Taylor v. Maughan
| Decision Date | 14 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 29911-2-III,29911-2-III |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | SANDRA TAYLOR, Appellant, v. DR. BRENT MAUGHAN and DEACONESS HOSPITAL, Respondents. |
Kulik, J. — Sandra Taylor suffered a sustained illness after Dr. Brent Maughan delivered Ms. Taylor's child in February 2008. In August 2010, Ms. Taylor sued Dr. Maughan and Deaconess Hospital for medical negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Maughan and Deaconess, finding that Ms. Taylor failed to present expert testimony to support her prima facie case. Ms. Taylor appeals. Because Ms. Taylor failed to meet her burden to defeat summary judgment, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
On February 27, 2008, Dr. Brent Maughan delivered Ms. Taylor's child by cesarean section at Deaconess Hospital. Ms. Taylor was discharged in good condition with no complications.
For five months after the delivery, Ms. Taylor suffered from an undiagnosed and untreated uterine infection. She contends that she repeatedly called Dr. Maughan's office for assistance and that Dr. Maughan and his staff dismissed her. Dr. Maughan and Ms. Taylor ended their doctor-patient relationship on August 18.
Ms. Taylor obtained counsel by September 23 and contacted Dr. Maughan and Deaconess. She alleged that Dr. Maughan breached his standard of care under RCW 7.70.030 () and that Deaconess negligently supervised Dr. Maughan. Upon Deaconess's request, Ms. Taylor provided Deaconess with the facts surrounding the negligent supervision claim. On October 29, 2008, Deaconess asked for a certificate of merit from a qualified expert to substantiate the claim.1 There is no evidence that Ms. Taylor produced the certificateof
merit or corresponded with either party after that date.
Almost two years later, on August 13, 2010, Ms. Taylor filed suit against Dr. Maughan and Deaconess. In her complaint, Ms. Taylor alleged that Dr. Maughan committed medical negligence by failing to exhibit the standard of care required of a reasonably prudent medical provider under RCW 7.70.030(1) and RCW 7.70.040. She also alleged that Deaconess committed corporate negligence by failing to supervise Dr. Maughan. Because Dr. Maughan and Deaconess pursued their cases individually, the procedural history relating to Dr. Maughan and Deaconess differs. Thus, the procedural history of each will be addressed separately.
Dr. Maughan. Ms. Taylor served Dr. Maughan on November 18. On December 16, Ms. Taylor contacted an expert. The expert reviewed Dr. Maughan's records in January. The expert shifted his belief from an insufficient standard of care to a failure of Dr. Maughan's staff to inform Dr. Maughan of the infection.
Dr. Maughan filed for summary judgment on January 28, 2011, and scheduled a hearing for March 11. On February 23, Ms. Taylor responded to the summary judgmentmotion with her own declaration and declarations from her ex-husband and sister as evidence that Dr. Maughan's treatment fell below the standard of care. She contended that expert testimony was not necessary to defeat summary judgment under the facts of her case. In the alternative, Ms. Taylor requested a continuance of the summary judgment hearing under CR 56(f) to review the extensive medical records. Ms. Taylor contended that Dr. Maughan's request for summary judgment was prematurely rushing her through the discovery process.
A few days before the hearing, Ms. Taylor supplemented her request for a continuance. She noted that an expert was currently reviewing the file to determine if Dr. Maughan's treatment fell below the applicable standard of care. Ms. Taylor also filed the declaration of nursing liability expert Natalie Mohammed RN and the declaration of corporate liability expert Brian Heller PhD.
The trial court heard Ms. Taylor's motion for a continuance and Dr. Maughan's motion for summary judgment on March 11. Ms. Taylor stated that she was still in the process of exploring expert opinion regarding Dr. Maughan's treatment. However, Ms. Taylor also acknowledged that she was unsure she would be able to find a physician who was willing and able to render the necessary testimony to support a prima facie claim. Both the trial court and Ms. Taylor agreed that the declaration of the nurse and thecorporate liability expert addressed the liability of Deaconess, and that the nurse was not competent to critique the standard of care of a doctor.
The trial court denied Ms. Taylor's motion for a continuance. The court found that Ms. Taylor did not identify a good reason for the delay in obtaining an expert witness evaluation of Dr. Maughan's standard of care and that Ms. Taylor did not establish that further discovery would produce the specific evidence needed to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
The trial court also granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Maughan. The trial court found that Ms. Taylor failed to present expert testimony of a competent doctor of obstetrics/gynecology to define the applicable standard of care relative to Dr. Maughan.
Ms. Taylor filed a motion for reconsideration of both decisions. She admitted that dismissal on the negligent standard of care claim was appropriate, but also contended that the expert opinion of Ms. Mohammed and Mr. Heller raised a genuine issue of material fact that Dr. Maughan failed to supervise his staff. She requested that the court clarify the order granting summary judgment to acknowledge that her case could proceed against Dr. Maughan for failing to supervise his staff and to allow time for investigation. Even though her complaint against Dr. Maughan did not allege failure to supervise, she contended that the claim should be allowed under the liberal pleading rules or,alternatively, the court should allow her to amend her complaint until the court-imposed cutoff date of May 23.
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, without oral argument, on April 14. The court determined that there was insufficient cause shown in the briefing to alter the court's decision.
Deaconess. On November 29, over three months after Ms. Taylor filed her lawsuit, Deaconess requested summary judgment. Deaconess contended that Ms. Taylor did not establish a prima facie case of medical or corporate negligence. In response, on January 3, 2011, Ms. Taylor requested additional time under CR 56(f) in order to procure expert declarations. Ms. Taylor did not serve a discovery request on Deaconess until January 4. She served two more requests around January 14 and January 18.
At the summary judgment hearing on January 21, the trial court was troubled by Ms. Taylor's failure to prioritize discovery in light of the potentially fatal summary judgment request by Deaconess. The trial court was concerned that Ms. Taylor waited five months to request the identity of individuals with information and that Ms. Taylor failed to give a good reason for her delayed response to the summary judgment motion. The trial court stated that if it was to review the motion on the merits, the motion would likely be granted. However, due to problems that arose with the sequencing of thehearing, the trial court continued the summary judgment hearing for one month to give each party the opportunity to address the motion on the merits. The trial court set the next hearing for February 25 and stated it would be making a decision on the merits of the motion. The trial court also ordered Deaconess to provide answers to the interrogatories by February 17 and stated that it would address discovery issues at the February 25 hearing, if needed.
Ms. Taylor filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that the trial court's order was inconsistent with its oral ruling. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.
Deaconess served its answers on February 17. Two days prior to the February 25 hearing, Ms. Taylor requested another CR 56(f) continuance because her expert had not provided a declaration and because Deaconess offered insufficient answers to the interrogatories.
On February 25, the trial court rejected Ms. Taylor's motion for a continuance because she failed to provide evidence that she contacted an expert, despite having knowledge that the declaration would be needed by the date of the hearing. Additionally, the trial court declined to continue the summary judgment hearing for potential discovery violations because Ms. Taylor failed to file a motion to compel discovery of theinterrogatories. Ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Deaconess.
As previously mentioned, Ms. Taylor filed the declarations of Ms. Mohammed and Mr. Heller on March 7. Both experts concluded that Deaconess failed to meet the standard of care required of a hospital.
On March 15, Ms. Taylor moved for reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment in favor of Deaconess. She asked the court to reconsider its decision on the presentment order. On April 14, the trial court denied Ms. Taylor's motion for reconsideration, without oral argument.
Motion to Amend the Complaint Against Both Parties. On April 29, Ms. Taylor filed a motion to amend her complaint. The amended complaint asserted a corporate negligence claim against Dr. Maughan for failure to supervise. She also restated her claim against Deaconess. Ms. Taylor contended that Dr. Maughan and Deaconess had notice of the factual basis of the claims and that she should be able to amend her complaint to conform to the evidence given by the experts.
The trial court denied Ms. Taylor's motion, finding (1) that the order denying Ms. Taylor's motion for reconsideration on April 14 dismissed the causes of action against Dr. Maughan and Deaconess, (2) that the requested amendments to the complaint wereaddressed through the order on reconsideration, and (3) that no basis could be established through a court rule that would allow Ms....
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