Taylor v. Shinseki
| Decision Date | 31 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13–1416 JDB |
| Parties | Melanie Taylor, Plaintiff, v. Eric K. Shinseki, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Dean Gregory, Law Offices of Dean Gregory, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Andrea McBarnette, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Melanie Taylor brings this action against defendants Eric Shinseki, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”), Mary Andrus, a/k/a Mary Charles, and Barbara Nugent. Taylor asserts claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ; under the Rehabilitation Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 701 ; and under various state laws. Pl.'s 3rd Amend. Compl. [ECF No. 22] (“Compl.”) 1. She seeks injunctive and monetary relief for alleged discrimination and retaliation on the basis of her sex, race, disability, and prior protected activity. Id. Defendant Shinseki1 moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, to transfer. Although the Court concludes that venue is proper in the District of Columbia, it will transfer the case to the Western District of Louisiana for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.
Taylor is an African–American female nurse, employed by the VA Medical Center in Alexandria, Louisiana. Compl. ¶ 8. Mary Andrus is Taylor's former coworker, and Barbara Nugent is Taylor's second-level supervisor. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. Taylor alleges that Andrus harassed her in the workplace and physically threatened her. Id. ¶¶ 13–20. As a result, Taylor filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint against Andrus. Id. ¶ 31. After an administrative investigation, Andrus was permanently reassigned, and the EEO office for the VA issued a final decision finding that Taylor proved she had been harassed based on sex. Id. ¶¶ 34–35. As for Nugent, she was apparently the subject of a previous EEO harassment complaint filed by Taylor for unspecified misconduct, and Taylor alleges that Nugent downgraded her performance review in retaliation for her complaint. Id. ¶¶ 38–41. Taylor does not dispute that all of these actions took place in Louisiana. After receiving the EEO decision, she filed this action on September 18, 2013. Defendants Andrus and Nugent have yet to respond to the complaint, while defendant Shinseki has now moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as to Andrus and Nugent and for lack of venue, or to transfer the case.
Federal courts have leeway to “choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.” Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007) (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) ). “[C]ertain nonmerits, nonjurisdictional issues may be addressed preliminarily, because ‘[j]urisdiction is vital only if the court proposes to issue a judgment on the merits.’ ” Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 486 F.3d 1342, 1348 (D.C.Cir. 2007) (quoting Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 431, 127 S.Ct. 1184 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, it is appropriate for this Court to decide defendants' challenge to venue before addressing the challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction. See Shay v. Sight & Sound Sys., Inc., 668 F.Supp.2d 80, 82 (D.D.C.2009) (); Aftab v. Gonzalez, 597 F.Supp.2d 76, 79 (D.D.C.2009) ().
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for improper venue, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Darby v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 231 F.Supp.2d 274, 277 (D.D.C.2002) ; 2215 Fifth St. Assocs. v. U–Haul Int'l, Inc., 148 F.Supp.2d 50, 54 (D.D.C.2001). But the Court need not accept as true inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C.Cir.2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) ). It may consider material outside of the pleadings. Cooper v. Farmers New Century Ins. Co., 593 F.Supp.2d 14, 18 (D.D.C.2008) (); Artis v. Greenspan, 223 F.Supp.2d 149, 152 (D.D.C.2002) () (citing Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n. 4, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91 L.Ed. 1209 (1947) ). “Because it is the plaintiff's obligation to institute the action in a permissible forum, the plaintiff usually bears the burden of establishing that venue is proper.” Williams v. GEICO Corp., 792 F.Supp.2d 58, 62 (D.D.C.2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also15 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3826, at 258 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp.2006) ().
Shinseki argues that Taylor's complaint should be dismissed for improper venue and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Having determined that it is usually appropriate to assess venue before subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court first turns to the propriety of venue in this district.
Venue in Title VII cases is not set by the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, but rather by the venue provision in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3). See Stebbins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 413 F.2d 1100, 1102 (D.C.Cir.1969) (per curiam); accord Quarles v. Gen. Inv. & Dev. Co., 260 F.Supp.2d 1, 8 (D.D.C.2003). Under Title VII, a plaintiff may bring suit: (1) where “the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed,” (2) where “the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered,” or (3) where “the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.” § 2000e–5(f)(3). Only if the defendant is not found within any of these districts can a plaintiff rely on a fourth possible location—“the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office.” Id. This venue statute governs all Title VII claims and supersedes any other venue provision governing actions in federal court. See Stebbins, 413 F.2d at 1102 ; Middlebrooks v. England, No. 05–0556, 2005 WL 3213956, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2005). Shinseki argues that venue is improper in the District of Columbia under any of Title VII's four venue categories, and that this case should therefore be dismissed or transferred to the Western District of Louisiana where venue is proper. See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss or Transfer [ECF No. 27] (“Def.'s Mot.”) 5; Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3).
To determine venue under Title VII, courts apply a “commonsense appraisal” of events having operative significance. See James v. Booz–Allen & Hamilton, 227 F.Supp.2d 16, 20 (D.D.C.2002) (citing Lamont v. Haig, 590 F.2d 1124, 1134 (D.C.Cir. 1978) ). The unlawful employment practices here were allegedly committed in the Western District of Louisiana. According to Taylor, she was harassed, discriminated against, and retaliated against in her workplace in Louisiana, by a coworker and a supervisor who both work in Louisiana. See Compl. ¶¶ 13–41. Nevertheless, she claims that Shinseki somehow discriminated against her in this district because the EEO decision (as well as a new anti-discrimination policy, which she argues was created in response to her complaint) was purportedly created in the District of Columbia. She further argues that because Shinseki was named as the respondent in her EEO complaint, he had actual knowledge of her discrimination, and that the adjudication of her EEO complaint thus somehow qualifies as discrimination occurring in this district. See Def.'s Mot. at 6–7. But the venue statute speaks of “unlawful employment practices,” and Taylor has not alleged that any conduct amounting to an unlawful employment practice—she does not complain of irregularities in the adjudication process—occurred in this district.See § 2000e–5(f)(3). Hence, venue is not proper in the District of Columbia based on the first statutory category of venue; rather, it is proper in the Western District of Louisiana.
Similarly, venue is also improper under the fourth catch-all venue category: Taylor does not argue that defendants cannot be found in any district—and indeed she could not, since venue would be proper in the Western District of Louisiana under the first category because the unlawful employment practices are alleged to have been committed there. Slaby v. Holder, 901 F.Supp.2d 129, 135 (D.D.C.2012) () (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); James, 227 F.Supp.2d at 24 (). Taylor also does not assert that she would have worked anywhere besides Louisiana but for the challenged employment practices, so the third venue category at issue does not apply here. See § 2000e–5(f)(3).
That leaves the second category as a possible basis for venue in this district: under that provision, venue lies where “the employment records relevant to [the unlawful employment practice] are maintained and administered.” § 2000e–5(f)(3). Courts in this...
To continue reading
Request your trial