Taylor v. State, SC17–1458

Citation246 So.3d 204
Decision Date05 April 2018
Docket NumberNo. SC17–1458,SC17–1458
Parties William Kenneth TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

246 So.3d 204

William Kenneth TAYLOR, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC17–1458

Supreme Court of Florida.

[April 5, 2018]


Kevin T. Beck of Law Office of Kevin T. Beck, P.A., St. Petersburg, Florida, for Appellant

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Christina Z. Pacheco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee

PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court on appeal by William Taylor from an order denying a motion to vacate a sentence of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a sentence of death, this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of relief.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Taylor was found guilty of first-degree murder of Sandra Kushmer, attempted first-degree murder of William Maddox, robbery with a deadly weapon, robbery with a firearm, and armed burglary of a dwelling. See Taylor v. State (Taylor I ), 937 So.2d 590, 596 (Fla. 2006). After the penalty phase, the jury returned a recommendation of death by a vote of twelve to zero. Id. at 597. The trial court found the following aggravating circumstances: "(1) the murder was committed while Taylor was on felony probation; (2) Taylor had previously been convicted of a felony involving a threat of violence to the person; and (3) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain." Id. (citations omitted). Each aggravating circumstance was afforded great weight. Id. The trial court did not find that any statutory mitigators existed, but found thirteen nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Id. The trial court concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and Taylor was sentenced to death. Id.

On direct appeal, Taylor raised one guilt phase claim and three penalty phase claims. Id. at 597–601. We denied Taylor's claims and upheld his convictions and sentence of death. Id. at 604. Taylor did not seek certiorari review, and his sentence became final upon expiration of the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1)(A).

On October 9, 2006, Taylor filed a postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Taylor v. State (Taylor II ), 87 So.3d 749, 756–57 (Fla. 2012). The postconviction court denied all of Taylor's postconviction claims. Id. at 757. Taylor also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 753. We affirmed the postconviction court's denial of Taylor's rule 3.851 motion and denied Taylor's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 765.

On January 9, 2017, Taylor filed a successive motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. The postconviction court denied Taylor's motion.

This appeal follows.

ANALYSIS

In this successive postconviction motion, Taylor raises two...

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1 cases
  • Reynolds v. Florida
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • November 13, 2018
    ...recommendation for death to conclude that the Hurst error in Crain's case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"); Taylor v. State, 246 So.3d 204, 206 (2018) ("[T]his Court has consistently relied on Davis to deny Hurst relief to defendants who have received unanimous jury recommendations of ...

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