Taylor v. State
| Decision Date | 07 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. A14A0497.,A14A0497. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | TAYLOR v. The STATE. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Daniel W. Taylor, pro se.
Paul L. Howard Jr., David K. Getachew-Smith, for Appellee.
Following a jury trial during which he represented himself, Daniel W. Taylor was convicted of aggravated assault,1 five counts of terroristic threats,2 burglary,3 aggravated assault on a peace officer, 4 obstruction of a law enforcement officer,5 removal of a weapon from a public official,6 and stalking.7 Taylor appeals pro se the subsequent denial of his motion for new trial, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress; (2) denying his motion for plea in bar following his speedy trial demand; (3) sentencing him as a recidivist; (4) failing to merge certain charges; (5) engaging in judicial misconduct; (6) admitting false testimony; and (7) failing to give his requested jury charges. Taylor also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we vacate Taylor's conviction for obstruction,affirm on the remaining counts, and remand for resentencing.
Viewed in favor of the verdict,8 the record shows that in early May 2008, Taylor was estranged from his wife, Kassandra Norman, and she took from him the key to her apartment.9 Thereafter, on May 7, 2008, Taylor left multiple threatening voice mails for Norman in which he threatened to kill her. Later that day, Taylor waited outside Norman's gated apartment complex until he saw her and their two children, crawled under the fence, charged towards her, and began striking her. Taylor grabbed Norman, slammed her to the ground, causing her to strike her head on the pavement, and cut her on her back and neck with a sharp object. Cedric Scott, an apartment maintenance worker, observed the attack, yelled out, and chased Taylor, who fled the scene.
On May 9, 2008, Norman applied for and obtained a family violence ex parte protective order against Taylor,10 and she took her two children to a domestic violence shelter to spend the night. The same day, Scott saw Taylor enter Norman's apartment building, and he called Deputy Wesley Carmack, the courtesy officer for the apartment complex, and directed the employees in the office to call the police.
Carmack and Scott went to Norman's apartment, where they observed that the door had been kicked in and was ajar. Carmack, who was in plain clothes, but wearing his badge, looked in and saw Taylor in the kitchen. Carmack entered the apartment, announced himself as a police officer, showed Taylor his weapon, told him that he was not allowed to be on the property, and directed him to turn around so he could cuff him. After Carmack secured one of Taylor's hands in the handcuffs, Taylor began swinging at the officer, grabbed him, punched him, struck him in the head with the handcuffs, and repeatedly tried to grab his gun. Carmack eventually shot Taylor in the foot after struggling with him for five or six minutes, during which time Taylor continued to reach for his gun and refused the officer's repeated commands to release him. Taylor continued to struggle, but Scott and two other maintenance workers were eventually able to subdue and cuff him. Police later found a letter from Taylor to Norman stating that he came to the apartment to kill her, but changed his mind and decided to kill himself instead, and they found a copy of Taylor's handwritten will.
Taylor was arrested and charged. Taylor fired at least four appointed attorneys before eventually proceeding to trial pro se. Following his convictions, Taylor appeals the denial of his subsequent motion for new trial.
1. As an initial matter, we note that a majority of Taylor's arguments are not supported by citations to the record as required by Court of Appeals Rule 25(a)(1), (c)(2)(1). As we have previously stated, “[o]ur requirements for appellate briefs were created not to provide an obstacle, but to aid parties in presenting arguments in a manner most likely to be fully and efficiently comprehended by this Court; a party will not be granted relief should we err in deciphering a brief which fails to adhere to the required form.” 11 We further note that Taylor has attached numerous exhibits to his appellate brief and caution him that “ ‘[e]xhibits attached to an appellate brief but not appearing in the record transmitted by the trial court cannot be considered by this court and afford no basis for reversal.’ ” 12
2. Taylor argues that trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence recovered from Norman's apartment because the officer's entry therein violated his Fourth Amendment rights.13 This enumeration is without merit.
Pretermitting whether Taylor has standing to challenge the search, 14 based upon the evidence that Taylor viciously attacked Norman two days before, her testimony that he was not authorized to be on the property, and the officer's observation that Taylor had kicked in the door to her apartment, exigent circumstances justified Deputy Carmack's entry into the apartment.15
3. Taylor contends that the trial court erred by denying his plea in bar and motion to dismiss on constitutional speedy trial grounds. We disagree.
“ Barker v. Wingo16 and Doggett v. United States17 ... guide a court in its consideration of whether a delay in bringing an accused to trial amounts to a denial of his right to a speedy trial.” 18 Our Supreme Court has recently reiterated that
[i]n Georgia, the application of these principles to the circumstances of a particular case is a task committed principally to the discretion of the trial courts, and it is settled law that our role as a court of review is a limited one. Under our precedents, we must accept the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous, and we must accept the ultimate conclusion of the trial court unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion, even though we might have reached a different conclusion were the issue committed to our discretion.19
There is a two-part test applicable to considering a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds.
The first stage requires a determination of whether the interval from the defendant's arrest, indictment, or other formal accusation to the trial is sufficiently long to be considered “presumptively prejudicial.” Where the delay is only ordinary, rather than presumptively prejudicial, the defendant's speedy trial claim fails at the threshold. A delay that is deemed to be presumptively prejudicial, however, triggers the second stage of the analysis. At this second stage, a court must determine whether the defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial by analyzing a four-part balancing test that considers the conduct of both the State and the defendant (i.e., the Barker– Doggett factors): (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay. Standing alone, none of these factors [is] a necessary, or sufficient condition to a finding of deprivation of the right to a speedy trial, but rather should be considered as part of a balancing test.20
(a) Presumptive prejudice. “Speedy trial rights attach at the time of arrest or formal indictment, whichever is earlier.” 21 Here, Taylor was arrested on May 9, 2008, and the trial court entered an order
denying his speedy trial motion on July 14, 2010. The 27–month delay in this case was presumptively prejudicial.22
(b) Barker– Doggett analysis.
(i) Length of the delay. “The 2[7]-month pretrial delay in this case was uncommonly long, and is a factor weighed against the State.” 23
(ii) Reasons for the delay. The trial court concludes in its order that the delay in bringing Taylor to trial “is wholly attributable” to Taylor's dismissal of at least four court-appointed attorneys before he filed his motion, and Taylor caused even more delay by filing a motion to recuse the trial judge. This finding is supported by the record, and we therefore defer to the trial court's conclusion that this factor is therefore weighed against Taylor.
(iii) Assertion of the right. Taylor first asserted his right to a speedy trial on November 10, 2009 by filing a pro se out-of-time demand for speedy trial,24 and he filed two other demands thereafter, one of which was deemed untimely, and the other he withdrew.
Although the State bears the burden to ensure that an accused is brought to trial promptly, the accused bears some responsibility to invoke the speedy trial right and put the government on notice that he would prefer to be tried as soon as possible. Once the right to a speedy trial attaches, the accused must assert it with reasonable promptness, and “delay in doing so normally will be weighed against him. That said, the accused is not required to demand a speedy trial at the first available opportunity, only to demand it “in due course.” 25
The trial court did not indicate whether it weighed this factor against Taylor and, if so, to what extent, but it did note that Taylor waited a year and a half after his arrest to assert his right. Despite the trial court's failure to specify its conclusion, this factor weighs against Taylor.26
(iv) Prejudice. Taylor did not assert lengthy pretrial incarceration or excessive anxiety or concern below. As the trial court concluded, Taylor contended in his written motion below that the State's failure to bring him to trial in a timely manner allowed the State to “ ‘gain a tactical advantage’ over him.” At the hearing, Taylor testified only that he was having trouble getting in touch with his witnesses due to his incarceration. He did not identify the witnesses, show that they could not be located, or explain how they would have testified and helped his defense. Under these circumstances, Taylor “has failed to present any actual evidence to show that his defense would be impaired,...
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