Taylor v. Lock, Moore & Co., Limited

• Decision Date: 11 July 1927
• Docket Number: 28580
• Citation: 114 So. 163,164 La. 577
• Parties: TAYLOR v. LOCK, MOORE & CO., Limited. In re LOCK, MOORE & CO., Limited
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

114 So. 163

164 La. 577

TAYLOR v. LOCK, MOORE & CO., Limited.

In re LOCK, MOORE & CO., Limited

No. 28580

Supreme Court of Louisiana

July 11, 1927

Rehearing Denied October 4, 1927

Judgment amended, and, as amended, affirmed.

C. E Hardin, of Leesville, for applicant.

Cline &amp Plauche and Griffin T. Hawkins, all of Lake Charles, for respondent.

THOMPSON, J. O'NIELL, C. J.

OPINION

THOMPSON, J.

Ike Taylor, a resident of Calcasieu parish and an employee of Lock, Moore & Co., domiciled in same parish, was injured while in the course of his employment to such an extent as to render him permanently disabled to do any work whatever.

His compensation at the time was $ 24 per week. After the injury he was paid compensation at the rate of $ 12.68 per week from September 8, 1924, to April 8, 1925. At about the last-mentioned date an adjuster for the insurance company got the plaintiff to agree to a lump sum settlement of $ 469.16 covering an additional period to that for which compensation had already been paid of 37 weeks at the same rate of $ 12.68 per week.

This agreement was presented to the judge of a district court other than the domicile of the employer and employee, by joint petition of the employer and employee, and was approved by the said judge on April 27, 1925. Accordingly the defendant company paid the amount fixed in the said agreement.

Thereafter, on June 5, 1926, the plaintiff brought suit in the district court of the parish of Calcasieu, the domicile of both himself and of the defendant, to recover $ 12,480 payable in a lump sum and being double the amount of the compensation due him on account of the injuries received by him, less the amount he had received.

In the petition it is alleged that the plaintiff is an illiterate negro, unable to read or write, and that he was induced to agree to the lump sum settlement by the false and fraudulent representations of the agent of the insurance company; that at the time of the execution of said agreement he was suffering a total permanent disability, which fact was well known to the defendant company.

It is further alleged that the lump sum settlement was made in violation of the provisions of Act 20 of 1914 and amendments thereto; that the said lump sum settlement was made at a greater discount than 8 per cent. in violation of the provisions of paragraph 8, section 8, of the act before referred to.

The defendant excepted to the jurisdiction of the court of Calcasieu on the theory that the present suit was an action to annul the judgment of another court and had to be brought before the court that rendered the said judgment.

The exception was overruled, and defendant answered, setting up various defenses not necessary to mention at this time.

On a trial there was judgment in favor of plaintiff for double the amount of the compensation he would have been entitled to, had not the lump sum settlement been made, subject to deductions for the amount the company had paid.

The judgment so rendered was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.

There appears to be no dispute as to the fact of injury and the extent of the injury and it seems to be conceded that, but for the lump sum settlement, the plaintiff would have been entitled to receive $ 15.60 per week for 400 weeks. Under the payments made and the lump sum settlement the plaintiff only received compensation for 72 weeks at $ 12.68 per week.

We are called upon to consider only two questions: (1) Did the court of Calcasieu have jurisdiction; and (2) is the plaintiff entitled to receive the double compensation.

It is the contention of the defendant that the court which approved the agreement for the lump sum amount of compensation had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, that is to say, jurisdiction ratione materiae, and that the parties had the right to waive jurisdiction ratione personae; which they did by the joint petition presented to the court. Hence, the agreement being merged into a judgment, the only court competent to annul that judgment was the court which rendered it.

All of which would be true, were this an action to annul the judgment.

It is provided in paragraph 8, § 8, of Employers' Liability Act, as amended by Act 216 of 1924, that a lump sum settlement may be made by agreement of the parties, if approved by the court as solely and clearly in the interest of the employee or his dependents, provided that in making such lump sum settlement the payments due to the employee shall not be discounted at a rate greater than 8 per cent. per annum.

If the settlement does not exceed a greater discount than 8 per cent. per annum, then such settlement approved by the court is binding, and the employer is discharged from further payments.

On the other hand, however, if a greater discount has been made than the statute allows, then the lump sum agreement is not binding on the employee, and such employee is expressly authorized at any time within five years to demand and receive in a lump sum from the employer such additional payment as together with the amount already paid will...