Taylor v. Sharp

• Decision Date: 21 April 1891
• Citation: 13 S.E. 138,108 N.C. 377
• Parties: Taylor v. Sharp.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

13 S.E. 138

108 N.C. 377

Taylor v. Sharp.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

April 21, 1891

Appeal from superior court, Rockingham county; Bynum, Judge.

This was a suit on two notes executed in the state of New York by Thomas Sharp to his wife, Gertrude, and by her indorsed to the plaintiff. She answered that she indorsed the notes for the accommodation and at the solicitation of her husband, and under a kind of matrimonial coercion, and without any consideration whatever to her thereunto moving, and without any benefit to her separate estate thereby arising, and this to the full knowledge of the plaintiff. It was also averred that, when the action was commenced, she was and still is a resident and citizen of the state of North Carolina. The plaintiff replied that the notes were indorsed by her to give credit to her husband, "and she had the legal right to do so under the laws of the state of New York, and she thereby rendered herself and her separate estate as liable as though she was a feme sole." At the trial the plaintiff introduced Laws N.Y. 1884, c. 381, providing that a married woman may contract as if she were a feme sole, except where the contract is made with her husband. No other evidence was offered. Under the direction of the court, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. There was a judgment on the verdict, and Gertrude Sharp appealed.

Under Laws N.Y.1884, c. 381, providing that a married woman may contract as if she were a feme sole except where the contract is made with her husband, she is bound by the indorsement of a note executed by her husband to her order, and by her indorsed for his accommodation.

Mebane & Scott, for appellant.

Haywood & Haywood, for appellee.

Shepherd J.

The single question presented in this appeal is whether the judgment rendered by his honor was authorized by the facts appearing in the record. It is a general principle that all matters bearing upon the execution, the interpretation, and the validity of a contract are to be determined by the law of the place where the contract is made, and, if valid there, it is valid everywhere. Watson v. Orr, 3 Dev. 163; Davis v. Coleman, 7 Ired. 424; Anderson v Doak, 10 Ired. 295; Scudder v. Bank, 91 U.S 406. An exception, however, is maintained by some of the continental jurists as to the capacity of a contracting party, and they generally hold that the incapacity of the domicile attaches to and follows the person wherever he may go. This is not, says Mr. Justice Story, (Confl. Laws, 103 104,) the doctrine of the common law; and Gray, C.J., in Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, after an elaborate...