Taylor v. State

• Decision Date: 16 December 1931
• Docket Number: No. 21602.,21602.
• Citation: 44 Ga.App. 387,161 S.E. 793
• Parties: TAYLOR . v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

44 Ga.App. 387

161 S.E. 793

TAYLOR .

v.STATE.

No. 21602.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1

Dec. 16, 1931.

.

Syllabus by the Court.

The trial judge did not err in overruling the demurrer to the indictment. The evidence supports the verdict; and no ground of the motion for a new trial presents any valid reason for reversing the judgment.

STEPHENS, J., dissenting.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; Edgar E. Pomeroy, Judge.

Walter C. Taylor was convicted of bribery, and he brings error.

Affirmed.

Arnold, Arnold & Gambrell, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

John A. Boykin, Sol. Gen., J. W. Le Craw, and Wm. Schley Howard, all of Atlanta, for the State.

LUKE, J.

The indictment in this case contains three counts, each charging Walter C. Taylor with the offense of bribery. The verdict was: "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty." The first question for determination is whether the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the indictment. The other questions pre-sented are raised by the exception to the judgment overruling defendant's motion for a new trial, containing the usual general grounds and sixty-five other grounds.

Count 1 charges Walter C. Taylor with the offense of bribery, "for that said accused, in the County of Fulton and State of Georgia, on the 2 day of July, 1927, * * * being then and there Clerk of Council of the City of Atlanta, * * * and, as such, being in a position of confidence, trust, and clerkship in the Legislative Department of the City of Atlanta, composed of the 'Mayor and General Council of the City of Atlanta, ' said office being an office of government of this State, did unlawfully receive of and from George C. Spence $9,000 in money, as a present reward given to the said Taylor, to influence his official behavior in his said office above set forth, and received by him for said purpose; said giving and receiving of said present and reward being pursuant to and in consummation of a previous agreement and understanding between Taylor and Spence that said present and reward would be given in return for the services of the said Clerk of Council in obtaining from the City of Atlanta the sum of $30,000, 'in full settlement in suit of Thos. B. Brady v. City of Atlanta in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Northern Division, ' and the purpose of the said unlawful agreement to give and receive said $9,000 as aforesaid, and the purpose for which said $9,000 was actually so paid and received in consummation of said agreement, included the influencing of the official behavior of accused as such Clerk of Council of the City of Atlanta, the official behavior of accused being that he procured the passage and adoption by General Council of a resolution authorizing said $30,000 settlement, that he procured the passage and adoption of said resolution first by Council of the City of Atlanta, that he then stamped said resolution 'adopted by Council, ' with his official stamp, that he then transmitted said resolution so stamped as aforesaid to the Aldermanic Board of the City of Atlanta, that he then stamped the said resolution 'concurred in' by said Aldermanic Board upon the said Aldermanic Board voting to concur therein, that he then transmitted said resolution so stamped as aforesaid to the Mayor of Atlanta; that he then transmitted and certified a copy of said resolution to the Comptroller of the City of Atlanta, after the Mayor's approval thereof; and accused then procured from the Comptroller of the City of Atlanta, the official check of the City of Atlanta for the $30,000 called for in said resolution, and delivered the same to George C. Spence, who was attorney for the said Thomas B. Brady; the said offense of bribery being unknown during the years 1927, 1928, and 1929, and not becoming known un til some time subsequent to January 1, 1930, said resolution authorizing the said settlement of $30,000 above referred to being as follows: " (Here was set out said resolution "by councilman Moore, " reciting that the terms of "said compromise" were "set forth in written communications from Spence and Spence, attorneys for the plaintiff, dated May 2 and May 10, 1927, addressed to Hon Frank H. Neely, Chairman Bond Commission, a copy of said communications being hereto attached.") We deem it unnecessary to set out said communications.

The indictment next sets out numerous ordinances prescribing the duties of the clerk of council. The following is the gist of some of them: Section 735. The clerk shall attend all meetings of the general council and aldermen, and keep a correct record of their proceedings. Section 736. The clerk shall issue all licenses, as hereinafter pointed out, and all orders, summonses, notices, or other instruments, which may be required of him by the mayor and general council. Section 737. He shall keep a book of minutes, and other records including an ordinance book and a book in which he shall record all petitions for street work, etc. Section 742. He shall have an official seal, which shall be affixed to all documents certified to by him. Section 744. He shall make copies of all ordinances, except ordinances for construction of sewers, or for work of public improvement, and certify and transmit the same to the head of the department charged with the enforcement of such ordinance. Section 747. He shall notify any departments of the city of Atlanta of the passage of any resolutions or ordinances by the council affecting such departments, and also furnish them copies of the same. Section 1966. In all elections by general council the vote shall be taken viva voce on call of the roll by the clerk, and shall be entered on the minutes. Sections 1000 and 1001. It shall be the duty of the clerk to make preparations for holding all regular and special elections in the city, providing polling places, ballot boxes, booths, stationary, etc. Section 2032. He shall give bond in the sum of $10,000 to account to the city for all articles, goods, and moneys coming into his hands by virtue of his office, including books, papers, etc. Section 2048. No person holding a position or office under the city government shall act as attorney in any legal proceeding against said city, nor be employed as attorney or counsel in any matter or cause adversely to said city.

After setting out said ordinances, count 1 concluded as follows: "And it also being * * * among the official duties of accused in his said office as Clerk of Council to certify all official action by said General Council on ordinances and resolutions and resolutions upon the said ordinances and resolutions, and transmit the same so certified to the Mayorof Atlanta for his official action thereon, and the Mayor of Atlanta relied upon the correct performance of his duty by the Clerk of Council in passing upon ordinances and resolutions so transmitted to him by accused; and it was also the duty of said Clerk of Council to record the action of the Mayor thereon in the official records of the General Council kept by accused, said duties being established by custom and usage in the Legislative Department of the City of Atlanta; and it also being * * * among the official duties of accused in his said office as Clerk of Council to certify all official action by Council of the City of Atlanta on resolutions and ordinances and transmit the same to the Alder-manic Board of the City of Atlanta, said duty being established by usage and custom in the Legislative Department of the City of Atlanta."

Counts 2 and 3 are so similar in form to count 1 that we deem it unnecessary to set out those counts fully.

Count 2 charges that on July 18, 1929, the defendant "did unlawfully receive of and from Samuel E. Evins, acting as attorney and agent for Atlantic Steel Company, $2,-500 in money, said money being so delivered to and received by accused for the purpose of influencing the official behavior of accused in the matter of the passage and adoption of a resolution by the General Council of the City of Atlanta and its approval by the Mayor, to the following effect: " (The effect of said resolution was to exclude the property of the Atlantic Steel Company from an annexation resolution.) Said count continues: "The official behavior of accused being that he procured the passage and adoption by General Council of the above stated resolution, that he then stamped the said resolution 'Adopted by Gen. Council' (said stamp constituting the official entry upon said resolution that it had been passed by General Council), that he then transmitted said resolution so stamped as aforesaid to the Mayor of Atlanta, certifying by said transmittal that the same had been passed and adopted by the said legislative body of the City of Atlanta. * * *

Count 3 charges that on March 18, 1927, the defendant "did unlawfully receive of and from M. P. Roane the sum of $500 * * * as a present and reward * * * to get certain sidewalk pavement placed and laid on the east side of West Peachtree street, * * * and the purpose of the payment of the said bribe and the purpose of the receiving of the said bribe by the accused included the influencing of the official behavior of accused as such Clerk of Council of the City of Atlanta; the official behavior of accused being that he procured the passage and adoption by General Council of an ordinance authorizing the said paving, that he procured the passage and adoption of said ordinance first by Council of the City of Atlanta, that he then stamped said ordinance 'adopted by Council' with his official stamp, that he then transmitted said ordinance so stamped as aforesaid to the Aldermanic Board of the City of Atlanta, that he then stamped said ordinance 'concurred in' by said Aldermanic Board upon the Aldermanic Board voting to concur therein, that he then transmitted said ordinance so stamped as aforesaid to the Mayor of Atlanta, certifying by said transmittal that the same had been passed and adopted by...