Taylor v. State
| Citation | 173 S.W.3d 359 |
| Decision Date | 06 October 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 26666.,26666. |
| Parties | Paul R. TAYLOR, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent-Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Mark A. Grothoff, Columbia, MO, for Appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Karen L. Kramer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
Paul Taylor ("Taylor") appeals from the denial of his motion to vacate, set aside or correct judgment or sentence pursuant to Rule 29.15.1 His amended motion alleged, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to comments in closing argument which permitted the jury to consider Taylor's prior convictions for the purpose of determining his guilt or propensity to commit crimes. Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion court denied this aspect of the amended motion on the grounds that the prosecutor's arguments either constituted appropriate comments concerning Taylor's credibility, or they were invited by Taylor's own trial strategy. Taylor claims the motion court's conclusions are clearly erroneous. We affirm.
Taylor was charged by information with committing the class A felony of murder in the second degree in violation of § 565.021.2 This murder charge arose out of an altercation in which the victim, Robert Wylder ("Victim"), was beaten to death by Taylor. The information also alleged that Taylor was a prior offender because he had previously pled guilty to the felony offense of unlawful use of a weapon.
At trial, the State presented evidence that Victim was sitting in his truck with a passenger, Brian Watker, when Taylor walked up and struck Watker without provocation. The blow knocked Watker out. When he regained consciousness, he saw Taylor sitting astride Victim's chest, beating him. Watker left the scene to get help, but Victim was already dead when Watker returned with the police. Taylor presented evidence that it was Victim and Watker who attacked Taylor without provocation; he merely acted in self-defense to repel their attack. All three men were intoxicated when the brawl occurred.
The jury received verdict-directing instructions on second degree murder and the lesser-included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. See § 565.025. The law of self-defense was explained via a separate instruction. The jury acquitted Taylor of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, but he was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Having found Taylor to be a prior offender as defined in § 558.016.2, the trial court imposed a sentence of seven years imprisonment. We affirmed Taylor's conviction and sentence on direct appeal in State v. Taylor, 123 S.W.3d 924 (Mo.App.2004).
Thereafter, Taylor filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside or correct judgment or sentence pursuant to Rule 29.15. Counsel was appointed, and he filed an amended motion on Taylor's behalf. After an evidentiary hearing was held, the motion court denied the motion.
The facts supporting Taylor's involuntary manslaughter conviction were extensively recounted in our opinion addressing the issues raised in his direct appeal and need not be repeated here. See Taylor, 123 S.W.3d at 925-28. We summarize below only those additional facts relevant to the issue presented by this second appeal: whether Taylor's trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's arguments concerning Taylor's prior convictions.
During Taylor's case in chief, he was asked about his prior convictions and gave the following testimony:
Q. And, before we get too far along, Paul, I want you to explain to the jury a little bit of some of the trouble you've had with the law in the past, okay?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you ready to do that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, sir, what sort of convictions have you had?
A. I've had an unlawful use of a weapon. I've had two D.W.I.s, domestic violence, and a paraphernalia.
Q. Okay, you said you'd had an unlawful-use-of-a-weapon conviction, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And, where was that at?
A. Stone County.
Q. How old were you?
A. Seventeen.
Q. And, you're how old now?
A. Thirty-one.
Q. And, you said that you've had a couple of D.W.I.s?
A. Yes.
Q. Where were those?
A. Here in Taney County.
Q. And, you've had a drug paraphernalia and domestic assault?
A. Yes.
Q. Where were those?
A. Christian County.
Q. Let me ask you, Paul, have you ever had a trial on any of those prior convictions?
A. No, I have not.
Q. Did you plead guilty?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Why did you plead guilty to those charges?
A. Because I was guilty.
Later in Taylor's direct examination, he gave the following additional testimony concerning his prior convictions:
Q. Paul, do you remember being asked at some point by Detective Swan or Detective Rozell—well, let me back up, if I may. You explained to the jury that you were convicted in Stone County, Missouri, of unlawful use of a weapon, right?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. What kind of crime was that? Was it a misdemeanor —
A.—No. It was a felony.
Q. And, did you actually end up having to do some prison time because of it?
A. Yes, I did.
After Taylor testified about his prior convictions on direct examination, he was cross-examined on this subject. Taylor admitted that, after he was charged with second degree murder for killing Victim in September 2000, he committed an assault for which he was convicted on November 14, 2001. He denied, however, that he was convicted of a second assault on May 23, 2002. The trial court admitted certified copies of these convictions, which showed both assaults had been committed against Taylor's wife. Even after reviewing the certified copies, Taylor steadfastly denied that he had been twice convicted of domestic violence after September 2000.
On redirect examination, Taylor was questioned once again about his prior convictions and gave the following testimony:
Q. Now, Paul, you told the ladies and gentlemen of the jury that you had an assault conviction out of Christian County, right?
A. Correct.
Q. And, [the prosecutor] presented to you two convictions, right?
A. Correct.
Q. Do you remember the additional conviction he showed you?
A. No.
Q. Can you just real briefly explain how those two things resulted, those two cases?
A. Resulted?
Q. How they came about.
A. How they came about, it's been pretty hard—pretty hard times last two—you know, two years, two-and-a-half years, and you know, sometimes you can be pretty hurtful to your loved ones, and the way for my wife to—to get even with me at—at the time was she would call 911.
Q. In fact, Paul, those—those third-degree assaults, those are with regard to your wife, correct?
A. Correct.
At the instruction conference, the trial court decided to give Instruction No. 11, which was an impeachment instruction patterned after MAI-CR 3d 310.10. Just prior to the commencement of closing argument, the court read all of the instructions to the jury. Instruction No. 11 stated:
If you find and believe from the evidence that defendant was found guilty of the offense of unlawful use of a weapon, driving while intoxicated, possession of drug paraphernalia, driving while intoxicated, driving while license suspended, 3rd degree assault, and 3rd degree assault, you may consider that evidence for the sole purpose of deciding the believability of the defendant and the weight to be given to his testimony and for no other purpose. You must not consider such previous finding of guilt as any evidence that the defendant is guilty of any offense for which he is now on trial.
Near the end of the State's rebuttal argument, the prosecutor began attacking Taylor's credibility as a witness. During this phase of the argument, which covered only about four pages of the transcript, the prosecutor made four comments forming the basis for Taylor's complaints in this appeal. To permit the specific comments challenged by Taylor to be evaluated in context, they are set forth below in italicized type:
Comments 1 and 2
Now, let's talk about the defendant's integrity and his honesty, when you talk about him. He came up and he decided he wanted to tell you a story. I can only say to characterize his story as memory is a kind factor. Memory is a kind factor. He only remembers the things that helped him, and if in fact they hurt him, he didn't remember. Remember he didn't tell you about all of the convictions. Let's think about his credibility. Here's a man that's charged with murder in the second degree, and the police arrest him, and he's charged, and he pleads guilty to domestic violence, and his explanation to you was Now listen to that, and what did he say was the reason you could get away with that? He said "I've been under a lot of pressure so I committed domestic violence." I assume, hit his wife, assaulted his wife. Think about that. If that man will assault his loved one and seeks justification, what will he not do to a stranger? We cannot put a police officer with him 24 hours a day to correct his bad judgment. Society doesn't owe that to us. His statement at least "Oh, I'm never anybody that tries to—tries to have fights, get in fights".[3] This is a whole litany of his fights and assaulting people, of unlawful use of a weapon.
Now, defense counsel, and he's very admirably represented his client, but as I said before, that's why we have prisons. We can't put police officers behind people who use violence when they drink. We can't do it. We just don't have enough police officers, and every time we have known something about the defendant, he can't control himself. He can't keep the violence away, and again, I was like stunned when he said he wasn't going to ask for help for the victim, but these domestic-violence cases occurred after he was charged with murder.
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