Taylor v. Winona & St. P. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 December 1890
• Citation: 47 N.W. 453,45 Minn. 66
• Parties: TAYLOR v WINONA & ST. P. R. CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

45 Minn. 66

47 N.W. 453

TAYLORvWINONA & ST. P. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 17, 1890.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Where the judge who holds land under the United States town-site act, in trust for the occupants, executes an official deed for a part of it, the presumption obtains that he did his duty in all respects by compliance with all the statutory prerequisites, and that he conveyed it to proper party; and one not a beneficiary of the trust, but a mere stranger to the title, cannot litigate or call in question the validity or regularity of the deed in those respects.

2. As soon as the land is entered, the trustee may proceed to execute the trust by giving deeds to the beneficiaries, although the patent from the United States has not been yet issued. When issued the patent relates back to the date of the entry, and no further deed from the trustee after its issue is necessary to vest title in such beneficiaries.

3. But it must appear that the judge was trustee; that is, had already entered the land when he executed the deed. And a recital of that fact in the deed itself is not evidence as against a stranger to the instrument.

4. To render a tax-deed, issued under Laws 1862, c. 4, prima facie evidence of title, it must be one that is regular on its face. Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. 480, (Gil. 358,) as to the construction and effect of said chapter 4, adhered to and followed.

5. Cause remanded for new trial on the issue as to the date of the entry of the land in suit.

Appeal from district court, Blue Earth county; SEVERANCE, Judge.

B. S. Lewis and Wilson & Bowers, for appellant.

Spencer, Washburn & Shoemaker, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

This was an action to recover possession of certain real estate of which plaintiff alleged himself to be the owner in fee. The defendant, which entered into possession in September, 1888, denied plaintiff's title, and alleged title in itself. The plaintiff claims the patent title under an entry of the land by Judge Chatfield as the site of the town of Mankato under the town-site act of May 23, 1844, (Rev. St. U. S. tit. 32, c. 8,) and a deed from Chatfield purporting to have been executed by him as trustee in pursuance of the territorial act of March 3, 1855, (Gen. St. 1878 c. 42,) regulating official trusts relating to town-sites. The defendant rests its claim of title solely upon a tax-deed, purporting to be issued under a sale for taxes on March 17, 1863, pursuant to chapter 4 Laws 1862. The plaintiff introduced in, evidence a patent, dated October 1, 1860 from the United States to Chatfield, as trustee, which recites the fact of an entry by him under the town-site act, but does not state the date of the entry. The plaintiff also introduced a deed, dated November 15, 1856, from Chatfield to one Shindell, (through whom plaintiff claims by mesne conveyances,) purporting to have been executed by him as trustee, pursuant to the provisions of the statutes above cited. This deed contains a recital that Chatfield entered the land under the town-site act on May 5, 1856. Defendant's contention is that it was incumbent on plaintiff to prove dehors the deed that Shindell was the party for whom Chatfield held the premises in trust, or, in other words, the party entitled to a deed; also that all the steps required by the statute as prerequisites to the executing of a deed had been taken or had. In this we think the defendant is wholly in error. The execution of a deed to a part of a town-site by the judge, who is trustee for that purpose, is analogous to the grant of a patent by that department of the government whose province it is to supervise the various steps necessary to be taken to obtain title. The execution of a deed by the judge is in the nature of an official declaration and determination by him that all the requirements preliminary to the execution of a deed have been complied with, and that the person to whom it is issued is the person entitled to it. The doctrine of presumptions in favor of official acts obtains,-that the judge did his duty in all respects, and had required the grantee to show by legal proofs that he was the party entitled to a deed, and that he had complied with all the necessary prerequisites to its execution. Moreover, when a trustee, in whom is vested the land constituting a town-site, in trust for the occupants, has executed a deed of a parcel of such land to one claiming to be a beneficiary of the trust, no one who is not a beneficiary of the trust, but a mere stranger to the title, as is the defendant here, can call in question the validity or regularity of such conveyance, or, by subsequent intrusion upon the possession, acquire any right to inquire into or litigate the question whether all the steps required by law were taken, or whether the party to whom the deed was executed was the person entitled thereto. Anderson v. Bartels, 7 Colo. 256,3 Pac. Rep. 225;Murray v. Hobson, 10 Colo. 66,13 Pac. Rep. 921;Chever v. Horner, 11 Colo. 68,17 Pac. Rep. 495;Mathews v. Buckingham, 22 Kan. 166;Ming v. Foote, 23 Pac. Rep. 515;Whittlesey v. Hoppenyan, 72 Wis. 140,39 N. W. Rep. 355;Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 640;Cofield v. McClelland, 16 Wall. 331-334. The rule contended for by the defendant would not only be against all precedent, but would lead to the gravest practical evils. If mere intruders or strangers to the title under the trust could compel the party holding under the trustee in every suit...