Taylor v. United Rd. Servs., Inc.

• Citation: 313 F.Supp.3d 1161
• Decision Date: 29 May 2018
• Docket Number: 1:18–cv–00330–LJO–JLT
• Parties: Cedric TAYLOR on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiff, v. UNITED ROAD SERVICES, INC., and Does 1–100, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

313 F.Supp.3d 1161

Cedric TAYLOR on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED ROAD SERVICES, INC., and Does 1–100, Defendants.

1:18–cv–00330–LJO–JLT

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed May 29, 2018

David Thomas Mara, Jamie Kathryn Serb, Tony Roberts, William Turley, The Turley & Mara Law Firm, APLC, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff.

David M. Krueger, Pro Hac Vice, Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff, LLP, Cleveland, OH, Michael A. Kaia, Jerry Wayne Pearson, Jr., Young Wooldridge, Bakersfield, CA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND AND FOR AWARD OF COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES TO PLAINTIFF (ECF No. 12)

Lawrence J. O'Neill, UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Plaintiff Cedric Taylor's motion to remand and for an order awarding attorneys' fees and costs. On March 7, 2018, Defendant United Road Services ("URS") removed the case to this Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), which provides that district courts have original jurisdiction over class actions comprising 100 or more class members in which the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and there is minimal diversity between plaintiffs and defendants. ECF No. 1. On April 6, 2018, Plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court. ECF No. 12 ("Motion"). Defendant opposed, ECF No. 13 ("Opp."), and Plaintiff filed a reply, ECF No. 14 ("Reply"). This matter is suitable for disposition without oral argument. See Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion to remand is GRANTED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This is a wage-and-hour class action arising out of Plaintiff's purported employment with URS. On February 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Kern. That complaint defined the putative class to be "All persons who are employed or have been employed by Defendants in the State of California as hourly, Non–Exempt truck workers, industrial truck workers, industrial truck drivers, industrial vehicle drivers, industrial workers, and/or other similar job designations and titles during the period of the relevant statute of limitations." ECF No. 1–1 at PDF page 14 ¶ 41. Defendant filed its answer on June 6, 2017. ECF No. 1–1 at PDF page 71. Pending at the time that Plaintiff filed his case was Brent Hooper, et al. v. URS Midwest, Inc. d/b/a United Road Services, Inc. , Lead Case No. CIVDS1607489, Superior Court for the State of California, County of San Bernardino ("Hooper action"). On July 10, 2017, the court granted final approval of the class settlement in Hooper . ECF No. 1–1 at 83. The settlement class was defined to be "All individuals who were employed by [URS] in the position of California-domiciled Car Hauler employee in any pay period during the ... period from May 13, 2012 through January 30, 2017." Id.

Plaintiff served discovery in mid-June, including requests for production of documents, interrogatories, and deposition notices. ECF No. 12–1, Declaration of Tony Roberts ("Roberts Decl.") ¶ 3. Defendant resisted, arguing that Plaintiff and the putative class were not employees of Defendant and that their claims were covered by the class settlement in Hooper . It was at this time, in mid-July, that Plaintiff first learned of the Hooper action. Because Defendant did not consider him to be an employee, he did not receive notice or opt-out rights. Id. ¶ 8.

Counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant engaged in a number of communications that Plaintiff now claims served to put Defendant on notice of the class that Plaintiff sought to represent. First, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant on August 21, 2017, clarifying that the putative class was not part of the Hooper settlement: "In other words, Mr. Taylor and the class of similarly situated persons were not part of the Hooper settlement because Defendant did not classify them as ‘employees’ and, therefore, [they] are entitled to pursue their claims under this lawsuit." Id. ¶ 10. Second, Defendant sent a letter on September 27, 2017, to Plaintiff, stating in part that it was Defendant's "understanding that Plaintiff believes that ‘similarly situated’ persons are individuals based in California who, while not a party to an IC Agreement, provided driver services to Fleet Owners." ECF No. 12–3. Third, Plaintiff sent an email to Defendant on October 10, 2017, requesting that Defendant "please send me a ballpark estimate of the class size (for all California based drivers of Fleet Owners)." ECF No. 12–4 at 5. Fourth, Plaintiff cites his response to Special Interrogatory No. 1, dated November 1, 2017, which stated Plaintiff's position that "he and other ‘drivers of Fleet owners’ " were non-exempt employees, contrary to Defendant's classification. ECF No. 12–5 at 4. Fifth is an email dated November 3, 2017, from Defendant to Plaintiff, in which Defendant stated that it was not in possession of any policies or procedures for "drivers of fleet owners that we have been discussing." Id. at 2.

On November 6, 2017, Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Plaintiff's claims were covered by the Hooper settlement. The court granted Defendant's motion on December 5, 2017, and permitted Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, which he did on February 5, 2018. He seeks to represent a class of drivers who were not directly employed by URS but drove for third-party entities that made pickups or deliveries for URS customers, defined as follows:

All persons who are employed or have been employed by Defendant in the State of California as all non-exempt drivers, car-haulers, fleet drivers, co-drivers or similar job designations who did not contract directly with but were dispatched by UNITED ROAD SERVICES, INC. to perform pickup and delivery services for customers of UNITED ROAD SERVICES, INC. or any related entity during the time period of February 1, 2013, to the present (hereinafter referred to as "Non–Exempt Employees"). This class of individuals does not include those drivers who received notice and opt-out rights in the class action settlement of Brent Hooper, et al. v. URS Midwest, Inc. d/b/a United Road Services, Inc (Hooper ) Lead Case No. CIVDS1607489, consolidated with Case Nos. CIVDS1609866, 1612011, 1614514, filed in the Superior Court for the State of California for the County of San Bernardino; this class of car-haulers does not include drivers who have an ownership interest in an entity that signed, an "Independent Contractor Service Agreement" or similar written contract with UNITED ROAD SERVICES, INC. or any related entity.

Amended Complaint ¶ 61. Defendant removed the case on March 7, 2018.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

"[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). "To remove a case from state court to federal court, a defendant must file in the federal forum a notice of removal ‘containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.’ " Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 547, 551, 190 L.Ed.2d 495 (2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) ). However, "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

CAFA vests federal courts with "jurisdiction over certain class actions, defined in § 1332(d)(1), if the class has more than 100 members, the parties are minimally diverse, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million." Dart , 135 S.Ct. at 551 (quoting § 1332(d)(2), (5)(B) ). "[U]nder CAFA[,] the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction remains, as before, on the proponent of federal jurisdiction." Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). "If the plaintiff's complaint, filed in state court, demands monetary relief of a stated sum, that sum, if asserted in good faith, is ‘deemed to be the amount in controversy.’ " Dart , 135 S.Ct. at 551 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2) ). "When plaintiff's complaint does not state the amount in controversy, the defendant's notice of removal may do so." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(A) ); see also Abrego , 443 F.3d at 683.

Under CAFA, there is no presumption against removal. Id. at 554. "Where facts are in dispute, the statute requires district courts to make factual findings before granting a motion to remand a matter to state court." Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Fin., 736 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2013). On a plaintiff's motion to remand, it is a defendant's burden to establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Dart , 135 S.Ct. at 553–54 ; Rodriguez v. AT & T Mobility Servs., LLC , 728 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2013).

In proving the amount in controversy, "[t]he parties may submit evidence outside the complaint, including affidavits or declarations, or other summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal." Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc. , 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The parties submit summary-judgment style evidence and using the preponderance standard "the court decides ... whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied." Dart , 135 S.Ct. at 554 ; see also Ibarra , 775 F.3d at 1199–1200. Thus, " ‘removal ... is proper on the basis of [an] amount in controversy asserted’ by the defendant ‘if the district court finds," using the preponderance standard, "that the amount in controversy exceeds’ the jurisdictional threshold." Id. at 553 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B) ). When a party relies on a chain of reasoning that includes...