Taylor v. State
| Decision Date | 18 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 68213,68213 |
| Citation | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 648,498 So.2d 943 |
| Parties | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 648 Danny Michael TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, and Kenneth Witts, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Richard B. Martell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for respondent.
Pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), of the Florida Constitution, petitioner Danny Taylor seeks review of the decision below, Taylor v. State, 481 So.2d 970 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), affirming his conviction of attempted robbery. The district court of appeal certified the following question as one of great public importance:
After submission of the cause to the jury for deliberations in the trial of a noncapital case, is it reversible error per se for a trial court to authorize the jury to separate overnight, or for some other definite time fixed by the court, and then reassemble and continue its consideration of a verdict?
481 So.2d at 971. We answer in the affirmative and therefore quash the decision of the district court of appeal and remand with instructions that petitioner's conviction be reversed for a new trial.
Petitioner was charged by information and tried for attempted robbery, a felony but not a capital offense. Over his objection, the trial judge allowed the jurors to go home for the night after they had begun deliberations. The jurors returned the next morning and found petitioner guilty as charged.
The district court of appeal affirmed on the basis of Engle v. State, 438 So.2d 803 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1074, 104 S.Ct. 1430, 79 L.Ed.2d 753 (1984), and Franklin v. State, 472 So.2d 1303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), rev. denied, 482 So.2d 348 (Fla.1986), holding that it is not reversible error as a matter of law for a trial judge to permit a jury to separate after deliberations have begun in a noncapital case. It then certified the above question as one of great public importance.
Petitioner points out that the rule in capital cases is that it is per se reversible error to allow, over a defendant's objection, a jury to separate after it has begun deliberating. See Livingston v. State, 458 So.2d 235 (Fla.1984). He argues that there is no legal basis to distinguish capital from noncapital cases on this issue. This view is set forth in the dissenting opinion of Judge Dauksch in the case under review.
In Livingston v. State, we traced the development of Florida law on jury sequestration, noting the distinction made between capital and noncapital cases. We reasoned that the purpose for requiring jury sequestration when deliberations had begun was
quite simply, to safeguard the defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury. This right is fundamental and is guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution. There is no way to insulate jurors who are allowed to go to their homes and other places freely for an entire weekend from the myriad of subtle influences to which they will be subject. Jurors in such a situation are subject to being improperly influenced by conversations, by reading material, and by entertainment even if they obey the court's admonitions against exposure to any news reports and conversations about the case they have been sworn to try.
458 So.2d at 238. We also noted that while Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.370(b) "provides for trial court discretion to allow the jurors to separate after final submission of the cause and before retiring to deliberate, it does not specifically contemplate such a separation in the midst of deliberations." 458 So.2d at 237. We held ...
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Reid v. State
...(separation in violation of statute per se reversible error); People v. Werwee, 112 Cal.App.2d 494, 246 P.2d 704 (1952); Taylor v. State, 498 So.2d 943 (Fla.1986); Legare v. State, 243 Ga. 744, 257 S.E.2d 247 (Ga.1979) cert. denied 444 U.S. 984, 100 S.Ct. 491, 62 L.Ed.2d 413 (1980); State v......
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Junco v. State
...required to reverse and set aside the verdicts, judgments and sentences, because of the supreme court's recent ruling in Taylor v. State, 498 So.2d 943 (Fla.1986) 2 (reversible error for jury to separate overnight in a non-capital case where deliberations had begun and defendant had objecte......
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Gonzalez v. State, 85-1122
...(Fla. 3d DCA 1986). The state argues that the juror's brief separation during a lunch recess does not warrant reversal. See Taylor v. State, 498 So.2d 943 (Fla.1986); Livingston v. State, 458 So.2d 235 The record reflects that prior to instructing the jury, the trial judge announced: Now, a......
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Walker v. State, 88-01447
...these convictions and remand for a new trial because the jury was permitted to separate overnight during deliberations. Taylor v. State, 498 So.2d 943 (Fla.1986). Although there is nothing in this record to suggest that the night's rest affected the jury's verdict in any fashion, Taylor doe......