Taylor v. United States

• Court: United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York
• Citation: 126 F. Supp. 928
• Parties: Courtney Townsend TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 09 December 1954

126 F. Supp. 928

Courtney Townsend TAYLOR, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

December 9, 1954.

Courtney Townsend Taylor, pro se.

J. Edward Lumbard, U. S. Atty., New York City, Leon Silverman, Asst. U. S. Atty. New York City, of counsel, for respondent.

BICKS, District Judge.

Petitioner pleaded guilty on June 22, 1951 to an information containing 225 counts charging him with transporting and causing to be transported in interstate commerce falsely made and forged

126 F. Supp. 929

securities¹, to wit, checks drawn on fictitious and non-existent bank accounts, and was committed by Judge Samuel H. Kaufman to the custody of the Attorney General for a term of fifteen years.²

In forced retirement from check writing activities, petitioner has turned his talents to drafting successive applications to this Court. This is the sixth in that series.

In the first, which was presented in July, 1951, he sought a reduction of the sentence imposed upon him urging, inter alia, that (a) he was being punished because of his prior criminal record and (b) the sentence was too severe because (i) he had cooperated fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and (ii) it was unlikely that he would be paroled. Judge Samuel H. Kaufman denied that motion in an opinion, D.C., 126 F.Supp. 927 dated August 14, 1951, stating in part:

"The Government recommended a sentence of 15 years. This, according to the defendant, was a fair recommendation if it included consideration of the many other charges against him. His only request was that the proposed sentence run concurrently with a sentence he was then serving. That request was granted."

In October 1952 he made a second motion, this time to vacate the judgment and commitment, pursuant to Title 28 U. S.C. § 2255 on the grounds, among others that: (1) the information did not state an offense cognizable under any federal statute; (2) he was denied due process of law in that he was not indicted and did not competently and intelligently waive indictment; (3) he was denied his constitutional right to be represented by counsel by reason of coercion, threats and promises by Government officials; (4) his plea of guilty was invalid because it was obtained by coercion, threats and promises by Government officials and (5) he did not know the charges to which he was pleading guilty. After a hearing, at which petitioner testified at length, Judge Edward Weinfeld denied said motion.³ In the course of his opinion, D.C., 111 F. Supp. 159, 162, he observed that

"* * * the petitioner is a shrewd, calculating and cunning individual and one who fully understood every single step taken by him in connection with the waiver of indictment, his plea of guilty, his waiver of counsel and persistent refusal to accept the Court's offer to appoint one.

"The charges are utterly without foundation in fact."

On appeal this determination was unanimously affirmed. See United States v. Taylor, 2 Cir., 207 F.2d 437.

126 F. Supp. 930

The third motion was made in June 1953. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was again invoked, the contention on this occasion being that the maximum sentence the Court could have imposed was ten years because the information, although purporting to contain 225 counts, actually set forth only one count. This motion was denied by Judge Sidney Sugarman. Again the petitioner appealed and again the decision appealed from was unanimously affirmed. See United States v. Taylor, 2 Cir., 210 F.2d 110.

In September 1953 petitioner made his fourth motion. He then asserted that the certified copy of the commitment did not...