Taylor v. State

• Decision Date: 03 June 1929
• Docket Number: Criminal 693
• Citation: 277 P. 978,35 Ariz. 317
• Parties: FRANK TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE, Respondent
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

277 P. 978

35 Ariz. 317

FRANK TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE, Respondent

Criminal No. 693

Supreme Court of Arizona

June 3, 1929

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Yavapai. Richard Lamson, Judge. Affirmed.

Mr. J Gardner Scott, for Appellant.

Mr. K Berry Peterson, Attorney General, and Mr. Charles L. Strouss Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

OPINION

ROSS, J.

From a conviction of grand larceny, defendant, Taylor, has appealed.

It appears from the record that the Dewey store, located at Dewey, about seventeen miles from Prescott, was, on the night of February 2d, 1928, broken into and a mixed assortment of goods stolen therefrom. The county attorney filed an information against defendant, charging him with the larceny, and described the property stolen as "one slicker, three lumber jacks, one leather coat, five suits underwear, one quilt, three pairs of shoes, two pairs of socks, one leather belt, one pair of gloves, one razor and razor blades. . . ." The prosecution introduced in evidence, in addition to the property described in the information, other property identified by one of the owners as taken at the same time and place. It is the contention of defendant that the evidence should have been limited to the property he was specifically accused of stealing. If the property, that described in the information as stolen and that not so described, was all taken at the same time and place, and thereafter found in defendant's possession, one as much as the other would tend to connect defendant with the original taking, and be proper evidence. In 36 C.J. 896, section 478, it is said:

"Evidence of possession by accused of property not described in the indictment, but shown to have been stolen at the same time and place as that described, is admissible as a circumstance tending to connect him with the crime. . . ."

It is next contended that the ownership of the property as alleged was not proven. All the testimony was to the effect that the property was that of Levi Young and C. E. Stanton, partners, doing business under the firm name of the Dewey store. This evidence is in accord with the allegations of ownership.

It seems that one Urmson, a witness for the prosecution, came into possession of two or three of the stolen articles, and defendant complains because the court refused to let him show, by defense witness A. C. Walton, Urmson's statements or declarations explanatory of his possession. We cannot see how such declarations or statements would prove, or tend to prove, any issue in the case. They might have been competent for the purpose of impeaching the witness Urmson, but they were not offered for that.

Finally it is not assigned, but is earnestly argued, that the only evidence of defendant's guilt is that of an accomplice. One Charles A. L. Macklin testified that he and defendant together, at night-time, entered the Dewey store, and took therefrom the goods introduced in evidence. There was no other evidence connecting defendant with the trespass or...