Taylor v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 30 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 93,661.,93,661.
• Citation: 2001 OK CIV APP 16,19 P.3d 895
• Parties: Elizabeth A. TAYLOR, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. James F. TAYLOR and College of Osteopathic Medicine of Oklahoma State University, Defendants/Appellants.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma

19 P.3d 895

2001 OK CIV APP 16

Elizabeth A. TAYLOR, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. James F. TAYLOR and College of Osteopathic Medicine of Oklahoma State University, Defendants/Appellants.

No. 93,661.

Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 1.

June 30, 2000.

Rehearing Denied August 25, 2000.

Certiorari Denied January 23, 2001.

N. Scott Johnson, Tulsa, OK, for Appellants.

Jon E. Brightmire, Richard J. Eagleton, Tulsa, OK, for Appellee.

Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 1.

OPINION

GARRETT, Judge:

¶ 1 Appellant, James F. Taylor, appeals the order of the trial court denying his Motion For New Trial And/Or In the Alternative Motion to Reconsider its order approving a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO). The order was entered to effect the transfer of the award of the marital interest in Appellant's retirement fund, pursuant to the divorce decree¹ of the parties, to Appellee, Elizabeth A. Taylor. The order of the trial court provides:

1. THIS COURT FINDS that the Qualified Domestic Relations Order (the "QDRO") requested by Plaintiff effects the transfer of the marital interest in Defendant's Oklahoma Teachers' Retirement System Benefits Plan in the Decree of Divorce entered October 3, 1997, and that the same should be, and thereby is, entered over the objection of Defendant.

2. THIS COURT FURTHER FINDS that, upon the request of Defendant, this Court hereby authorizes Plaintiff to file the QDRO entered today with the Court Clerk in and for Tulsa County, but not to serve the QDRO on the Oklahoma Teachers' Retirement System until further order of this Court.

¶ 2 The QDRO, issued pursuant to 70 O.S. Supp.1999 § 17-109(B) for dividing retirement benefits under the Oklahoma Teachers' Retirement System (OTRS) provides, inter alia:

2. Amount or Percentage:

The Alternate Payee [Appellee] is awarded 100% of the benefit accrued from June 23, 1985, to April 19, 1994.

3. Number of Payments:

The Alternate Payee shall receive the above-referenced percentage of the value of all parts of the Member's account over the Member's lifetime payable in lifetime monthly payments by OTRS.

4. Applicable Plan:

This Qualified Domestic Order shall apply to the General Defined benefit plan authorized by 70 O.S.1991 § 17-101, et seq., of the Oklahoma Teachers' Retirement System. § 17-109(B)(5)(d)

¶ 3 The order also provides that the payment of benefits to an alternate payee is not required prior to Appellant's actual retirement date and that the obligation of OTRS to pay an alternate payee shall cease upon Appellant's death.

¶ 4 He also contends the order incorrectly awards Appellee retirement benefits which are his separate property. Appellant was allowed to purchase five years of eligibility for teaching in another state after he had achieved ten years of service at the Oklahoma College of Osteopathic Medicine. He contends that the five years represents experience received prior to the marriage. Therefore, Appellant argues Appellee would receive benefits which were earned prior to marriage and which are his non-divisible, separate property, although the five years' experience was purchased during the marriage.

¶ 5 For reversal, Appellant contends:

1. The trial court's rewriting of the parties' substantive stipulation is contrary to law and an abuse of discretion.

2. The trial court's modification of the division of property after the expiration of the term time to include Appellant's separate property in the division of the marital estate and the awarding of Appellant's separate property to Appellee is contrary to Oklahoma law, against the clear weight of the evidence and an abuse of discretion.

¶ 6 Appellant contends that the trial court rewrote the divorce decree provision relating to the division of retirement benefits in a specified sum, and that the order is an improper modification of a divorce decree which had become final and unappealable. In so doing, Appellant contends, the trial court disregarded a stipulation of the parties made pursuant to a property settlement which should be treated as a contract between himself and Appellee.

¶ 7 At the time of the divorce, the parties stipulated the marital portion of the OTRS fund had a value of $39,514.37. Appellee proposed that each party receive 50%, and Appellant proposed that he receive the entire fund. However, the court awarded the entire marital portion to Appellee. The language used by the court in the divorce decree awards the marital interest which is represented by the benefits "accumulated, accrued, and earned" for a particular period, rather than a specific sum. The court's valuation on the marital interest was the stipulated amount submitted by the parties for purposes of property settlement. We note the decree does not award Appellee "the sum of $39,514.37 contained in the fund", or "the retirement fund up to $39,514.37." The decree provides:

The marital interest in Defendant's Teachers' Retirement System of Oklahoma... accumulated, accrued, and earned from June 23, 1985, through April 19, 1994, along with all gains, losses, appreciation, or interest thereon from and after April 19, 1994, which the Court values at $39,514.37 (by Qualified Domestic Relations Order); ... [Emphasis supplied.]

¶ 8 The QDRO, as well, gives Appellee the entire marital interest in the fund for the period of the marriage. We, therefore, find the decree and the QDRO are consistent. Also, the court did not rewrite the parties' stipulation as to the value of the fund, because the parties stipulated the entire marital interest was valued at $39,514.37.

¶ 9 Appellant also complains that the trial court's QDRO modified the divorce decree by including his separate property in the award to Appellee. His purchase of five years' experience from another state to apply to his OTRS fund occurred during the marriage, although the experience it represented occurred prior to the marriage. Appellee responds that this evidence was raised too late. At the hearing on the motion for new trial and/or motion to reconsider, the trial court also questioned why the issue was not raised earlier:

THE COURT: I just think that if you had access at the time to go behind the numbers of this retirement fund, I don't see how you have a right—if there was an opportunity to gather new evidence later on that wasn't available to you at the time of trial, that would be one thing.

. . .

THE COURT: Back to—okay. Back to this argument. If you had the ability to find out that it was worth more at the time of trial, and you weren't impeded in any way, and now we find out suddenly it is worth more, do you think you can come in and ask—or that you can complain?

¶ 10 It was argued at the above hearing that Appellant had requested a provision in the divorce decree that, of the OTRS fund, he would be awarded the interest earned or accumulated prior to the marriage, and that the subject five years' experience was "earned or...