Department of Industrial Relations v. Travelers' Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 September 1933
• Docket Number: 9400.
• Citation: 170 S.E. 883,177 Ga. 669
• Parties: DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO. et al. [*] TRAVELERS' INS. CO. et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

170 S.E. 883

177 Ga. 669

DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO. et al. ^[*]

TRAVELERS' INS. CO. et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS.

No. 9400.

Supreme Court of Georgia

September 14, 1933

Syllabus by the Court.

On appeal from compensation award payable weekly during disability, superior court could not render lump-sum judgment in final settlement of claim, pursuant to agreement of insurance carrier and claimant not approved by industrial relations department (Laws 1920, pp. 175, 178, 199, §§ 7, 19 59; Laws 1931, p. 42, § 101 et seq.; Civ. Code 1910, §§ 4849, 5964, 6510-6516).

Where superior court, on appeal from compensation award payable weekly, rendered lump-sum judgment, industrial relations department had no authority to intervene in superior court and ask to be made party and pray that judgment be set aside (Laws 1920, p. 167, as amended; Laws 1931, pp. 1, 42).

1. Where the department of industrial relations of Georgia formerly the industrial commission, on hearing a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, made an award in favor of the claimant for compensation payable in a certain amount weekly during disability, the judge of the superior court, in considering the case on appeal from the award of the department of industrial relations, had no authority or jurisdiction to render a judgment against the insurance carrier and in favor of the claimant for a lump sum, in full and final settlement of the claim, in pursuance of an agreement of the insurance carrier and the claimant not approved by the department of industrial relations.

2. The department of industrial relations had no authority to intervene in the superior court and "ask that it be made a party in the cause, and to pray that the judgment awarding a lump sum to the claimant be reopened and set aside."

Certified Questions from Court of Appeals.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by a claimant opposed by the Travelers' Insurance Company and another. On appeal to the superior court from an award of the Department of Industrial Relations in favor of claimant, the superior court rendered a judgment against the insurance carrier in favor of claimant for a lump sum, whereupon the Department of Industrial Relations intervened and asked that it be made a party in the cause and prayed that the judgment awarding a lump sum to claimant be reopened and set aside. To review the judgment of the superior court, the Department of Industrial Relations brings error, and the Travelers' Insurance Company and another bring a cross-bill of exceptions, to the Court of Appeals, which certifies questions.

Questions answered.

RUSSELL C.J., dissenting, and GILBERT, J., dissenting in part.

James C. Davis, of Atlanta, M. J. Yeomans, Atty. Gen., and B. D. Murphy and Jno. T. Goree, Asst. Attys. Gen., Harold Hirsch & Marion Smith, of Atlanta (for parties at interest, not parties to record), for plaintiff in error.

McDaniel, Neely & Marshall and Harry L. Greene, all of Atlanta, and Jas. C. Graham, of Thomaston, for defendants in error.

The first question propounded by the Court of Appeals might suggest a number of subordinate questions, and among other matters discussed in the briefs of counsel are (1) the jurisdiction of the superior court, and (2) the right of the parties to enter into a binding and enforceable agreement without authority from the department of industrial relations. Properly construed, however, the question relates only to the authority or jurisdiction of the superior court to render a certain judgment under stated circumstances, and our answer will be limited accordingly.

While the superior courts are commonly referred to as courts of general jurisdiction, they have only such jurisdiction and powers as are conferred by the Constitution and laws of this state. Tucker v. Harris, 13 Ga. 1 (6), 58 Am.Dec. 488; Perkins v. Perkins, 21 Ga. 13; Civ. Code 1910, 4849. The constitutional provisions relating to the jurisdiction of such courts are found in the Civil Code, §§ 6510-6516. The provision contained in section 6512, that "said courts shall have jurisdiction in all civil cases, except as hereinafter provided," clearly relates to original jurisdiction, since the very next provision is that "they shall have appellate jurisdiction in all such cases as may be provided by law." Civ. Code 1910, § 6513. It appears that the present case did not originate in the superior court, but reached that court on appeal, and the question therefore pertains only to appellate jurisdiction. The constitutional provision as to such appellate jurisdiction is not self-executing, and such jurisdiction can be exercised only in accordance with enabling acts; that is, only in such manner and to such extent as may be provided by statute. Hendrix v. Mason, 70 Ga. 523 (2); In re Lester, 77 Ga. 143; DeLamar v. Dollar, 128 Ga. 57 (3), 66, 57 S.E. 85.

The jurisdiction of the superior court in cases appealed from the department of industrial relations is not as provided in other laws relating to appeals (Central Georgia Power Co. v. Cornwell, 139 Ga. 1 [3], 76 S.E. 387, Ann.Cas. 1914A, 880; Maryland Casualty Co. v. England, 160 Ga. 810, 129 S.E. 75), but is as defined in section 59 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Ga. L. 1920, pp. 167, 199. That section contains a statement of the grounds upon which the superior court may set aside an order or decree of the "industrial commission," now the department of industrial relations (Ga. L. 1931, pp. 1, 42, § 101 et seq.), after which it is further declared: "No order or decree of the Industrial Commission shall be set aside by the Court upon any grounds other than one or more of the grounds above stated. If not set aside upon one or more of such stated grounds, the Court shall affirm the order, judgment, decree or decision of the Commission so appealed from." According to the question certified by the Court of Appeals, the judge of the superior court undertook in effect to set aside an award of the department of industrial relations and to substitute a different judgment based upon an agreement of the parties, which agreement did not enter into the award from which the appeal to the superior court was taken, but constituted a new element and made a different case. This action by the court was in direct conflict with the provisions of the statute prescribing and limiting the jurisdiction of the superior court in such cases. The facts upon which the superior court was authorized to exercise jurisdiction were those, and only those, contained in the record transmitted to it by the department of industrial relations (Burdett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 40 Ga.App. 92, 149 S.E. 55; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Christian, 35 Ga.App. 326, 133 S.E. 639), and the agreement of settlement as subsequently made by the parties was a new and distinct subject-matter to which such appellate jurisdiction did not attach. Jurisdiction of the subject-matter cannot be conferred by consent. Civ. Code 1910, § 5964. Furthermore, it is the general rule that the superior court as an appellate court has no greater or broader powers in reference to the subject-matter than the court or tribunal from which the appeal was taken. Maloy v. Maloy, 134 Ga. 432 (2), 68 S.E. 80; Mulherin v. Kennedy, 120 Ga. 1080 (6), 48 S.E. 437; Stansell v. Massey, 92 Ga. 436, 17 S.E. 821. The department of industrial relations has no power or jurisdiction to approve a settlement so as to preclude an opening of the case upon a change of condition (Globe Indemnity Co. v. Lankford, 35 Ga.App. 599, 134 S.E. 357), and under the general rule to which we have just adverted, the superior court, on appeal, would be limited in like manner.

Section 7 of the Compensation Act provides, "That no contract or agreement, written or implied, no rule, regulation or other device, shall in any manner operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by this Act, except as herein otherwise expressly provided." Section 19 declares that no agreement of settlement shall be binding unless approved by the commission; but the commission itself is not clothed with authority to render judgments on contracts, and is therefore without power to foreclose the rights of the employee upon any terms other than those prescribed in the act (see sections 43, 44, 45). We conclude that the superior court had no authority on appeal to render a judgment for a lump sum in full and final settlement of the claim, in pursuance of the agreement of the parties not approved by the department of industrial relations.

Similar views have been expressed by courts of other jurisdictions. In Industrial Commission v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 66 Colo. 575, 185 P. 344, the facts were identical with those of the case at bar, being stated by the court as follows: "Ray Brown was awarded compensation for an injury, on a hearing before the Industrial Commission. The case was taken by the Guarantee Company to the district court, and, while pending there, Brown and the said company entered into a stipulation for a settlement of Brown's claim for a sum less than that awarded him by the commission. Upon the filing of this stipulation in the district court objection was made by the commission to any order being entered thereon, it being insisted that the court could give judgment only after a hearing and under the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Judgment was, however, entered on the stipulation, and the commission brings the cause here for review." It was urged by the commission that the powers of the district court were limited to those named in the statute, and upon this question the court said: "We have several times held that the findings of the...