Taylor v. State, ED101114
Decision Date | 10 March 2015 |
Docket Number | No. ED101114,ED101114 |
Citation | 456 S.W.3d 528 |
Parties | Reginald Taylor, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Scott Thompson, Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Missouri Public Defender, 1010 Market Street, Suite 1100, St. Louis, Missouri 63101, for appellant.
Chris Koster, Attorney General, Rachel Flaster, Assistant Attorney General, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, Missouri 65102, for respondent.
Appellant Reginald Taylor (“Taylor”) appeals from the judgment of the motion court denying his Rule 24.0351 motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Taylor pleaded guilty to one count of domestic assault in the first degree and received a suspended sentence of five years' imprisonment. Taylor's probation was subsequently revoked and the trial court executed the five year sentence. On appeal, Taylor argues that the motion court clearly erred in denying his motion for post-conviction relief because Taylor alleged facts not conclusively refuted by the record which would entitle him to relief. Specifically, Taylor alleges he was denied effective assistance of counsel because he was assigned new appointed counsel after his preliminary hearing, and his new counsel was “disinterested” in trying the case, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. Because the record conclusively refutes Taylor's claim, the motion court did not clearly err in denying his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the motion court.
The State charged Taylor with one count of domestic assault in the second degree. Brooke Curtis (“Curtis”) was initially appointed as counsel for Taylor. Curtis served as Taylor's attorney until after his preliminary hearing and arraignment, at which point another public defender from the same office, Erica Nuyen (“Nuyen”), assumed responsibility for Taylor's defense. Nuyen served as Taylor's attorney during plea negotiations and the plea hearing.
On March 23, 2012, pursuant to plea negotiations with the State, Taylor pleaded guilty to one count of domestic assault in the second degree, and received a suspended sentence of five year's imprisonment and probation. At the plea hearing, the trial court asked Taylor several questions about his guilty plea and Nuyen's performance. Taylor confirmed that he understood the crime with which he was charged, that he had apprised Nuyen of all facts and circumstances surrounding the crime, and that Nuyen had fully explained the nature of the charged crime, including the elements and any possible defenses Taylor may have. The State then summarized the evidence it would have presented had the case gone to trial, which Taylor confirmed was correct. The trial court summarized the proposed plea agreement, including the terms associated with Taylor's proposed probation. Taylor stated that he understood the terms of the agreement and understood that if the trial court accepted his guilty plea, he would be placed on probation. Taylor further stated that he understood his probation could be revoked, resulting in the execution of his jail sentence. The trial court confirmed that Taylor still wanted to move forward with his guilty plea, after which the following exchange occurred:
The trial court then asked Taylor a series of questions to ensure that Taylor understood the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty rather than proceeding to trial, including the right to a trial by jury, the right to be represented by counsel at trial, and the presumption of innocence, among others.
The trial court accepted Taylor's guilty plea, finding that the plea had been “made voluntarily and intelligently, with a full understanding of the charge and the consequences of the plea and with an understanding of his rights attending a jury trial and the effect of a plea on those rights.” The trial court then sentenced Taylor to five year's imprisonment, suspended execution of the sentence, and placed Taylor on five years' probation.
On August 2, 2012, Taylor appeared before the trial court for a probation revocation hearing. The trial court found that Taylor had violated the terms of his probation and executed his previously-imposed five year sentence. Prior to sentencing, the trial court questioned Taylor about his representation by legal counsel. Taylor confirmed that he was represented by both Curtis and Nuyen during his case. Taylor had the following exchange with the trial court regarding their assistance:
The trial court found that no probable cause existed to believe that Taylor received ineffective assistance of counsel and concluded the hearing.
Taylor subsequently filed a pro se Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief. Counsel was appointed and filed an amended motion for post-conviction relief. In his amended motion, Taylor alleged that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because (1) he had insufficient time to discuss the case with counsel prior to pleading guilty, and (2) he was discouraged when Curtis was replaced by Nuyen, who seemed unfamiliar with the case. But for this ineffective assistance, Taylor maintained, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. In support of his claim, Taylor alleged that he was dismayed and discouraged when his case was transferred from Curtis to Nuyen. Taylor also alleged that he felt Nuyen would not vigorously defend him at trial because he and Nuyen had only one meeting, during which Nuyen seemed more interested in negotiating a guilty plea than investigating the case. Taylor further alleged that he did not have enough time to speak with Nuyen about the case prior to entering his guilty plea.
The motion court denied Taylor's request for an evidentiary hearing and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order, and Judgment denying Taylor's motion for post-conviction relief. The motion court concluded that Curtis and Nuyen provided effective assistance of counsel and that Taylor's claim of ineffective assistance was refuted by the record. The motion court focused on the statements made by Taylor at both the plea hearing and the probation revocation hearing, finding:
[Taylor] stated he had enough time to speak with his attorney, that his attorney answered all his questions, that he was given enough time to discuss his case with his attorney, that he had no complaints with his attorney, and that he did not know of any witnesses she could have contacted. At the probation revocation hearing [Taylor] stated that both his attorneys did everything he asked of them. [Taylor's] point 8 is refuted on the record and is denied.
This appeal follows.
In his sole point on appeal, Taylor contends that the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing because Taylor alleged facts not conclusively refuted by the record which would entitle him to relief in that Taylor was denied effective assistance of counsel,...
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