Taylor v. United States

• Decision Date: 16 January 1907
• Docket Number: 191.
• Parties: TAYLOR v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

152 F. 1

TAYLOR v. UNITED STATES.

No. 191.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

January 16, 1907

This cause comes here upon a writ of error to review a judgment of the Circuit Court, Southern District of New York, entered May 21, 1906, on a verdict of 'guilty' found by a jury after trial upon an indictment for a misdemeanor, under section 18 of the Immigration Act of 1903 which provides (Act March 3, 1903, c. 1012, 32 Stat. 1217 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1905, p. 283):

'That it shall be the duty of the owners, officers, and agents of any vessel bringing an alien to the United States to adopt due precautions to prevent the landing of any such alien from such vessel at any time or place other than that designated by the immigration officers, and any such owner officer, agent, or person in charge of such vessel who shall land or permit to land any alien at any time or place other than that designated by the immigration officers shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall on conviction be punished by a fine for each alien so permitted to land of not less than one hundred or more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.'

William G. Choate, for plaintiff in error.

Henry L. Stimson and Michael Byrne, for defendant in error.

Before WALLACE, LACOMBE, and TOWNSEND, Circuit Judges.

LACOMBE Circuit Judge (after stating the facts).

Taylor was the captain of the Cunard steamship Slavonia, which arrived at her pier in New York City early in the morning of October 10, 1905, at the end of a voyage from Fiume, Hungary. At the time of her arrival the place of landing designated under the statute by the immigration officers for aliens landing from a vessel was Ellis Island. When the Slavonia was at Fiume, one Elias Ramadonawich, an alien, shipped on her as third cook in the steerage kitchen. He had previously served on an Austrian ship, and showed his previous shipping papers when he signed the articles of the Slavonia. He shipped for the round trip; the terms of the articles being that he should not be paid off until he returned to Fiume. The amount of wages earned by him on his arrival in New York was less than $6.

At a quarter of 6 o'clock in the evening of October 10th after finishing his day's work he reported to the head of his department that his work was finished, but asked no permission of him, or of any one else, to go ashore. He then went to his room and washed and dressed. After this, with two other members of the crew, he walked down the gang plank out on the pier and into West street. No one stopped him either on the gang plank or on the pier, or interfered in any way with his departure. So far as appears his record during the short time of his service was good. It was the rule of the ship that members of the crew whose records were good could go ashore after the day's work was over; each department merely keeping enough of its force to do the necessary night duty. No ticket of leave or written permission to the seaman desiring to go ashore was issued, nor any means provided to inform the watchman at the gang plank or on the pier whether any of the crew seeking to go past him had permission to go ashore or not. It does not appear whether on the evening in question there was any watchman, but Ramadonawich saw none, and from defendant's statement of the rule or custom of the ship when in port here it is not apparent that, if he had been there, it would have been his duty to make any inquiry before allowing any of crew to walk off the pier into the city streets.

Ramadonawich never returned to the ship, so that his landing became, as defendant's counsel expresses it, 'the ordinary desertion of a roving seaman in a foreign port. ' The immigration officers first learned of his presence in this country from a letter dated November 10, 1905, received from the superintendent of the Flatbush Poorhouse. An inspector went in search of him, and found him (November 28th) in the Metropolitan Hospital, where he had been for 16 days. Evidently it did not take long for him to 'become a public charge.'

The court instructed the jury that, under section 18, 'if the captain of the ship does not use due precaution to shut off opportunity for * * * desertion and landing, due precaution to prevent the overt act which the alien does, then he would fall under the condemnation of the act. ' Elsewhere he instructed them:

'It is his duty to exercise the care that any good business man in that occupation would exercise; take the precautions that such a man would take and see to it that men who are aliens and part of his crew, if allowed to go ashore, should be allowed to do so under such rules, discipline, and restraint as would tend to bring them back to the ship. Now, if the captain has done that he has done his whole duty, and that is the essential thing for you to grasp and say what would a typical business man in that occupation have done under those circumstances.'

This seems to us an entirely fair and reasonable construction of this section. It gives force to all the clauses of its single sentence, coupling the penal provisions against permitting to land with the provisions requiring the adoption of due precautions against such landing, and thus making the test of offense committed, not the alien's mere landing, but the failure to adopt due precautions to prevent it. The statute certainly was not intended to make the owners, officers, and agents insurers against the escape of every alien who might be on board the vessel when she reached this port, and the language used does not require so harsh a construction. The careful and prudent man, who can satisfy a jury that he adopted precautions reasonably adequate to prevent the landing, need be under no apprehension that he incurs a penalty whenever an alien who has arrived in his ship steps ashore.

There was evidence which is discussed in the briefs as to the desertion of seamen generally in the port of New York, as to granting shore leave, and as to the extent to which seamen can be confined to the ship. None of this need be considered here. It deals with the question whether due precautions were taken, and that question was one wholly for the jury under proper instructions.

The main contention of plaintiff in error is that the word 'alien,' in section 18, does not include seamen. The reasons why we do not find this contention persuasive may be briefly stated:

The word 'alien' is a broad one, with a definition wholly unambiguous and clearly understood by all, lawyers and laymen alike. To warrant a construction which will restrict the meaning of such a word deliberately selected by the draftsman of a statute, there must be something highly persuasive to show an intent not as far reaching as the use of such a word would import. The Supreme Court, in Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457, 12 Sup.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226, construing an earlier immigration statute, found that certain broad language used therein should be given a restricted meaning, because of the 'familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers. ' But, as was subsequently pointed out by the same court, such cases are few and exceptional, and only arise when there are cogent reasons for believing that the letter does not fully and accurately disclose the intent, for the 'lawmaker is presumed to know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar. ' As in that case (U.S. v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 18 Sup.Ct. 3, 42 L.Ed. 394), so in this, the language of the act, interpreted in its ordinary sense, 'does not offend the moral sense. Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457, 12 Sup.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226. It involves no injustice, oppression, or absurdity. U.S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 19 L.Ed. 278; McKee v. U.S., 164 U.S. 287, 17 Sup.Ct. 92, 41 L.Ed. 437.'

It may safely be assumed that the surest guide to the intent of a legislative body will be found in the recorded action of that body itself. Examination of these so-called 'immigration statutes' discloses the fact that they have been frequently amended and recast, almost always in the direction of a more drastic exclusion. A review of some of these changes, following decisions of the courts which tended to relax the provisions of earlier acts, will be found in Re Ellis (C.C.) 124 F. 637. Turning, then, to the statute book, we find that section 18 of the act of 1903 (now under consideration) substantially re-enacts part of section 8 of the act of March 3, 1891. Act March 3, 1891, c. 551, 26 Stat 1085 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1298). In the earlier statute it was made the duty of officers of vessels to adopt due precautions to prevent the landing 'of any alien immigrant.' The later statute makes it the duty of these officers to prevent the landing 'of any alien' (omitting the word 'immigrant '). 'Alien immigrant' is a less comprehensive term than 'alien,' and, when it is deliberately discarded for the broader term, the change is highly significant. That the change was deliberate is also apparent. It was no single instance which might be accounted for by some clerical oversight. In sections 12, 13, 17, 20 the term 'alien' was substituted for the term 'alien immigrant' found in earlier acts. See section 8, Act March 3, 1891; sections 1, 2, 6, Act March 3, 1893; Act Oct. 19, 1888, c. 1210, 26 Stat. 566 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1294). Significantly, also, the act refers, in section 2, to the 'admission,' not the 'immigration,' of the excluded classes of aliens; in section 3 to the 'importation,' not merely the 'immigration,' of prostitutes; in sections 4, 5, and 6 to 'importation or migration' of...