Taylor v. State
| Decision Date | 10 January 1911 |
| Parties | TAYLOR. v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
1. Criminal Law (§ 608*)—Continuance-Grounds.
A continuance will not be granted simply on the asseveration of the accused, without any supportive evidence, that because of public excitement he will not be able to have a fair trial.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1364-1308; Dec. Dig. § 608.*]
2. Criminal Law (§ 594*)—Continuance-Absent Witness—Discretion of Court.
The grant of a continuance on the ground of the absence of a witness to prove the general good character of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court, which was not abused in this case.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1321, 1322; Dec. Dig. § 594.*]
3. Criminal Law (§ 400*)—Evidence—Conduct Indicative of Consciousness of Guilt.
The conduct and utterances of one charged with crime indicative of a consciousness of guilt, such as an effort to suppress evidence and the like, are receivable in evidence as incriminatory admissions.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 894-919; Dec. Dig. § 400.*]
4. Criminal Law (§ 390*)—Evidence—Reason of Witness for Seeking Relevant Facts.
It is competent for a witness to give the reasons which actuated him in making a discovery of a relevant fact in the case on trial.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 858; Dec. Dig. § 390.*]
5. Witnesses (§ 388*)—Impeachment—Contradictory Statements — Sufficiency of Foundation.
It is no ground for the exclusion of a previous contradictory statement made by a witness that in laying the foundation she was asked if she had not made the statement to "Bud" Wilcox, and the impeaching witness is called to the stand by the name of Wilcox, where all the circumstances indicate a knowledge by the witness, as to whom impeachment is sought of the identity of the person to whom the alleged statement was made.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1233-1242; Dec. Dig. § 388.*]
6. Criminal Daw (§ 450*)—Evidence—Opinion Evidence—Inferences from Collective Facts.
Where a witness has observed a matter in issue, and from the nature of the circumstances he cannot adequately state or recite the data so fully and accurately as to put the jury completely in the witness' place and enable them to equally well draw the inference, it is allowable for the witness to give his inference in connection with the facts upon which it is predicated, but, if the data can be placed before the jury in such a way that they may draw the inference as well as the witness, then it would be superflous to add by way of testimony the inference which the jury may well draw for themselves.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent Dig. § 1036; Dec. Dig. § 450.*]
7. Criminal Law (§ 388*)—Evidence—Experiments— Possibility of Identifying Person.
The possibility or impossibility of identifying a particular person under the same circumstances and conditions wherein a witness testified that he identified the accused may be shown by an experiment made by the same witness.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 854; Dec. Dig. § 388.*]
8. Criminal Law (§ 761*)—Instructions-Assumption of Facts—Matters Not Controverted.
Where the evidence affords no inference of any degree of homicide less than murder, and would sustain no other verdict than that of murder or acquittal, and the defendant in his statement to the jury repeatedly refers to the killing of the decedent, and mentions having heard the shots fired, and the only defense set up by him in his statement or in the evidence introduced by him is that he was not the perpetrator of the crime, it is not error to instruct the jury that, if the defendant was the person who Milled the deceased under such circumstances, he should be convicted.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1754-1750; Dec. Dig. § 761;* Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 582.]
9. Homicide (§ 167*)—Evidence—Threats.
On a trial for murder, where an unlawful killing has been proved, and one of the issues is the identity of the accused as the slayer, evidence of threats by the accused against the deceased may be considered by the jury along with other evidence in determining the identity of the accused as the slayer. Fulton v. State, 58 Ga. 224.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 332-340; Dec. Dig. § 167.*]
10. Criminal Law (§ 785*)—Instructions-Impeachment of Witness.
An instruction upon the effect of an impeachment of a witness premised by a statement that one of the modes provided for the impeachment of a witness is by previous contradictory statements is not rendered erroneous by a failure to charge in immediate connection that such previous statements must relate to a material matter, and the attention of the witness sought to be impeached must have been called to the time and place of making them. The mode of impeachment concerns the testimony offered for that purpose; and. where the impeaching testimony is material to the issue and admitted in compliance with therules of law, the court is not required, at least in the absence of a proper request, to repeat the rule governing the admissibility of such testimony when charging on its effect.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1892; Dec. Dig. § 785.2-*]
11. Alibi—Proper Charge.
The charge on the subject of alibi was in substantial accord with the rule laid down in Harrison v. State, 83 Ga. 130, 9 S. E. 542.
12. Newly Discovered Evidence—Insufficient Ground fob New Trial.
The alleged newly discovered evidence was not of such character as would probably produce a different verdict, even if proper diligence had been shown in ascertaining the witnesses, and their evidence were not cumulative.
13. Review on Appeal.
The evidence was sufficient to authorize the verdict; no error of law was committed; and the discretion of the trial judge in refusing a new trial will not be disturbed.
Error from Superior Court, Appling County; T. A. Parker, Judge.
F. T. Taylor was convicted of murder, and he brings error. Affirmed.
A. V. Sellers and W. W. Bennett, for plaintiff in error.
Parker & Highsmith, J. H. Thomas, Sol. Gen., and H. A. Hall, Atty. Gen., for the State.
The plaintiff in error, F. T. Taylor, was convicted of the murder of Wade H. Belcher, and sentenced to be hanged. The deceased was assassinated while traveling along the public road near his home. There was evidence that two or three hours before the homicide the accused quarreled with the deceased at the latter's home, and that the deceased ordered the accused from the premises. The accused left, armed himself with a pistol, and came to the shingle mill of the deceased, inquired for him, using threatening language and vile epithets. Shortly thereafter the deceased came to the mill, tarried a short while, and then left, traveling in a buggy, and accompanied by his three year old daughter. The accused left the mill and went in the same direction the deceased had gone. Shortly thereafter three reports from a pistol or rifle were heard in the direction where the dead body of the deceased was found, and the accused was seen to jump over a fence a few feet from the scene, and run across a field. The defendant set up an alibi, claiming that at the time of the homicide he was at a place about 400 yards away from the scene of the killing.
The homicide was alleged to have been committed on August 10, 1909, and the accused was put on trial at the ensuing September term of the court. When his case was called for trial, he made a written motion for continuance, on the grounds that because of public excitement he could not get a fair trial so soon after the time of the alleged homicide (six weeks), and because of the absence of a witness by whom h...
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