Taylor v. Steele

• Decision Date: 26 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-2763,19-2763
• Citation: 6 F.4th 796
• Parties: Leonard S. TAYLOR Petitioner - Appellant v. Troy STEELE Respondent - Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

6 F.4th 796

Leonard S. TAYLOR Petitioner - Appellant

v.Troy STEELE Respondent - Appellee

No. 19-2763

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: December 15, 2020

Filed: July 26, 2021

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant and appeared on the brief was Kent E. Gipson, of Kansas City, MO. The following attorney(s) also appeared on the appellant brief; Kevin L. Schriener, of Saint Louis, MO.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee and appeared on the brief was Katharine Dolin, AAG, of Jefferson City, MO.

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

SMITH, Chief Judge.

Leonard S. Taylor claimed in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that his trial counsel was ineffective for not providing closing argument during the penalty phase of his capital-murder trial. The district court¹ denied relief.

Taylor, though advised otherwise, insisted that his trial counsel forgo closing argument. Taylor's informed, voluntary decision thus prevented his counsel's reluctant compliance with Taylor's wishes from subsequently becoming ineffective assistance of counsel. The nature of the decision to forgo closing argument, whether fundamental or one of trial strategy,² does not alter this result. Taylor's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is procedurally defaulted and therefore barred. Thus, we affirm the district court's denial of the petition.

I. Background

In 2004, police found Taylor's girlfriend Angela Rowe and her three children dead inside their home. Missouri charged Taylor with four counts of first-degree murder and four counts of armed criminal action for the killings of Rowe and her children. While awaiting trial for their murders, Taylor was convicted on an unrelated charge of forcible rape and sentenced to 100 years’ imprisonment without parole. See State v. Taylor , 238 S.W.3d 145 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).

The jury for Taylor's murder trial convicted him on all counts. The next day, the jury reconvened for the penalty phase of the trial. The state presented evidence of Taylor's prior convictions, testimony from the victim in the forcible-rape conviction, and testimony from Rowe's and her children's family.

For the defense, Taylor's trial team—at his insistence—did not present closing argument during the penalty phase. And the only mitigating evidence that it presented was one stipulation as to Taylor's good behavior in prison. Twice, the state trial court questioned Taylor's decisions during the penalty phase:

THE COURT: Mr. Taylor, do you want to come up with your lawyers?

(Whereupon the attorneys approached the bench and the following occurred outside the hearing of the jury.)

THE COURT: Mr. Taylor, we're about to proceed with this, the second stage of the trial, the punishment phase on the jury's finding of guilt to four counts of Murder in the First Degree. Just a few moments ago I was approached by your attorneys who indicated to me that you have instructed them in this phase of the trial that you do not want them to—well, let me ask you, first, you've given them certain instructions about how you want them to conduct this second phase of the trial. Why don't you tell me what it is that you told them, what limitations you're putting on them.

THE DEFENDANT: I have instructed my attorneys not to argue anything in this portion of the trial, this penalty phase. As a Muslim we do not ask for other men something they cannot give us or take from us. I would never ask another man or jurors for a dime which they could give me, and being that I definitely wouldn't ask them for my life, which they can't take nor can they give. Only Allah can do that. So to concede to that would be giving them a false sense of authority they don't have. Neither they have that nor you. And if it's Allah's will I'll die tonight, tomorrow, fifty years from now.

THE COURT: The second phase procedure following the second phase, both sides, the State and your lawyers are allowed to make opening statements. And the opening statements are basically confined to what they expect to present as evidence in this second phase of the trial. It's my understanding, and I'll direct this to [trial counsel], you do have some evidence that you were going [to] present on behalf of Mr. [Taylor]; is that correct?

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Well, I've discussed this with Mr. Taylor and I think he is okay with us basically indicating [to] the jury not much more than we do have some evidence by stipulation regarding his behavior while incarcerated, and think he's indicated he's okay with that.

THE COURT: And that's correct?

THE DEFENDANT: That's the only thing I will allow them to enter into stipulation as to whatever my conduct has been while incarcerated, or so forth. So on that matter not either—whatever else will be.

THE COURT: Once the evidence has been concluded then both sides are going to have an opportunity to argue this case and argue—I guess they'll argue the evidence that has been presented. And I'm sure if it follows, the course followed in the past, the State will be asking the jury to impose the death penalty. Your lawyers, if allowed, would ask the jury to spare your life. Are you asking them not to do that?

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I would never ask another man not to do something they have no power to do. Only Allah can spare my life, only Allah gave me life. So if they impose a death sentence that means nothing to me, okay?

THE COURT: I understand. The position you're taking is going to severely hamper your attorneys in their efforts to try to spare your life, do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: I'm not going—I wouldn't ask you to spare my life, I would not allow them to do that because you have no power to do that, you have no power to take my life.

THE COURT: I guess my question to you, do you understand you're really hamstringing them in terms of presenting a defense for you?

THE DEFENDANT: What I understand is this here, Your Honor, I'm leaving the power of life and death in the hands of Allah who's the only person who has that power. It would not be the prosecutor, no juror, no one else for my life, only Allah can give that, only Allah can take that. At birth every man was sentenced to death, it may be a day, it may be a year, it may be a hundred [years], but you're guaranteed to die, you know, so we're not afraid of that if it be that. It may not be that.

THE COURT: It is your decision, I'm satisfied it's not a decision forced on you by anybody. You're taking this position through your own volition and this is your decision; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: I'm a Muslim.

THE COURT: I understand.

THE DEFENDANT: And as we establish ourselves through positive action and live by that, whatever the course may be, and we except [sic] that. Now if they want to argue for death, go ahead, but we're not going to beg them or anybody else.

THE COURT: I want this record to be perfectly clear this is your decision.

THE DEFENDANT: It's my decision. It's a last decision.

THE COURT: You've gone through and communicated to your lawyers and now you've communicated to me it is your decision.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right.

THE DEFENDANT: Ma sha Allah.

Taylor v. Steele , 372 F. Supp. 3d 800, 861–62 (E.D. Mo. 2019) (sixth alteration not in original). After a second colloquy with the court clarifying Taylor's instructions to counsel, defense counsel read into evidence the written stipulation describing Taylor's good behavior while incarcerated.

The jury recommended the death penalty on each first-degree murder count, and the state trial court sentenced Taylor to death on each murder charge and imposed consecutive sentences of life imprisonment on the armed criminal action charges. Taylor filed a direct appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court, which affirmed. Taylor also moved for postconviction relief that the postconviction court denied. He then appealed the denial to the Missouri Supreme Court, and it affirmed the post-conviction court.

Taylor then petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus based on eight grounds. The district court rejected his arguments but granted Taylor a certificate of appealability on a single issue: whether Taylor received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel followed his directive to forgo closing argument during the penalty phase of his trial. Taylor appeals the district court's denial of relief on this basis.

II. Discussion

"We review de novo the question whether [a] claim is procedurally defaulted." Stephen v. Smith , 963 F.3d 795, 800 (8th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Kemp v. Kelley , 924 F.3d 489, 499 (8th Cir. 2019) ). The first time that Taylor raised the certified ineffective-assistance claim was in his federal habeas petition. The parties agree that Taylor's failure to raise it in his state postconviction motion defaulted his claim.

Federal courts generally cannot "review [the] claims that a habeas petitioner has defaulted in state court" unless the claim satisfies the Martinez v. Ryan³ exception to procedural default. Harris v. Wallace , 984 F.3d 641, 647–48 (8th Cir. 2021). Under the exception, Taylor may overcome the default if: (A) "the state collateral review proceeding was the ‘initial’ review proceeding with respect to the ‘ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim’ "; (B) the ineffective-assistance claim is "substantial"; and (C) postconviction counsel's ineffectiveness was the "cause" for the default. Id. at 648 (quoting Kemp , 924 F.3d at 499 ).

A. Initial-Review Collateral Proceeding

Taylor satisfies the first requirement because his postconviction motion was his first opportunity to raise an ineffective-assistance claim. See id. ("Missouri ‘prevent[s] individuals from pursuing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal,’ requiring instead that they make such claims in a post-conviction, ‘initial-review collateral proceeding.’ " (alteration in original) (quot...