Taylor v. State
| Docket Number | 8278. |
| Decision Date | 16 December 1931 |
| Citation | 162 S.E. 504,174 Ga. 52 |
| Parties | TAYLOR v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Jan. 16, 1932.
Syllabus by the Court.
Bribery is committed when clerk of council of Atlanta receives money to influence official behavior; clerk of council being "office of government" (Pen. Code 1910, § § 270 271).
Clerk of city council charged with receiving money to influence official conduct in enforcement or nonenforcement of ordinance could not urge as defense that ordinance was unconstitutional.
In prosecution of clerk of council for bribery, evidence of similar transactions held admissible to show defendant's intent and method.
In prosecution of clerk of council for bribery, evidence relating to other transactions held admissible though involving offenses for which defendant had been tried and acquitted.
Statute limiting prosecutions does not run so long as offender or offense is unknown.
Where indictment alleged that offense was unknown until within two years before return of special presentment, and Solicitor General so testified, limitation was no defense.
1. The office of clerk of council of the city of Atlanta is such an office as that the crime of bribery is committed in respect thereto when an occupant of that office receives a sum of money to influence his official behavior in the office; and the indictment charging that he did receive money for the purpose indicated was not open to the general demurrer that it did not charge a crime.
2. The clerk of council of the city of Atlanta, who received money to influence his official conduct in the matter of the enforcement or nonenforcement of an ordinance of the city imposing a certain license tax upon individuals engaged in certain lines of business, could not make a valid defense based upon the ground that the ordinance was unconstitutional and invalid.
3. The court did not err in refusing the written requests to charge as set forth in special grounds 2 and 3 of the motion for a new trial.
4. In view of the court's charge as given, there was no error in refusing the written requests to charge as set forth in special grounds 4 and 5 of the motion.
5. Considered in connection with other evidence in the case there was no error in admitting the evidence set forth in ground 7, over the objection that it was irrelevant and inadmissible.
6. The court did not err in making the ruling on which error is assigned in the eighth ground of the motion. The materiality of the evidence excluded does not appear, and its exclusion is not shown to have been hurtful to the defendant.
7. The evidence set forth in grounds 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 was not inadmissible on the objection that it was irrelevant immaterial, and prejudicial to the defendant because it related to other transactions than that for which he was on trial and for which he had been tried and acquitted.
8. In grounds 14, 15, 16, and 17 is set forth testimony of named witnesses, which was admitted over the objection that it was irrelevant, inadmissible, and highly prejudicial, and that it showed distinct and different alleged offenses. This evidence was not inadmissible for the reasons urged.
9. To the statute of limitation of prosecutions, fixing the time within which indictments may be found, there are certain exceptions as to the time within which the statute begins to run, and one of the exceptions is the limitation shall not run "so long as the offender or offense is unknown." And this case, under the record, is brought within that exception.
10. The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.
Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; Edgar E. Pomeroy, Judge.
Walter C. Taylor was convicted of bribery, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
Arnold, Arnold & Gambrell, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
John A. Boykin, Sol. Gen., J. W. Le Craw, and Wm. Schley Howard, all of Atlanta, for the State.
Walter C. Taylor was tried on an indictment containing five counts charging bribery, and was convicted on counts 4 and 5. He was found not guilty on the first, second, and third counts. Counts 4 and 5 on which the defendant was convicted dealt with the same alleged transaction. Count 4 alleged that Taylor on the 13th day of October, 1925, received from Mike Ellman, of the firm of Clein & Ellman, the sum of $400 to influence him in his official behavior as clerk of council of the city of Atlanta, which office was then held by Taylor, in the matter of an issuance of a license by the city of Atlanta to the firm of Clein & Ellman, which firm was then and there conducting an auction jewelry business in the city of Atlanta, this fact being known to Taylor; the purpose of said payment and delivery of money to Taylor by Ellman being, in part, to influence the official behavior of said Taylor in causing him not to enforce against Clein & Ellman a certain license tax ordinance of the city of Atlanta, which provided that a license tax of $1,000 must be paid by any person or firm which engaged in the said city in the business of "selling watches, clocks, and jewelry at auction." Count 5 charged that Taylor, on the 13th day of October, 1925, unlawfully received from Mike Ellman, a member of the firm of Clein & Ellman, the sum of $400 to influence his official behavior in his office of clerk of council of the city of Atlanta; and that the purpose of the payment was, in part, to influence the behavior of Taylor in causing him not to enforce against the auction business of Clein & Ellman a license tax ordinance of the city of Atlanta, which provided that license taxes shall be assessed and collected yearly from persons or firms doing business in the city of Atlanta, "upon auctioneers or vendue masters, where ad valorem taxes are paid, $60, and upon auctioneers or vendue masters where no ad valorem tax is paid, $240." The defendant filled a demurrer upon the grounds, first, that the indictment sets forth no offense under the laws of Georgia; second, the office of clerk of council of the city of Atlanta is not such an office as that the crime of bribery can be committed in respect thereto; third, that the Act of the General Assembly of December 19, 1893 (page 175), is unconstitutional; fourth, that the jewelers' auction ordinance passed in pursuance thereto is unconstitutional, and the ordinance requiring vendue masters to pay a license is invalid because discriminatory and unreasonable.
It is insisted that there was no authority in the city of Atlanta or in Taylor to exact the $1,000 license tax prescribed for the selling of watches, clocks, and jewelry at auction, for the reason that the ordinance passed after the Act of December 19, 1893 (page 180, § 8), which provided that the mayor and council shall have authority, in their discretion, to require the payment of a registration tax not exceeding $1,000 per annum on the business of selling watches, clocks, and jewelry at auction, provided that, when the registration tax on such business shall exceed $200 per annum no ad valorem tax shall be charged to the dealer paying such registration tax on the stock carried by him; and provided further that, when such dealer is relieved from the payment of ad valorem tax on his stock, the registration tax shall not in any case be less than the ad valorem tax on said stock would amount to. The act referred to is attacked as being in violation of certain specified portions of the Constitution of this state.
The demurrers were overruled, and to this ruling the defendant excepted. A verdict of guilty was returned by the jury. A motion for a new trial was overruled, and to that judgment Taylor excepted.
1. There were grounds of demurrer other than those stated above which it is not necessary to set forth specifically and in detail, but they will be covered by the rulings which follow. In the second ground of the demurrer, the contention is made that the office of clerk of council of the city of Atlanta is not such an office as that the crime of bribery can be committed in regard thereto. This contention is not sound, in view of the statutes of this state relating to the crime of bribery. Section 270 of the Penal Code is as follows: And section 271 is in the following language:
In Payne v. State, 153 Ga. 882, 113 S.E. 446, 447, it was held that it was the intention of the Legislature that these two sections should be construed together, and the court held that, so construed, section 271 provides the penalty for the offense of bribery as defined in both sections. It was held further that a policeman of the city of Atlanta was appointed by a board of the municipal government under legislative authority authorizing the creation of that board, and that therefore he came within the meaning of "office of government or of justice" and "officer of this State," under those two secti...
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