Taylor v. State

• Decision Date: 19 October 1994
• Docket Number: No. 816-93,816-93
• Citation: 885 S.W.2d 154
• Parties: Valerie Susan TAYLOR, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 154

885 S.W.2d 154

Valerie Susan TAYLOR, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 816-93.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas En Banc.

Oct. 19, 1994.

Terri Tipton Holder, court appointed on appeal, Angleton, for appellant.

Jim Mapel, Dist. Atty., Mary Peter Cudd, Asst. Dist. Atty., Angleton, and Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the Court en banc.

OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

MALONEY, Judge.

Appellant was indicted for murder and pled not guilty by reason of insanity. A jury convicted appellant and assessed life imprisonment. The First Court of Appeals affirmed. Taylor v. State, 856 S.W.2d 459 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993). We granted appellant's petition for discretionary review to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that an intoxication instruction was properly given at the guilt/innocence stage of trial. ¹

The Court of Appeals' opinion sets forth in detail the facts leading to the instant offense and the testimony at trial. Id. at 462-67. Briefly, appellant killed her four-year old daughter, confessed to committing the act, but pled not guilty by reason of insanity. At trial, evidence was admitted that appellant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and had exhibited psychotic behavior in the weeks before the offense. There was evidence that appellant shared a marihuana cigarette with her common-law husband the night of the offense, ² and that the use of marihuana could trigger a psychotic episode. The State maintained that although appellant was undoubtedly mentally disturbed, she knew the difference between right and wrong at the time of the offense. Alternatively, the State argued that if appellant did not know right from wrong at the time of the offense, it was because of her use of marihuana.

The trial court instructed the jury at guilt/innocence on the affirmative defense of insanity. The court also instructed the jury as follows:

Voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to the commission of a crime.

For the purpose of this section "intoxication" means disturbance of mental or physical capacity resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body.

Appellant objected to the instruction on intoxication "in that it does not come under the guidelines of Section 8.04 of the Penal Code. And we are not raising any defensive issues that would go to that particular instruction."

The Court of Appeals upheld the instruction, concluding that

there was [ ] evidence "which might have lead" the jury to believe that appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense, and that such intoxication "might have contributed" to appellant's claimed insanity. Therefore, the trial court did not err by instructing the jury on intoxication.

Id. at 472 (following Jaynes v. State, 673 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) and Williams v. State, 567 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Crim.App.1978)).

Appellant argues that the instruction objected to was improperly given because she asserted a defense of insanity, not "temporary insanity" caused by her use of marihuana, and that the evidence was insufficient to show that she was "intoxicated." The State contends the instruction was adequately supported by the evidence.

I.

At one time Texas courts considered evidence of intoxication as being relevant to the defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense. See generally Evers v. State, 31 Tex.Crim. 318, 20 S.W. 744, 746-47 (App.1892) (discussing history of caselaw on issue of intoxication as excuse to committing crime). The theory was

... that drunkenness ought to be admitted in evidence, not to excuse, justify, or mitigate the crime, but simply to throw light upon the mental status of the offender, to enable the jury to find out what crime had been committed; or rather, by proving the absence of the necessary constituents of the crime (such as malice, premeditation, intent, etc.,) to show that no crime was committed.

Id. 20 S.W. at 746 (emphasis in original). Reportedly, following a trial in which a defendant who committed murder "without provocation" was acquitted "on the ground of temporary insanity caused by drunkenness," the Legislature enacted Penal Code article 36, the predecessor to section 8.04. ³ Id. (discussing, but not citing, the celebrated case which gave rise to enactment of article 36).

The principles set forth in article 36 remain embodied in section 8.04, which was codified as part of the 1974 Penal Code. See Ramos v. State, 547 S.W.2d 33, 34 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (section 8.04 "quite clearly" a recodification of article 36). Section 8.04, Intoxication, states:

(a) Voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to the commission of crime.

(b) Evidence of temporary insanity caused by intoxication may be introduced by the actor in mitigation of the penalty attached to the offense for which he is being tried.

(c) When temporary insanity is relied upon as a defense and the evidence tends to show that such insanity was caused by intoxication, the court shall charge the jury in accordance with the provisions of this section.

(d) For purposes of this section "intoxication" means disturbance of mental or physical capacity resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body.

Subsection (a) of section 8.04 is directed to the guilt/innocence phase of trial (per use of the word "defense"), ⁴ essentially providing that voluntary intoxication will not excuse a defendant's actions. Subsection (b) is a punishment provision, specifically providing that a defendant may introduce evidence of temporary insanity caused by intoxication for purposes of mitigating his punishment.

Subsection (c) is a "charge" provision, designating circumstances in which a jury instruction must be given. We interpret subsection (c) as setting forth only certain circumstances in which a trial court must give an instruction. Subsection (c) does not preclude the giving of an instruction if circumstances, different than those outlined in subsection (c), otherwise raise an issue under either subsection (a) or (b). This view is consistent with the application of former article 36. Similar to subsection (c), article 36 provided that "where temporary insanity is relied upon as a defense and the evidence tends to show that such insanity was brought about by the immoderate use of intoxicating liquors" the court was required to "charge the jury in accordance with the provisions of section 1." See fn. 3, supra. Section 1 was the substantive equivalent of subsections (a) and (b) combined. Nevertheless, we upheld instructions on Section 1, even when there was no evidence of temporary insanity, or evidence that temporary insanity was produced by intoxication. See, e.g., Valdez v. State, 462 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tex.Crim.App.1970); Kincheloe v. State, 146 Tex.Crim. 414, 175 S.W.2d 593, 596 (App.1943); Ramos v. State, 141 Tex.Crim. 126, 147 S.W.2d 809, 811 (App.1941). In Kincheloe, the defendant's complaint was similar to appellant's complaint in the instant case--the defendant complained that the instruction given under Section 1 was prejudicial since there was no evidence of temporary insanity produced by intoxication. We said:

The record does reflect that appellant was intoxicated at the time of the killing but not to a degree that it produced temporary insanity. Consequently, an instruction on temporary insanity from the use of ardent spirits was not required, but the instruction of the court that intoxication produced by the voluntary use of ardent spirits was not any excuse for the commission of the offense ... was not improper.

Kincheloe, 175 S.W.2d at 596.

Moreover, it is well settled that a trial court must instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case. See, e.g., Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 36.14 (jury charge of trial judge shall "distinctly set[ ] forth the law applicable to the case"); Jackson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 897 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Rider v. State, 567 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); Dominguez v. State, 141 Tex.Crim. 67, 147 S.W.2d 480, 482 (App.1941). Both subsections (a) and (b) set forth rules of law that could be implicated by circumstances other than those set forth in subsection (c); if an instruction can only be given under subsection (c) circumstances, law applicable to the case could conceivably be kept from the jury. We do not believe that this is what the legislature intended. Were subsection (c) intended to set forth exclusive circumstances in which an instruction should be given, the legislature could have explicitly stated that an instruction may not be given under subsections (a) or (b) except as provided by subsection (c).

Failing to recognize that an issue may be raised under subsection (a) by circumstances other than those set forth in subsection (c), appellant's argument turns primarily upon whether the circumstances set forth in subsection (c) have been met. Having held that subsection (c) is not controlling of whether an instruction is required under subsection (a), we will address only those portions of appellant's argument that are relevant to subsection (a). ⁵

II.

Appellant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to raise an issue that she was intoxicated, relying upon one case from this court, Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1110, 106 S.Ct. 897, 88 L.Ed.2d 931 (1986). In Nethery, a witness testified that the defendant had 3 "kamikaze" drinks and smoked a marihuana cigarette in her presence, but that he did not act or appear intoxicated. The defendant gave a written statement upon his arrest in which he stated that he "remembered drinking beer, whiskey, and vodka," smoking marihuana and "being naked and running into some water." Id. at 711-12. A police officer testified that of three shots made by the defendant, one was a hit and that the defendant managed physical maneuvers that were "fairly difficult to do when one is sober." We...