Taylor v. State, 02-545.

• Decision Date: 16 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-545.,02-545.
• Parties: Kevin TAYLOR v. STATE of Arkansas.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

125 S.W.3d 174

354 Ark. 450

Kevin TAYLOR v. STATE of Arkansas.

No. 02-545.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

October 16, 2003.

Kevin Taylor, Newport, pro se.

Mike Beebe, Att'y Gen., by Jeffrey A. Weber, Ass't Att'y Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

RAY THORNTON, Justice.

On December 12, 1991, in Crittenden County Circuit Court case number 91-617, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of possession of a controlled substance, and upon conviction, appellant was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. In April 1993, appellant was released from the sentence imposed in case number 91-617, and his sentence for this offense was discharged in July of 1996.

Also on December 12, 1991, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of delivery of a controlled substance, a Class Y felony, in case number 91-756. After entry of his guilty plea, appellant received a twenty-year sentence, imposition of which was suspended.

On December 11, 1997, the State filed a petition seeking revocation of the suspension of appellant's sentence in case number 91-756. After a hearing on the State's petition, the trial court granted the petition and sentenced appellant to twenty years' imprisonment on the charge of delivery of a controlled substance. In 1998, appellant appealed the trial court's order and the court of appeals affirmed the revocation in an unpublished opinion.

On March 12, 2002, appellant filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. In his petition, appellant argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and that he was "being held pursuant to an invalid conviction." Specifically, appellant argued that the original sentencing court erred when it suspended imposition of his sentence in case number 91-756 on the charge of delivery of a controlled substance. He argued that suspension of such a sentence was prohibited by statute. Next, appellant contended that the twenty-year suspended sentence imposed in case number 91-756 and the ten-year sentence that he received in case number 91-617 should have run concurrently. Finally, appellant argued that the second sentencing court erred when it sentenced him to twenty years' imprisonment without taking into account the time which he served in case number 91-617. Appellant requested that his twenty-year sentence be "dismissed or corrected."

On April 24, 2002, the Jefferson County Circuit Court entered an order denying appellant's petition. It is from this denial that appellant appeals. We reverse the circuit court's denial of appellant's petition, grant appellant's request for a writ of habeas corpus, and remand this case for resentencing.

We have explained the rules we follow when reviewing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, in Renshaw v. Norris, 337 Ark. 494, 989 S.W.2d 515 (1999), we wrote:

A writ of habeas corpus will issue where a commitment is invalid on its face or where the sentencing court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter or modify the sentence. See, e.g., Sawyer v. State, 327 Ark. 421, 938 S.W.2d 843 (1997), Mackey v. Lockhart, 307 Ark. 321, 819 S.W.2d 702 (1991). When a habeas corpus petition alleges that a sentence is void or illegal, we review the matter of the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction to enter such sentences regardless of whether an objection was made to the trial court.

Renshaw, supra. In Renshaw, we also noted that detention for an illegal period of time is precisely what a writ of habeas corpus is designed to correct. Id. In order to obtain habeas relief a petitioner must plead either the facial invalidity or the lack of jurisdiction and make a "showing, by affidavit or other evidence, [of] probable cause to believe" he is so detained. Flowers v. State, 347 Ark. 760, 68 S.W.3d 289 (2002); see also Ark.Code Ann. § 16-112-103 (1987).

Prior to reviewing the challenge to the validity of the judgment and commitment orders entered in this matter, we will consider whether the Crittenden County Circuit Court had jurisdiction over appellant's case. In case number 91-756, appellant was charged by criminal information with the crime of selling or delivering a controlled substance. Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-88-101(a)(3) (1987) provides in relevant part:

(a) The jurisdiction of the various courts of this state, for the trial of offenses, shall be as follows:

* * *

(3) the circuit court shall have general jurisdiction for the trial of all offenses which may be prosecuted by indictment, and all prosecutions and penal actions....[.]

Id. Based upon the foregoing statutory provision, we conclude that the Crittenden County Circuit Court had jurisdiction over case number 91-756 and had jurisdiction to accept appellant's guilty plea entered in that case. Accordingly, any contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over appellant's case is without merit.

Additionally, before considering the merits of appellant's appeal, we note that in its brief, the State argues that appellant should have raised the issues contained in his habeas petition during his direct appeal. In support of its proposition, the State cites Hutcherson v. State, 316 Ark. 551, 873 S.W.2d 164 (1994). In Hutcherson, a criminal defendant was seeking a writ of habeas corpus after his conviction had been affirmed on appeal. Hutcherson argued that the circuit court had no jurisdiction over his conviction because the federal and state authorities had violated a federal act. Id. We determined that Hutcherson's argument was without merit and that his argument, which was not jurisdictional, should have been raised during his direct appeal. Id. (emphasis added). In Hutcherson, we also noted that a petition for writ of habeas corpus cannot serve as a substitute for an appeal of a criminal conviction. Id.

Mindful of the principles articulated in Hutcherson, we conclude that the State's argument is misplaced. Specifically, the issues raised in appellant's habeas petition involve allegations of a void or illegal sentence. We have said that we will treat allegations of void or illegal sentences similar to the way that we treat problems of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Flowers v. State., 347 Ark. 760, 68 S.W.3d 289 (2002), see also Renshaw v. State., 337 Ark. 494, 989 S.W.2d 515 (1999). Additionally, we have noted that detention for an illegal period of time is precisely what a writ of habeas corpus is designed to correct. Flowers, supra. Accordingly, because appellant's petition raises allegations of an illegal sentence, and because we have held that such allegations are appropriate for writs of habeas corpus, we will proceed to our consideration of the merits of appellant's petition.

In appellant's first point on appeal, he argues that the judgment and commitment order entered in case number 91-756 in December of 1991 was facially invalid. Specifically, appellant argues that the trial court was without authority to suspend imposition of his sentence in case number 91-756. Appellant further argues that because his sentence was improperly suspended in 1991, in a facially invalid judgment and commitment order, the trial court was without authority to impose the terms of that sentence in the 1998 judgment and commitment order which was issued after the trial court granted the State's revocation petition.

We note that in Arkansas, sentencing is entirely a matter of statute. State v. Stephenson, 340 Ark. 229, 9 S.W.3d 495 (2000). Sentencing may not be other than in accordance with the statute in effect at the time of the commission of the crime. Id. Where the law does not authorize the particular sentence pronounced by a trial court, that sentence is unauthorized and illegal, and the case must be reversed and remanded. Id.

We now consider whether the judgment and commitment order entered in case number 91-756 in December of 1991 was facially invalid. Appellant contends that the trial court lacked authority to impose the sentence that it entered in case number 91-756. Appellant further contends that because the trial court acted without authority, the order entered in case number 91-756 was invalid.

The order that appellant challenges sentenced appellant to twenty years' imprisonment and suspended imposition of the sentence. Appellant argues that the trial court lacked authority to suspend imposition of the sentence. In support of his argument, appellant cites Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-301(a)(1)(F) (Supp 1991). This statute provides in relevant part:

(a)(1) A court shall not suspend imposition of sentence as to a term of imprisonment nor place the defendant on probation for the following offenses:

* * *

(F) Drug related offenses under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act § 5-64-101 et. seq. ...[.]

Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-301(a)(1)(F); see also Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-104(e)(1)(F) (Supp.1991).

In case number 91-756, the case in which appellant received the twenty-year suspended sentence, appellant pleaded guilty to delivery of a controlled substance. According to the information filed in case number 91-756, the controlled substance that appellant delivered was cocaine. These actions were prohibited by the Uniform Controlled Substance Act. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-401 (1987).

After reviewing the foregoing statutory provisions, we conclude that the trial court lacked authority to suspend imposition of appellant's sentence in case number 91-756 and that the judgment and commitment order entered in that case was facially invalid. Specifically, appellant pleaded guilty to delivery of a controlled substance, a Class Y Felony, which was prohibited by the Uniform Controlled Substance Act. The trial court was therefore required by statute to sentence appellant to a term of imprisonment. Rather than sentencing appellant to a term of imprisonment and executing that sentence, the trial court sentenced appellant to a twenty-year term of imprisonment and suspended imposition of that...