Taylor v. State
| Decision Date | 09 December 1904 |
| Parties | TAYLOR v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
TAYLOR
v.
STATE.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Dec. 9, 1904.
JURY — DISQUALIFICATION—OATH—HOMICIDE— THREATS—EVIDENCE—WITNESS —CROSS-EXAMINATION.
1. The inclusion of a juror within the panel of 48, who is ineligible to serve at a particular term of court, does not vitiate the entire panel. The juror's disqualification is good cause of challenge to the poll, but not to the entire array.
2. It is not necessary to administer the oath prescribed for jurors in civil cases (Pen. Code 1885, § 856) to the jury impaneled to try criminal cases. The oath prescribed in Pen. Code 1895, | 979, is the only oath designed for jurors in criminal cases.
3. Declarations by the deceased of peaceful intent, communicated to the defendant, are admissible in rebuttal of evidence of previous threats made by the deceased against the defendant.
4. The evidence excluded by the court was inadmissible, and was properly rejected.
5. The interest of a witness and his bias or freedom from prejudice may always be inquired into, and the testimony objected to was admissible in rebuttal of the testimony of the defendant's witnesses.
6. In his discretion, the trial judge may allow a leading question, and a new trial will not be granted solely because a leading question was permitted, unless it appears that the court's discretion has been abused.¶ 6. See Witnesses, vol. 60, Cent Dig. 55 795, 837.
7. It is not objectionable for counsel to embellish the argument with figurative speech, provided prejudicial facts extrinsic of the record are not introduced. Neither the remarks of the solicitor nor of the court offended the proprieties of a legal trial.
8. As stated by the court, the contentions comprehended the defense as presented both by
[49 S.E. 304]the evidence and the defendant's statement. If a more elaborate presentation was desired, a timely written request should have been made.
9. The charge of the court on the subject of threats was appropriate and correct.
10. The judge is not bound to read Pen. Code 1895, § 76, to, the jury, where the general charge sufficiently presents justifiable homicide as a substantive defense.
11. The charge of the court on justifiable homicide was not too narrow or restricted, _ and is not open to the criticism made against it.
12. The verdict is amply supported by the evidence, and has the approval of the trial judge, and no reason is shown for disturbing it.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error from Superior Court, Washington County; A. F. Daley, Judge.
O. T. Taylor was convicted of murder, and brings error. Affirmed.
J. K. Hines, G. H. Howard, J. E. Hyman, and T. W. Hardwick, for plaintiff in error.
W. E. Armistead, Evans & Evans, B. T. Rawlings, Sol. Gen., and John C. Hart, Atty. Gen., for the State.
EVANS, J. C. T. Taylor was indicted and tried for the crime of murder. The testimony disclosed that the deceased, W. R. Veal, and the defendant were bitter enemies, and that for a period of about three months prior to the homicide each was anticipating and was prepared for a deadly encounter. On the day of the homicide, Veal, while riding along a public road in a buggy with a negro driver, was stopped by another negro who had been working for him, and who asked that he might see him on a matter of business. Veal got out of his buggy, and went a short distance out on the side of the road, stopping by an embankment at or near a fence corner. The negro driver remained in the buggy to hold the horse. While conversing with the negro who had called him to this place on the roadside, and while engaged in tying one of his shoes, Veal was approached by another negro in his employment, who was coming down the road, followed by the defendant. The defendant, when first seen by Veal and the negro with whom he was talking, had his pistol in his hand; and, when he arrived within a few feet of Veal, he, without any warning, fired upon him, inflicting a wound in his side, under one arm. At the time Veal was sitting on the ground, tying his shoe, and was not aware until that moment of the presence of the defendant. After receiving this wound, Veal threw up his hands, quickly rose to his feet, and, apparently realizing his helplessness, started to run. As he was running away, the defendant fired three shots at him, each of which took effect in his back, and he fell to the ground. There was testimony that shortly after the shooting a pistol was found on the ground near the body of deceased, but the eyewitnesses to the homicide swore that neither before nor after the first shot did he make any effort to draw the weapon as a measure of offense or defense. The defendant introduced testimony disclosing that the deceased had previously made repeated threats to kill him on sight, which threats had been communicated to him; that the deceased habitually carried with him a Mauser rifle, and had it in his buggy on this occasion; and that he had stated to a number of people that he had procured this rifle for the express purpose of killing the defendant with it when they next met. The defendant also sought to prove his contention that the purpose of the deceased in leaving his buggy and going to one side of the road, where he was partially concealed from view by the embankment, because of a curve in the road, was to waylay the defendant and carry out these threats; that defendant, while walking along the road, suddenly and unexpectedly came upon the deceased, who immediately threw his hand to his pocket and attempted to draw his pistol; and that, realizing his imminent peril, the defendant thereupon fired four shots at him in quick succession. The defendant also made an attempt to impeach the witnesses for the state upon whose testimony...
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