Taylor v. Miriam's Promise
| Decision Date | 07 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | M2020-01509-COA-R3-CV |
| Parties | MCKAYLA TAYLOR v. MIRIAM'S PROMISE, ET AL. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Session November 3, 2021
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Putnam County No. 2017 - CV - 123 Ronald Thurman, Chancellor
This appeal involves an award of attorney fees after a remand from this Court. The appellant argues that the statute authorizing such fees is inapplicable by its terms and also unconstitutional as a violation of her right to access the courts. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.
Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed and Remanded
Connie Reguli, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellant, McKayla Taylor.
Cynthia A. Wilson, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellees Cookeville Regional Medical Center and Kellye Ann Reid.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor General; and Mary Elizabeth McCullohs, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Carma Dennis McGee, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Frank G. Clement, Jr., P.J., M.S., and W. Neal McBrayer, J., joined.
Plaintiff McKayla Taylor filed this lawsuit against twelve defendants involved with the adoption of her child. According to the complaint, Ms. Taylor changed her mind about the adoption shortly after the birth of her child, and the child was ultimately returned to her. However, Ms. Taylor filed this action seeking up to $50 million in damages and asserting numerous causes of action, including conspiracy to commit a fraud, tortious civil kidnapping, negligence, professional negligence, and conspiracy to commit conversion of a person.
This appeal only involves two of the twelve defendants - Kellye Reid and Cookeville Regional Medical Center ("CRMC"). The complaint alleged that Kellye Reid was a licensed social worker employed by CRMC who had Mother execute legal documents while under the influence of medication and falsely led Mother to believe that she could change her mind regarding the care and control of the child after executing the documents. The complaint alleged that the actions of Ms. Reid fell below the standard of care for a licensed social worker and were the proximate cause of injury to Ms. Taylor. It alleged that CRMC was vicariously liable for Ms. Reid's actions.[1]
All of the defendants filed motions to dismiss, asserting numerous alternative grounds for dismissal. The trial court entered a single order granting the motions of all defendants. The trial court explained that the "predicate of all the claims against all the Defendants" was that the adoption process used in this case was illegal under Tennessee law, but based on its review of Tennessee law, the trial court concluded "that is not the case." Accordingly, the trial court found that this was a basis for dismissal of the entire suit, and all of the claims against the defendants failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). However, the trial court also made alternative rulings as to some specific claims and defendants. With respect to defendant Kellye Reid and other social workers, the trial court found that "these individually-named Defendants were not provided with pre-suit notice" in accordance with the Health Care Liability Act. Because Ms. Taylor was unable to benefit from the 120-day extension under the Act, her claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The court also found that Ms. Taylor failed to strictly comply with the certificate of good faith requirement. The court alternatively dismissed the intentional tort claims against CRMC as barred by the Governmental Tort Liability Act. It also found that the claims for conversion of a child and tortious civil kidnapping were not recognized under Tennessee law, and the fraud claims were not pled with specificity.
Ms. Taylor appealed the trial court's order of dismissal to this Court. On appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal of all claims on various grounds. See Taylor v. Miriam's Promise, No. M2017-01908-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 410700 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019). Ms. Taylor then filed an application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied Ms. Taylor's application for permission to appeal but designated the opinion of the Court of Appeals as "Not for Citation" in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 4 § E.[2]
Upon remand to the trial court, Ms. Reid filed a motion for an award of attorney fees as the prevailing party pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-113 of the Governmental Tort Liability Act, which provides, in relevant part:
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-113. Ms. Reid asserted that she was employed by a private act hospital, was sued in her individual capacity, and prevailed within the meaning of the statute because all claims against her were dismissed, with that ruling being upheld on appeal. Thus, Ms. Reid asserted that "all of the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-113 have been satisfied," and she was entitled to an award of her attorney fees. She submitted an affidavit and declarations in support of her motion.
Ms. Taylor filed a response to the motion for attorney fees and challenged Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-113 as unconstitutional. Specifically, she argued that the statute violated her rights to equal protection and "access to the Courts." Ms. Taylor argued that the "[e]qual protection analysis requires strict scrutiny when the classification interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right," and rational basis review when it does not. She argued that the statute at issue could not meet either test. As for her claim regarding the right of access to the courts, Ms. Taylor asserted that "[t]he [United States] Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right of access to the courts, whereby a plaintiff with a nonfrivolous legal claim has the right to bring that claim to a court of law." She quoted Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir. 1997), which states that "the right of access to the courts finds support in several provisions of the Constitution including: the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV." (internal citations omitted). Ms. Taylor asserted that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-113 "interfere[s] with the constitutionally protected right to access to the courts." She argued that the statute was "unconstitutional as written" and alternatively "unconstitutional as applied." She claimed that her case "was truncated in the judicial process by the Supreme Court denying the Rule 11 application for review but categorizing the Court of Appeals opinion as 'Not for Publication.'" Ms. Taylor insisted that she had demonstrated in her application for permission to appeal that the Court of Appeals opinion was contrary to the law, but the Tennessee Supreme Court "basically eras[ed] the Plaintiff's litigation from history." As an alternative to her constitutional arguments, Ms. Taylor argued that Ms. Reid failed to meet the statutory requirement of showing that she had "incurred" attorney fees, and therefore, the statute was inapplicable by its terms.
The State of Tennessee, through the office of the Attorney General and Reporter, filed a motion to intervene in order to defend the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-113. The trial court granted the motion, and the State filed a memorandum in support of the constitutionality of the statute.[3] With respect to the equal protection challenge, the State asserted that strict scrutiny was inappropriate because the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that "[w]...
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