Taylor v. Shaw and Cannon Co., 860608
| Decision Date | 23 September 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 860608,860608 |
| Citation | 372 S.E.2d 128,236 Va. 15 |
| Parties | Noel C. TAYLOR, Mayor, et al. v. SHAW AND CANNON COMPANY, et al. Record |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
William R. Rakes, W. David Paxton (Gentry, Locke, Rakes & Moore, Roanoke, on briefs), for appellants.
Jack V. Place, T.L. Plunkett, Jr. (Thomas B. Dickenson, Jolly, Place, Fralin & Prillaman, P.C., Plunkett & Logan, Roanoke, on briefs), for appellees.
Present: CARRICO, C.J., and POFF, COMPTON, RUSSELL, THOMAS and WHITING, JJ.
Shaw and Cannon Company, a South Carolina partnership (Shaw), is the owner of a 49.5-acre tract of land in an area of the City of Roanoke zoned "LM-Light Manufacturing." On November 28, 1984, Shaw submitted to the city a preliminary site plan for subdividing the land as a mobile home park. On March 18, 1985, the city's zoning administrator denied Shaw a permit to construct the mobile home park, stating that the proposed use would violate § 36-248 of the city's zoning ordinance.
Shaw then filed a "Request for Interpretation" with the city's board of zoning appeals (the Board). By order dated April 10, 1985, the Board found that § 36-248 "specifically permits mobile home parks in Light Manufacturing districts" and directed the zoning administrator to issue a "proper permit."
On May 9, 1985, Noel C. Taylor, the Mayor of Roanoke, along with the other members of city council and the city manager (collectively, the City), filed a petition for certiorari in the court below seeking reversal of the Board's decision. By final order entered April 9, 1986, the trial court found that the decision of the Board was "clearly right" and affirmed the Board's order. The City has appealed.
In the zoning ordinance, no provision is made for the use of mobile homes per se. Mobile home parks, however, are listed as one of 26 principal uses permitted in C-2 general commercial districts. The principal uses permitted in light manufacturing districts are listed in § 36-248(a):
In the LM light manufacturing district, the following principal uses and structures shall be permitted: Any use permitted in the IDM district and, in addition, any use permitted in the C-2 [district], C-3 [district] and C-4 [district], except residential dwellings.
(Emphasis added.) Also relevant is § 36-251, which prohibits "[d]wellings" as principal uses in light manufacturing districts.
The question for decision is whether mobile home parks, while ostensibly permitted as principal uses in light manufacturing districts through § 36-248(a)'s incorporation of C-2 permitted uses, are in fact excluded by § 36-248(a)'s exclusion of "residential dwellings" and § 36-251's prohibition against "[d]wellings."
The City argues that the language of the zoning provisions in question is unambiguous and that since the term "residential dwellings" is not specifically defined in the zoning ordinance, it must be given its plain and natural meaning. When given this meaning, the City maintains, the term refers to "a place where one or more people live and sleep, as opposed to a structure used for commercial or business purposes."
Clearly included in the plain meaning of the prohibition against "residential dwellings," the City opines, are mobile homes. Indeed, the City points out, § 36-2 of the zoning ordinance defines a mobile home as a "detached residential dwelling unit." 1 The City also points out that the same section defines mobile home parks as "[p]remises ... where spaces or lots are set aside or offered for sale or rent for use by mobile homes for living or sleeping purposes." The City concludes that since mobile homes are residential dwellings and mobile home parks are places designated for the use of mobile homes, § 36-248(a) excludes both mobile homes and mobile home parks from light manufacturing districts.
The Board and Shaw contend that the question whether mobile home parks are permitted in light manufacturing districts cannot be resolved by referring only to § 36-248(a) and the definition of mobile homes in § 36-2. Rather, the argument goes, the entire zoning ordinance must be read in pari materia and effect given to all provisions concerning permitted and prohibited uses in order to understand § 36-248(a) and interpret it properly.
A reading of the entire ordinance, the Board and Shaw say, demonstrates that mobile homes are treated separately from residential dwellings. Accordingly, the argument continues, had it been intended to exclude mobile homes from light manufacturing districts, the exclusion would have been accomplished by separate reference to such homes rather than by the use of the term "residential dwellings" in the exception clause of § 36-248(a).
In an attempt to show that the term "residential dwellings" does not mean what the City claims it means, the Board and Shaw cite numerous other provisions of the zoning ordinance. For example, they cite the definition of a single-family dwelling in § 36-2 as meaning "[a] permanent, detached residential unit, not a mobile home, having a single front entrance and being designed for and occupied by one family only." (Emphasis added.) The Board and Shaw then argue that had § 36-248(a) excepted "single family dwellings," rather than "residential dwellings," it would be clear that mobile homes are not prohibited in light manufacturing districts. 2
Finally, the Board argues that if the terms of the zoning ordinance itself do not indicate that mobile home parks are permitted in light manufacturing districts, then "legislative history and other extrinsic facts" are available to support such a conclusion. The Board does not tell us what the "legislative history and other extrinsic facts" are, but Shaw picks up the argument and cites previous rulings by the city zoning administrator and the city attorney's office interpreting the zoning ordinance as permitting mobile home parks in light manufacturing districts. 3
These arguments of the Board and Shaw are...
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...(construing statutes appearing in Title 46.2 and dealing with insurance requirements for motor vehicles); Taylor v. Shaw & Cannon Co., 236 Va. 15, 19, 372 S.E.2d 128, 131 (1988) (statutes are “read ... in pari materia since they relate to the same subject”). 3. Because we hold today that Ha......
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Wolfe v. Board of Zoning Appeals
...Code § 15.2-2286(A)(4) and § 18-101(1) of the zoning ordinance, "since they relate to the same subject." Taylor v. Shaw & Cannon Co., 236 Va. 15, 19, 372 S.E.2d 128, 131 (1988). When so read, there is imposed upon "any officer" taking action under Code § 15.2-2314 the requirement that the a......
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