Taylor v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 15 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-441.,06-441.
• Citation: 250 S.W.3d 232,369 Ark. 31
• Parties: Matthew Kevin TAYLOR, Appellant, v. Kristi Lynn TAYLOR, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

250 S.W.3d 232

369 Ark. 31

Matthew Kevin TAYLOR, Appellant, v. Kristi Lynn TAYLOR, Appellee.

No. 06-441.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

February 15, 2007.

Charles Scott Jackson, Berryville, AR, for appellant.

No response.

ROBERT L. BROWN, Justice.

Appellant Matthew Kevin Taylor appeals from a divorce decree granting appellee Kristi Lynn Taylor a divorce on grounds of eighteen months' separation and adultery. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) the circuit court erred in its award of alimony to Kristi, (2) the circuit court erred in its calculation of his income for child-support payments; and (3) the circuit court erred in finding that the travel trailer used by him was marital property. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

Kevin Taylor and Kristi Taylor were married on January 16, 1993, and separated on June 1, 2003. The couple has two minor children, Kassandra Hope Taylor, born September 6, 1992, and Koddie Faith Taylor, born April 14, 2000. Kristi is a stay-at-home mother, and both children have been home-schooled by her since approximately 2002. Pursuant to a Mediation Agreement executed by the parties on November 3, 2004, Kristi was granted custody of both children, subject to visitation by Kevin.

In the subsequent divorce decree entered on January 17, 2006, the circuit court found that Kevin earned a sum of $555 per week in take-home pay and ordered him to pay $149 per week in child support to Kristi for the support of their two children. The circuit court further ordered Kevin to pay $110 per week in alimony to Kristi. The circuit court also ruled that Kevin's interest in a travel trailer, in which he and his girlfriend, Michelle Sharp, lived, was marital property. The court ordered that the travel trailer be sold at a public sale together with all other marital property.

I. Alimony Award

Kevin contends, as his first point on appeal, that the circuit court erred in awarding alimony to Kristi simply because she chooses to educate their children at home. In support of this point, he makes four arguments: (1) that alimony should only be used to equalize marital property in a divorce and should not be used to compensate a parent who chooses to home-school children;¹ (2) that the alimony award to Kristi violates the public interest of this state by not encouraging parents to work to contribute to the financial support of their children; (3) that the circuit court's limiting instructions in the divorce decree for termination of the alimony obligation failed to include remarriage and cohabitation and, thereby, violated the public policy of this state; and (4) that if this court finds that alimony is appropriate, then this court should remand the case to the circuit court for reconsideration of the length of the alimony obligation. On this last argument, he contends that the alimony obligation should last for four or fewer years.

This court reviews divorce cases de novo on the record. See Farrell v. Farrell, 365 Ark. 465, 231 S.W.3d 619 (2006). Moreover, we will not reverse a circuit court's finding of fact in a divorce case unless it is clearly erroneous. See McKay v. McKay, 340 Ark. 171, 8 S.W.3d 525 (2000). Findings of fact made by the circuit court in a divorce case will be reviewed by this court in the light most favorable to the appellee, and we will defer to the superior position of the circuit court to judge the credibility of witnesses. See id. The decision to grant alimony lies within the sound discretion of the circuit court and will not be reversed on appeal, absent an abuse of discretion. See id.

Kevin first argues that alimony should not be awarded to compensate a parent who chooses to home-school her children and remain unemployed. Our standard of review for awards of alimony has been summarized by this court:

The purpose of alimony is to rectify economic imbalances in earning power and standard of living in light of the particular facts in each case. The primary factors that a court should consider in determining whether to award alimony are the financial need of one spouse and the other spouse's ability to pay. The trial court should also consider the following secondary factors: (1) the financial circumstances of both parties; (2) the amount and nature of the income, both current and anticipated, of both parties; (3) the extent and nature of the resources and assets of each of the parties; (4) the earning ability and capacity of both parties. The amount of alimony should not be reduced to a mathematical formula because the need for flexibility outweighs the need for relative certainty.

Kuchmas v. Kuchmas, 368 Ark. 43, 45-46, 243 S.W.3d 270, 271-72 (2006) (internal citations omitted). We have added that the circuit court has the discretion to award alimony that is reasonable under the circumstances. See id.

The circuit court made the following findings in its letter opinion relating to Kevin's obligation to pay Kristi alimony:

The counterplaintiff also requests alimony. She is a stay-at-home mother and she is educating the children at home. She is 30 years of age. She is in good health. She has raised a few head of cattle, but appears to have little in the way of marketable skills. 20% of the counterdefendant's take-home pay is $110.00. He is ordered to pay $110.00 per week alimony to the counterplaintiff. In reaching this amount, the Court was guided by Administrative Rule 10, Section III(e). His obligation to pay alimony is limited by statutory law and/or until both children enter public school or the youngest child shall graduate from high school or reaches age 18, whichever event may first occur.

Bolstering the court's findings was Kristi's testimony at the divorce hearing. She testified that she had not worked in twelve years, had never been employed full-time, and had been a stay-at-home mother throughout the entire marriage. She further testified that it had always been an understanding between Kevin and her that she would take care of the home and the children and that Kevin would provide economic support for the family. She added in her testimony that Kevin traveled frequently for work as a welder and that when their first child was young, she and their child traveled with him. Kristi stated that she had home-schooled both of their children for three years at the time of the divorce hearing (April 19, 2005), and she testified that her home-school schedule began at approximately eight in the morning each day and ended at three in the afternoon. She testified that both she and Kevin originally agreed to the idea of home-schooling their children.

In our analysis, we note initially that Kevin's argument misinterprets the circuit court's order when he contends that the court awarded Kristi alimony solely to compensate her for home-schooling the children. That was not the case. It is clear from the testimony presented at the hearing, as well as the circuit court's order, that Kristi's choice to home-school the children was only one consideration by the court. Other factors supporting the alimony award were Kristi's role as a stay-at-home mother during their marriage and afterwards and her lack of any marketable skills or meaningful employment history.

This court and the court of appeals have emphasized in the past that the circuit court is in the best position to view the needs of the parties in connection with an alimony award. See, e.g., Bailey v. Bailey, 97 Ark.App. 96, 244 S.W.3d 712 (2006) ($250 per week was an insufficient award of alimony where wife had few assets and had only worked part time through most of her twenty-four year marriage after the couple's first child was born and was seeking employment, but was not employed, at time of divorce hearing); Kuchmas, supra (holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony of $100 per month to the appellee, where appellee had worked throughout the marriage and continued to work during the divorce, but her take-home income was only $500 every two weeks and she had no special skills or training); Hiett v. Hiett, 86 Ark.App. 31, 158 S.W.3d 720 (2004) (there was no abuse of discretion in circuit court's award of lifetime alimony to appellee who remained at home during most of her marriage, had not worked outside the home in twenty-five years, had never earned more than minimum wage when she did work, all while appellant was earning over $100,000 per year); Schumacher v. Schumacher, 66 Ark.App. 9, 986 S.W.2d 883 (1999) (appellee showed a need for alimony where she had not worked full time in over fourteen years so she could be a stay-at-home mother and could not find a job after the divorce that would keep her in her accustomed standard of living).

We observe, in addition, that other jurisdictions have held that a wife's homemaker status can be a basis for awarding alimony. See, e.g., Donovan v. Donovan, 191 S.W.3d 702 (Mo.App.2006) (stating that it is well established that a wife's withdrawal from the workforce to be a homemaker is a sound basis for awarding spousal maintenance); In re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2005) (alimony was warranted where wife was forty-eight years old at the time of the divorce, had been treated for cancer and other illnesses, had stayed home during most of her twenty-three-year marriage, and could earn only approximately $8 per hour upon entering the job market); Byers v. Byers, 910 So.2d 336 (Fla.App.2005) (alimony was appropriate where wife stayed home during marriage to raise the couple's children and, although she stipulated to an earning potential of $20,000 per year, her husband was earning approximately $147,000 per year); In re Letendre, 149 N.H. 31, 815 A.2d 938 (2002) (there was a need for alimony where wife did not have a high school diploma, had been a stay-at-home mother throughout her marriage, had dyslexia, and had only worked minimum-wage jobs).

Kevin relies on Donna G.R. v. James B. R., 877 So.2d 1164 (La.App.2004), as...