Taylor v. State
| Decision Date | 27 February 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 34414,34414 |
| Citation | 243 Ga. 222,253 S.E.2d 191 |
| Parties | TAYLOR v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
August F. Siemon, Waycross, for appellant.
Dewey Hayes, Dist. Atty., M. C. Pritchard, Asst. Dist. Atty., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Nicholas G. Dumich, Staff Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The defendant appeals from his convictions of murder, rape, sodomy, aggravated assault and armed robbery, for which he was given a life sentence for each offense, other than 10-years' imprisonment for aggravated assault.
1. The first enumeration of error is the denial of a Brady 1 motion for an in camera inspection of all investigatory information and materials in the possession of the state which linked with illicit drug activities, any owner, past or present, of the retail clothing store where the crimes were perpetrated.
The burden is on the appellant to show that he was denied beneficial evidence which was so important that its absence prevented his receiving a fair trial, and to show how his case has been materially prejudiced, even though the trial court declined to make the in camera inspection. Pryor v. State, 238 Ga. 698, 706(5c), 234 S.E.2d 918 (1977) and cits., cert. den., 434 U.S. 935, 98 S.Ct. 422, 54 L.Ed.2d 294, reh. den., 434 U.S. 1003, 98 S.Ct. 650, 54 L.Ed.2d 500 (1977).
The appellant contends that the suspected involvement in illicit drug activity of one of the part owners of the store would be material in that the son of the other part owner was one of the two men who chased the perpetrator on foot and identified him as the appellant, thereby possibly giving him some undisclosed interest in prosecuting the appellant, and in that evidence of illegal drug activity at the store might authorize a finding that the appellant was seized by a compulsional delusion in entering the store. However, the trial court conducted an in camera hearing, in which evidence was adduced indicating that the state had at no time conducted an investigation of drug activity at the store, that the state had no information that the store or its employees were in any way linked with drug activities, and that, although the state had received rumors from an informant, in the course of an investigation of alleged drug activities in Ware County, as to the store's part owner's suspected drug-related activities, such rumors had produced no evidence which could be used against him. The investigation produced no information that the other part owner or his son, the state's witness, were in any way involved in illegal drug traffic.
Furthermore, even if the state had information linking the part owner with drug activity, that information would be immaterial to the crimes in question. The other part owner's son only became involved in the case when his help was sought and under circumstances wherein he could have identified the appellant only by the clothing that he wore. There was positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator by witnesses other than the part owner's son. Moreover, there was no testimony indicating that the appellant's visit to the store was in any way connected with drugs, and a search by police of the establishment after the crimes revealed no evidence of drugs on the premises.
The Constitution does not require police to provide a defendant with all police investigatory work, and the mere possibility that an undisclosed item of information might have helped the defendant or might have affected the outcome of a trial, is not sufficient to establish materiality under Brady v. Maryland, especially where there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). In the case sub judice, the fact that there is no reasonable doubt about guilt is reenforced by the fact that the sufficiency of the evidence to authorize the convictions is not urged on appeal. Accordingly, we find that the appellant has not carried his burden with respect to his Brady motion.
2. The second enumerated error is the failure to excuse for cause juror Mercer, on the ground that her son was one of the state's witnesses.
The conduct of the voir dire and whether to strike a juror for cause, are within the discretion of the trial court, and the court's rulings are proper absent some manifest abuse of discretion. Patterson v. State, 239 Ga. 409, 411(1), 238 S.E.2d 2 (1977) and cits. The fact that a juror is related to one of the witnesses for the state in a criminal prosecution, does not render the juror incompetent and subject to dismissal for cause. Atkinson v. State, 112 Ga. 411(1), 37 S.E. 747 (1900); Williams v. State, 23 Ga.App. 518, 98 S.E. 557 (1919).
Although the juror testified on voir dire that she would trust the testimony of her son, she also indicated that she could fairly consider all of the evidence and render an impartial verdict by applying the evidence to the court's charge regardless of who the witnesses were. Furthermore, her son's subsequent testimony was uncontradicted, simply relating to the results of his investigation and the identification of state's exhibits 15, 16 and 20. Failure to strike this juror for cause was neither an abuse of discretion nor harmful error.
3. The third enumerated error is the failure to excuse for cause juror Van Winkle, on the ground that she had testified on voir dire that she believed that the defendant was at the scene of the crime, because he was arrested and because of radio reports and discussions at the school where she taught.
A juror is not incompetent merely because he "had a little opinion" about the case. Butler v. State, 231 Ga. 276(3), 201 S.E.2d 448 (1973). Tennon v. State, 235 Ga. 594, 596(2), 220 S.E.2d 914 (1975). This prospective juror testified that she had no opinion on the defendant's guilt or innocence, that if selected as a juror, she could listen to all of the evidence and arrive at a verdict based on that evidence applied to the law as charged by the court, regardless of any talk which she had heard, and that she would not let anything she had previously heard or read sway her. There was no abuse of discretion in failing to strike this juror for cause.
4. There was no abuse of discretion, as contended in enumerated errors 4 and 5, in excusing juror Henderson for cause when it appeared that he was related by marriage to the defendant, had known him a long time, did not believe he was guilty, and where he testified on voir dire that he could not be perfectly impartial between the state and the accused. See Carr v. Carr,240 Ga. 161(3), 240 S.E.2d 50 (1977) and cits.; Jones v. Cloud, 119 Ga.App. 697, 706-707(5), 168 S.E.2d 598 (1969); Martin v. State, 44 Ga.App. 567(2), 162 S.E. 150 (1932)...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Burgess v. State
...court's decision to strike Barbara James for cause will not be overturned absent a "manifest abuse of discretion." Taylor v. State, 243 Ga. 222, 224(2), 253 S.E.2d 191 (1979). No such showing has been made 11. The State and appellant agreed that one of the three prospective jurors who had b......
-
High v. State
...striking of some black potential traverse jurors. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965); Taylor v. State, 243 Ga. 222, 253 S.E.2d 191 (1979), see also Willis v. State, 243 Ga. 185, 253 S.E.2d 10 (1979); Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 820, 256 S.E.2d 907 (1979). 2. App......
-
Waters v. State
...charge of the court upon the trial of the case." Tennon v. State, 235 Ga. 594, 595-96, 220 S.E.2d 914 (1975), Accord, Taylor v. State, 243 Ga. 222, 253 S.E.2d 191 (1979). The trial court did not err in refusing to grant defendant's challenges for (3) During voir dire, defendant's counsel as......
-
Graham v. State
...anything she had previously heard or read sway her. There was no abuse of discretion in failing to strike this juror for cause." Taylor v. State, 243 Ga. 222(2, 3), 253 S.E.2d 191 (1979). See also Foster v. State, 248 Ga. 409(3), 283 S.E.2d 873 Appellant Graham contends that Ms. Lloyd's pos......