Taylor v. State

• Decision Date: 26 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. 97-215.,97-215.
• Citation: 7 P.3d 15
• Parties: John A. TAYLOR, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

7 P.3d 15

John A. TAYLOR, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 97-215.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

May 26, 2000.

Representing Appellant: Sylvia L. Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Karl Linde, Assistant Appellate Counsel; and T. Alan Elrod, Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee: William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,¹ JJ.

TAYLOR, Justice, Retired.

Following a bench trial, appellant was found guilty of possession of a deadly weapon with intent to unlawfully threaten the life or physical well-being of another in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-103 (Lexis 1999). Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the charging information, the constitutionality of the warrantless seizure of firearms and ammunition from his home/business, and the sufficiency of the evidence pointing to intent at trial. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. ISSUES

Appellant, John A. Taylor (Taylor), presents four issues which, in essence, are reiterated by appellee, State of Wyoming:

1. Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this case because neither the information nor its supporting documents specifically identified the victim, the State actively withheld the victim's identity, and the appellant did not have actual notice of who the victim was?

2. Whether the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to prove that appellant had the intent to threaten another under Wyo. Stat. § 6-8-103 where appellant, while possessing a non-concealed weapon, walked into the Lander City Attorney's offices, served an attorney with documents from a civil action, said "You've had your fun, now it's my turn," and walked away?

3. Whether Lander police officers unconstitutionally seized personal items from appellant's home that were not described in the search warrant, and whether these items should have been returned to appellant when he moved for their return pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 41(e)?

4. Whether the district court imposed an illegal sentence when it ordered a forfeiture of appellant's property when this punishment is not mandated under Wyo. Stat. § 6-8-103?

II. FACTS

The series of events which led to Taylor's arrest began when Taylor threw tree branches into his neighbor's yard and was subsequently cited for littering. In response, Taylor filed a civil suit against various entities, including the City Attorney for Lander. On Friday, November 1, 1996, the district court granted the City Attorney's motion for summary judgment, and ordered Taylor to pay costs and attorney fees for filing a frivolous suit. On Monday, November 4, 1996, Taylor, who had represented himself in the civil suit, visited the offices of Mr. Gingery, the assistant city attorney, and Mr. Sollars, Mr. Gingery's supervisor.

At approximately eight o'clock that morning, Gingery and Sollars were having a cup of coffee in the office kitchen when they saw Taylor's car approach. Stating something to the effect that, "he didn't want to deal with John that morning," Sollars went into his office. Gingery walked down the hallway and met Taylor in the lobby. Taylor, carrying a weapon resembling an Uzi strapped to his shoulder, handed Gingery two documents, and stated, "You've had your fun; now it's my turn." Taylor then left the office.

The documents were two "pleadings" filed with the district court and bearing the number of the dismissed civil lawsuit. One was titled "Declaration of War" (Declaration) and the other, "Notice of Lack of Jurisdiction" (Notice). The Declaration, in pertinent part, stated that "[a] state of war now exists between John A. Taylor and the totalitarian city, state and federal government * * *." The Declaration further threatened retaliation against Taylor's neighbors, stated that no future court summonses would be answered or honored for any reason, and that the exercise of "`court authority' will be considered an act of aggression." The Notice asserted that Taylor would not answer to any "unconstitutional, totalitarian court."

After Taylor left, Gingery went to Sollars' office and the two read the documents. Gingery then called the police. Officer Cecrle of the Lander Police Department responded to the call at approximately 8:20 a.m., meeting with Gingery and Sollars, both of whom seemed very upset. After hearing the account of Taylor's visit, Officer Cecrle made copies of the Declaration and Notice and notified others of the contents, including Taylor's neighbors named in the Declaration. Officer Cecrle then went to Taylor's home/business at approximately 10:45 a.m. Taylor was in the front yard, but walked quickly to the front door when the officer approached. A few seconds later, Taylor reappeared in the front door, staring at Officer Cecrle. Feeling that it was tactically unsafe to approach any further, Officer Cecrle returned to the police department and attempted to telephone Taylor. Taylor, however, refused to talk. Officer Cecrle then obtained an arrest warrant and a warrant to search Taylor's home/business and car for "an Uzi-type" weapon.

At about 4:30 that afternoon, Taylor was arrested outside his home/business. A search pursuant to the warrant began five or six minutes later. As the officers entered the front door, on a shelf approximately one step away from the door where Taylor had stood looking at Officer Cecrle earlier in the day, lay a loaded "Uzi-type" 9 millimeter semiautomatic pistol. Nearby, officers found two 30-round magazines taped together for quick loading and a bag of loose ammunition for the weapon. The search continued, revealing a loaded AR-15 assault rifle hanging by the back door, with additional ammunition located within steps of the rifle. Proceeding to the bedroom, officers found a .45 Colt Ruger Blackhawk revolver, holster and belt holding rounds of ammunition, a knife sheath and a Bowie knife. At the foot of the bed, additional ammunition for the assault rifle was found. In all, police seized three weapons and approximately 4,179 rounds of ammunition.

The Information charging Taylor with possession of a weapon with intent to unlawfully threaten another did not name a victim, but the supporting affidavit mentioned both Sollars and Gingery. Prior to trial, Taylor moved the district court to dismiss the case for lack of a named victim or, in the alternative, for a Bill of Particulars. Taylor also moved to suppress and return to him all items seized that were not listed in the search warrant. After a hearing on these motions, the district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that Taylor had adequate notice of the victim by virtue of the State's witness and exhibit lists and other pleadings on file. The district court also denied the motion to exclude the seized evidence not specifically identified in the warrant.

Following a bench trial in which the prosecution submitted only the first weapon found in the search, the district court found Taylor guilty of one count of possession of a deadly weapon with the unlawful intent to threaten another. He was sentenced to not less than two nor more than four years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. In addition, the weapons, ammunition, and other evidence seized from Taylor's residence were "forfeited to the City of Lander Police Department for such disposition as the Department finds appropriate." This appeal followed.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The factual findings of the district court at the hearing on the motion to suppress are binding on our Court unless they are clearly erroneous. Callaway v. State, 954 P.2d 1365, 1369 (Wyo.1998). The constitutionality of a particular search or seizure is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.; Burgos-Seberos v. State, 969 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Wyo.1998)

. Similarly, whether the sufficiency of an information passes constitutional muster under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Vernier v. State, 909 P.2d 1344, 1350-51 (Wyo.1996). In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, we determine whether the evidence is adequate to support a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state. Rogers v. State, 971 P.2d 599, 601 (Wyo.1999).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE INFORMATION

Taylor claims the charging information was insufficient because it did not identify the victim of the alleged act. Taylor further contends that the State actively concealed the identity of the victim by refusing to designate either Gingery or Sollars as the victim of the crime. He concludes that under our holding in Walker v. State, 847 P.2d 542 (Wyo.1993), the omission of a specific victim's name in connection with the deliberate conduct of the prosecution constitutes reversible error. In response to Taylor's motion to dismiss or for a Bill of Particulars, the prosecution stated that "Defendant has actual knowledge of the identity of the victim." The district court agreed, finding that the information and pleadings in this case adequately informed Taylor of the charges against which he must defend.

In Walker, we held that the failure to inform the defendant of the identity of the victims in two counts of indecent liberties until the end of the presentation of evidence at trial was reversible error. Walker, 847 P.2d at 545. Later decisions, however, have clarified that it is not merely the lack of the victim's identity, but the prejudice suffered by the defendant which determines whether reversal is warranted on the basis of insufficiency of the information. Lowseth v. State, 875 P.2d 725, 728 (Wyo.1994); McDermott v. State, 870 P.2d 339, 348 (Wyo.1994).

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