Taylor v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
| Decision Date | 16 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 03-516.,Civ.A. 03-516. |
| Citation | 421 F.Supp.2d 946 |
| Parties | Elton TAYLOR v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Keith M. Pyburn, Jr., Lawrence J. Sorohan, II, Nicole Gonzalez Devoss, Stefanie J. Allweiss, Fisher & Phillips, New Orleans, LA, for United Parcel Service Inc.
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendant, United Parcel Service, Inc. ("UPS"). [Doc. No. 90]. Plaintiff, Elton Taylor ("Taylor") has sued UPS for alleged race discrimination and retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. and Louisiana state law. Taylor asserts essentially five claims: (1) "failure to promote" based on discrimination; (2) "failure to promote" based on retaliation; (3) disparate pay based on discrimination; (4) disparate pay based on retaliation; and (5) a hostile work environment.1 Defendant moves for summary judgment dismissing all of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the reasons which follow, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues as to any fact material to Plaintiff's promotion and hostile work environment claims and that UPS is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those claims. The Court finds that there are genuine issues of fact concerning Plaintiff's pay claims, and therefore denies the motion as to those claims.
Taylor has worked for UPS since 1975. During his employment, he has worked in a variety of different positions. In June of 1992, he was promoted to the Center Manager position at the Harvey Center. Subsequent to that promotion, Taylor worked in various "special assignment" positions, such as working with Customer Service for a mobile center and working as a Quality Manager at the Center Manager level. In January of 1999, Taylor was reassigned to a Pre-load Manager position in Shreveport. In early 2000, he also began running Shreveport's On-road Center. It is unclear from the record the current status of Taylor's employment. In any event, he does not assert a termination claim.
Taylor worked for the Gulf South District of UPS. The District is headed by a District Manager. The District Manager has the authority to select any eligible employee within the district to fill an opening or to determine that there is no suitable employee in the district. [Doc. No. 92-3, No. 55]
The Gulf South District conducts Career Development Meetings (or "People's Meetings") twice a year. [Doc. No. 92-3, No. 63] These meetings are attended by the District Manager and his staff, with includes all district personnel at the Division Manager level (Salary Grade 18 or 19). [Id., No. 64] In these meetings, the District Manager and his staff determine eligible candidates to fill any Division Manager level openings which arise before the next meeting (the "Ready Now List"). [Id., No. 65] However, these District Manager positions are not posted and there is no system for applying for such positions. [Id., Nos. 55, 56]
Although Taylor asserts promotion claims all the way back to 1991, as will be shown below, the only relevant time period is from March of 2002 forward. During that time period, Taylor claims he was denied 3 promotions to the position of Division Manager. [Doc. No. 104] The following people were placed in those Division Manager positions:
September 1, 2002 Jerry Kattawar white male
September 1, 2002 Jeffery Soule black male
August 2, 2003 Debra Malone black female
[Id.; Doc. No. 105]
In addition to his promotion claims concerning the Division Manager positions, Taylor also seems to be asserting a failure to promote claim concerning all promotions to Human Resource Division Manager nationwide since March 2002. [Doc. No. 104] However, the only specific promotion of which Taylor complains is a District Human Resources position awarded to Cathy Buck-Lehman in January or March of 2003. [Id.] Taylor complains that he cannot provide further information concerning Human Resource promotions because UPS has failed to provide full discovery concerning its Human Resource personnel. [Id.]
On June 17, 1994, another suit was filed against UPS claiming racial discrimination in pay and promotional opportunities. See Morgan v. United Parcel Service of America, Docket No. 94-CV-1184, Eastern District of Missouri. The Morgan suit was certified as a class action on October 30, 1996. Although not a named plaintiff, Taylor was a class member in Morgan. He was actively involved in the suit, being named as a witness in 1999 and being deposed in 2000. [Doc. No. 92-3, Nos. 159-161]. All of the class claims were dismissed via summary judgment on June 26, 2000. See Morgan v. United Parcel Service of America, 143 F.Supp.2d 1143 (E.D.Mo.2000).2 Some individual claims survived summary judgment, and entry of final judgment on those claims was not made until May 10, 2002. Taylor filed the instant lawsuit on March 19, 2003.
Summary judgment should be granted if the record, taken as a whole, "together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir.1996). The Supreme Court has interpreted the plain language of Rule 56(c) to mandate "the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also, Gunaca v. Texas, 65 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir.1995). A party moving for summary judgment "must `demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,' but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2552). If the moving party "fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
If the moving party meets this burden, Rule 56(c) requires the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and show by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, or other admissible evidence that specific facts exist over which there is a genuine issue for trial. Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (5th Cir.1996). The nonmovant's burden may not be satisfied by conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, metaphysical doubt as to the facts, or a scintilla of evidence. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075; Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047. Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at 1075); see also, S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir.1996). The Court will not, "in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." McCallum Highlands v. Washington Capital Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir.1995), as revised on denial of rehearing, 70 F.3d 26 (5th Cir.1995). Unless there is sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict in the nonmovant's favor, there is no genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When the nonmovant has the burden of proof at trial, he "must come forward with evidence which would be sufficient to enable it to survive a motion for directed verdict at trial." Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 656 (5th Cir.1996). If the nonmovant cannot meet this burden, then "the motion for summary judgment must be granted." Id., Little, 37 F.3d at 1076.
In order to determine whether or not summary judgment should be granted, an examination of the substantive law is essential. Substantive law will identify which facts are material in that "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.
Taylor claims that the statute of limitations on his individual claims was tolled during the pendency of the class action in which he was a class member, Morgan v. United Parcel Service, Docket No. 94-CV-1184, Eastern District of Missouri. The Morgan suit was filed on June 17, 1994 and was certified as a class action on October 30, 1996. All of the class claims were dismissed via summary judgment on June 26, 2000. Some individual claims survived summary judgment, and entry of final judgment was made on May 10, 2002. The instant lawsuit was filed on March 19, 2003. Accordingly, the timeliness of Taylor's individual claims in the instant matter depends in large part upon whether the statute of limitations was tolled until entry of final judgment in the Morgan case (as Taylor contends) or whether it was only tolled until the class claims were dismissed via summary judgment (as UPS contends).
It is well settled that the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class, and...
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