State v. Taylor
Decision Date | 20 November 2007 |
Docket Number | No. SC 88426.,SC 88426. |
Citation | 238 S.W.3d 145 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Leonard TAYLOR, Appellant. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Robert W. Lundt, Michelle M. Rivera, Office of Public Defender, St. Louis, MO, for Appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Dora A. Fichter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
Must the state prove correct venue as an element of the offense — that is, that the alleged crime occurred in the county where the case is being initiated?
In this case, the victim of a rape seemed uncertain whether the crime occurred in St. Louis County or in the city of St. Louis. The case presents the Court an opportunity to clarify the law of venue in criminal cases. Venue is not "jurisdictional." Venue is not an element of the offense. An objection to venue must be presented, and ruled on, prior to trial.
Any error in handling the question of venue in this case was not prejudicial. The judgment is affirmed.
Appellant Leonard Taylor lived with his wife and stepchildren in Alton, Illinois. On July 10, 2000, Leonard Taylor and his 16-year-old stepdaughter, P.L., went to a park in Alton. While at the park, Taylor asked P.L., who had her driver's permit, to drive him across the bridge to St. Louis. Leonard told P.L. that they would drive across the bridge and then return to the park. P.L. agreed. As they were driving across the bridge, Taylor placed his hand on P.L.'s chest and said that he was checking to see if her heart was beating quickly.
Once they had reached the other side of the bridge, Taylor gave P.L. directions to a house. When they arrived at the house, Taylor took a gun from the glove compartment of the car and P.L. waited while Taylor went inside the house. P.L. does not know where the house was located. Taylor returned to the car some time later and directed P.L. to drive to another house, where Taylor again went inside with the gun. P.L. said she believes that the second house was in the city of St. Louis, but is unsure of the exact location. Taylor again returned to the car, and they drove to the house of a woman named Winnifer in the city of St. Louis. Taylor and P.L. stayed at Winnifer's house until nightfall.
When they left Winnifer's, P.L. drove Taylor to a liquor store, where Taylor bought alcohol. As they left the liquor store, Taylor put his hand inside P.L.'s shirt. P.L. told Taylor to stop. Taylor again said that he was checking to see if P.L. was scared. Taylor then told P.L., P.L. began to cry and told Taylor that she did not want to drive anymore. Taylor then got into the driver's seat and drove P.L. five or ten minutes from the liquor store to what appeared to be an abandoned grocery store. Although P.L. was not sure of the exact location of the abandoned grocery store, she testified that she was sure it was in the city of St. Louis.
When they reached the grocery store, P.L. was crying and told Taylor that she wanted to go home. Taylor hit P.L. in the face and ordered her to open the passenger side door. Taylor then got out of the driver's seat and walked to the passenger side of the car. He ordered P.L. to pull her pants down and pushed her down on the seat. Taylor then got on top of P.L. and put his penis in her vagina. When Taylor had finished, he got back into the driver's seat and drove back to Alton. Taylor threatened to kill P.L.'s mother and siblings if she told anyone about the rape.
More than four years after the event, in December 2004, P.L. reported the incident to St. Louis City Police Detective John Blaskiewicz. In an attempt to pinpoint the location of the rape, Detective Blaskiewicz drove P.L. around the city of St. Louis. The detective drove her to all the abandoned grocery stores in the area. P.L. could not identify any of the grocery stores as the place where the rape took place, although she stated she was sure that the rape happened in the city of St. Louis.
The state charged Taylor with one count of forcible rape under section 566.030.1 On the first day of trial, Taylor filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue because the victim did not know where the incident took place. The trial judge overruled the motion.
At the close of the state's evidence, Taylor filed a motion for judgment of acquittal based on improper venue. Taylor argued that there was no evidence that the incident occurred in the city of St. Louis and, therefore, venue was improper. The trial judge overruled the motion.
First, that (on) (on or about) [date], in the (City) (County) of, State of Missouri, the defendant had sexual intercourse with [name of victim], and
Second, that defendant did so by use of forcible compulsion, And
Third, that defendant did so knowingly, then you will find the defendant guilty (under Count ____) of forcible rape (under this instruction).
However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of that offense."
The trial court refused to allow defense counsel to argue that the state did not prove that the rape occurred in the city of St. Louis. The trial court did, however, allow Taylor to argue the issue of location to the extent that it affected P.L.'s credibility. During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that P.L. was lying because if she were telling the truth, she would know where the rape occurred.
The jury returned with a verdict of guilty of one count of forcible rape. Taylor was sentenced to prison as a prior and persistent sexual offender. On appeal, the court of appeals transferred the case to this Court pursuant to Rule 83.02.
Taylor argues that the trial court impermissibly lessened the state's burden by not allowing defense counsel to argue that the state failed to prove the rape occurred in the city of St. Louis. Taylor points to MAI-CR 320.01, which requires the state to prove, as an element of the offense, that the crime occurred in the county where the trial is being held.
Taylor correctly points out that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] was charged." State v. Erwin, 848 S.W.2d 476, 481 (Mo. banc 1993), (quoting Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979)). Section 566.030.1 sets forth the elements of forcible rape under Missouri law. The statute provides that "a person commits the crime of forcible rape if such person has sexual intercourse with another person by the use of forcible compulsion." Under this statute, location is not a "fact necessary to constitute the crime" of rape; thus, for this crime, the state need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the location where the crime occurred. Erwin at 481.
Taylor argues that, despite the absence of venue as an element of the crime in section 566.030.1, the inclusion of venue as an element under Missouri Approved Instruction 320.01 — which this Court approved — is presumptively correct. See State v. Huckleberry, 823 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Mo.App.1991); Rule 28.02(c). When an approved instruction conflicts with a statute, however, the statute prevails. State v. Carson, 941 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Mo. banc 1997). Insofar as the MAI-CR 320.01 makes venue an element of the offense of rape, it is incorrect.2
While not an element of the offense of forcible rape, correct venue is an important procedural right of the criminal defendant. The Missouri Constitution provides that a criminal defendant has the right to stand trial in the county in which he is alleged to have committed the crime. Missouri Constitution article I, section 18(a); section 541.033.1(1); State v. Garrett, 416 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Mo.1967).3
Though it is an important procedural right of the criminal defendant, proper venue is not a jurisdictional requirement. Jurisdiction describes the power of a court to try a case, while venue relates to the locale where the trial is to be held. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law section 503 (2007). Jurisdictional doctrine prevents courts from holding trials when the crime at issue occurred out of state; a state court lacks the authority to enforce criminal law unless the conduct, or some substantial portion of it, occurred within the state. State v. Kleen, 491 S.W.2d 244, 245 (Mo.1973) (citing State v. Shaeffer, 89 Mo. 271, 1 S.W. 293 (1886)). Venue determines, among many courts with jurisdiction, the appropriate forum for the trial. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law section 503 (2007).
Article I, section 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution protects criminal defendants from the hardship and unfairness that would result if the state chose to prosecute in a remote location.4 Although venue in criminal cases is prescribed in the Missouri constitution, the venue requirement is not absolute and can be waived. Waiver occurs, for example, when a criminal defense moves for a change of venue. Rules 32.03 and 32.04.
If a criminal defendant believes venue is incorrect, the defendant must object. If the defendant does not object, the case can be tried even though venue would otherwise be incorrect. Incorrect venue does not affect a trial court's power to render judgment. By contrast, a lack of jurisdiction means that a court has no power to hear a case. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law section 503.
Historically, Missouri cases melded the concepts of jurisdiction and venue in both civil...
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