S. 797, 65 S.Ct. 1533, 89 L.Ed. 1939 (1945); and Columbia River Co. v. Hinton, supra. See also, Los Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers v. United States, supra.
But the validating effect of the Norris-LaGuardia Act has limits also. Where a union and its members combine with non-labor groups to monopolize a market and to fix prices of a product, such conduct has been held to violate the antitrust laws, United States v. Employing Plasterers Assn., 347 U.S. 186, 74 S.Ct. 452, 98 L.Ed. 618 (1954); United States v. Women's Sportswear Assn., 336 U.S. 460, 69 S.Ct. 714, 93 L.Ed. 805 (1949); and Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, supra, and where the activity complained of was, in fact, that of individual businessmen fixing the price of a product, even though denominated that of a union, the antitrust exemption has been held not available to them, Los Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers v. United States, supra; Columbia River Co. v. Hinton, supra. See also, American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 63 S.Ct. 326, 87 L.Ed. 434 (1943).
The basic test to determine whether the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts validate any given activity otherwise condemned by the Sherman Act stems from the language of § 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 52, and §§ 4 and 7 of the...
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Taylor v. Local No. 7, Inter. U. of Journeymen Horseshoers, 9310.
...no single factor is controlling and the totality of the circumstances must be considered." (Emphasis supplied.) In its opinion (222 F.Supp. 812, at 817-818), the District Court, in considering evidence of the present day relationship between farriers and trainers, deemed it helpful to refer......