Taylor v. New York Life Insurance Co.
| Decision Date | 04 January 1929 |
| Docket Number | 27,033 |
| Citation | 222 N.W. 912,176 Minn. 171 |
| Parties | BERTHA E. TAYLOR v. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Hennepin county by the beneficiary of an insurance policy issued by defendant on the life of plaintiff's daughter, Phyllis S. Taylor, to recover the amount payable under a double indemnity clause of the policy. There were findings for the plaintiff, and defendant appealed from an order, Nordbye, J. denying its motion for a new trial. Affirmed.
Meaning of "accidental means" in insurance policy.
A life insurance policy contained a provision for "double indemnity" if death resulted from an injury effected by "accidental means," unless the death resulted from (a) infirmity of body, or (b) the taking of poison, or (c) bacterial infection. A surgeon in preparation for the removal of insured's tonsils administered novocaine which because of her unknown bodily hypersusceptibility to this drug, caused her death.
Held:
1. Death resulted from injury effected by "accidental means;"
2. Death did not result from an infirmity of body;
3. Death did not result from the taking of poison; and
4. Death did not result from bacterial infection.
See note in 13 A.L.R. 660; 39 A.L.R. 81; 14 R.C.L. 1239; 3 R.C.L Supp. 364; 4 R.C.L. Supp. 950; 5 R.C.L. Supp. 804; 6 R.C.L. Supp. 781; R.C.L. Supp. 488.
Doherty, Rumble, Bunn & Butler, for appellant.
C. E. Purdy and O. G. Haugland, for respondent.
Defendant appealed from an order denying its motion for a new trial. Plaintiff's daughter held a $1,000 life insurance policy issued by defendant in which plaintiff was the beneficiary. The insured died. To the extent of $1,000 the policy has been paid. The policy provided for "Double Indemnity" or an additional $1,000 if "the death of the insured resulted directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental means," etc; but under the terms of the policy "Double Indemnity" was not payable if death result "from the taking of poison * * * whether voluntary or otherwise; * * * or, directly or indirectly, from infirmity of mind or body, * * * or from any bacterial infection other than bacterial infection occurring in consequence of accidental and external bodily injury."
The important question in the case is whether the death resulted from injury effected by accidental means. The trial court said that it did.
The insured was a dental nurse. Aside from chronic tonsillitis she was in good health. She submitted to an operation for the removal of her tonsils. The plan was to use a local anaesthetic. Pure novocaine was intentionally used in the usual and proper way for the doing of such intended operation. The insured's body was hypersensitive to the drug novocaine, and her death resulted before the operation was performed. Hypersusceptibility to this particular drug is not the condition of the normal person but is an unusual condition or abnormality which is rarely found. This condition was unknown to the insured and to the surgeon.
1. Had the policy used the words "accidental death" there would be no room for reasonable argument hostile to plaintiff's claim. The difficulty arises in construing the words "accidental means." From a strictly technical point of view the defendant's position finds a logical foundation upon the theory that one may do certain acts the result of which acts may produce unanticipated consequences, and perhaps accidental death, but the means are precisely what he intended. Here the "means" if limited to things designed were not accidental. To follow this theory to its logical conclusion would preclude plaintiff's recovery. There are authorities which support this view. We are not inclined to follow them.
It has been judicially stated that probably from a strictly scientific investigation there is no such thing as an accident. Brintons, Ltd. v. Turvey (1905) A.C. 230, 2 Ann. Cas. 137. It seems to us to be better in the interest of substantial justice to adopt the more practical construction of the language involved and follow its meaning as commonly understood. We think the weight of authority is to the effect that the term "accidental" is equally descriptive of means which produce effects which are not their natural and probable consequences, as it is of means which are wholly unexpected.
"Where the effect is not the natural and probable consequence of the means which produce it -- an effect which does not ordinarily follow and cannot be reasonably anticipated from the use of the means, or an effect which the actor did not intend to produce, and which he cannot be charged with a design of producing -- it is produced by accidental means." 1 C.J. 427, § 73.
In Western C.T. Assn. v. Smith (C.C.A.) 85 F. 401, 405, 40 L.R.A. 653, Judge Sanborn tersely stated the rule which we adopt:
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