Taylor v. Patrick
| Decision Date | 31 October 1808 |
| Citation | 4 Ky. 168 |
| Parties | Taylor v. Patrick. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
The compromise of a doubtful claim is a good consideration to uphold a contract, and it is immaterial on which side the right ultimately turns out-- Cann v. Can, 1 Pr. Wms. 726; Powell Cont. 142.
If the parties were capable of contracting, understood the subject matter of the contract itself, and were willing to contract a Court of Equity will not dissolve the contract, however beneficial to the one party and injurious to the other.
A stipulation procured by one party from the other whilst his mind was incapable of rational volition, either by reason of unsoundness or of illegal and of unjust constraint, ought to be dissolved by a Court of Equity, as wanting the assent of the party, unless ratified and confirmed whilst the mind was sound and free to act.
Motives inducing the one party to make the contract, however unwise or bad, cannot affect the other party, unless he was the unjust instrument of producing them; Osmond v. Fitzroy, 3 Pr. Wms. 130-1, and note (A).
Any act which clearly indicates the assent of the mind to stand to and perform a contract previously entered into, is a confirmation.
When a compromise of two land claims is made, the Court will not investigate the relative merits of the two claims for the purpose of setting the agreement aside.
If the parties to a compromise understand the facts correctly erroneous deductions of law from those facts by a party would not be cause of setting aside a compromise induced by those deductions.
It might be otherwise if the compromise was predicated upon the mistake of a matter of fact, which, when correctly ascertained, admitted of no dispute or contrariety of opinion.
Judge BIBB did not sit in this cause.
THE appellant exhibited his bill in chancery, in the Madison Circuit Court, praying to be relieved against a contract of compromise entered into between himself and the appellee whereby he agreed to relinquish on his part a certain portion of his land to the appellee, in consideration of the appellee engaging to relinquish a part of an entry which was supposed to interfere with the appellant's claim, and which the appellee, in right of himself and wife, derived title to, under Calloway, etc.; and as ground of relief, suggests that his mind was disordered and insane at the time of making the contract; that undue advantage was taken of his situation; that the appellee had deceived him; that the appellee's entry could not legally be established; that if valid it would not cover any of his land; and that it was forfeited because it had not been surveyed in due time.
The compromise of a doubtful right is a good consideration to found a contract on; and it is immaterial on whose side the right ultimately turns out to be, as it must be on one side or the other, because there can be but one good right to the same piece of property. It seems to be proper to inquire whether the compromise in this case has been fairly obtained. To render it legal, the parties should be capable of contracting, willing to contract, and understand the subject matter of the contract itself. With these requisites, it is presumed there can rarely be a case (if any can exist), however injurious on the one side, or beneficial on the other, in which a Court of Equity would be justified in dissolving the solemn obligation of parties.
Nothing is alleged against the appellant's capability of contracting. As to his willingness to contract, it has in no other manner been attacked than by suggesting that his mind was rendered unsound and imbecile by several day's intoxication immediately preceding the contract, and by suggesting a constraint imposed upon him by the appellee. Certain it is, that where the mind is rendered, by any cause whatever, incapable of rational volition, or is illegally and unjustly constrained, so as to prevent free volition, a contracting party cannot be said to have been willing to contract, or to have given his assent to the contract; and any stipulation procured from him in such a situation, ought to be avoided by a Court of competent power, unless it had...
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City of Rawlins v. Jungquist
...213; Morse v. Monroe, 30 Ga. 630; Frick v. Price, 66 N.W. 834; Oglesby v. Attrill, 105 U.S. 605; Comstock v. U.S. 9 Ct. Cl., 141; Taylor v. Patrick, 4 Ky. 168; Adele Prudhommo, 16 La. Ann., 343; Tard v. Tarry, 26 Mo.App. 598.) The evidence does not show certain items only were allowed. The ......