Taylorsville City v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 14 May 2020
• Docket Number: No. 20180930,20180930
• Citation: 466 P.3d 148
• Parties: TAYLORSVILLE CITY, Respondent, v. Jeffrey Mark MITCHELL, Petitioner.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

466 P.3d 148

TAYLORSVILLE CITY, Respondent,

v.Jeffrey Mark MITCHELL, Petitioner.

No. 20180930

Supreme Court of Utah.

Heard February 12, 2020

Filed May 14, 2020

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Nathan H. Jack, Asst. Solic. Gen., Salt Lake City, Stephen K. Aina, Taylorsville, for respondent

Alexandra S. McCallum, Salt Lake City, for petitioner

Associate Chief Justice Lee authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Himonas, Justice Pearce, and Justice Petersen joined.

Associate Chief Justice Lee, opinion of the Court:

¶1 Jeffrey Mark Mitchell was convicted of three misdemeanors in justice court. He then invoked his statutory right to appeal these convictions by seeking a trial de novo in the district court. On retrial, he was convicted of two of the charges and acquitted of the other. By statute, Mitchell's appellate road was then at an end. See UTAH CODE § 78A-7-118(4), (8) (providing for a "hearing de novo in the district court" on justice court convictions but foreclosing further appeal "unless the district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance"). But Mitchell sought to pursue an appeal in the court of appeals anyway. The court of appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We then granted certiorari to consider Mitchell's constitutional challenges to the statute as applied to this case.

¶2 Mitchell asserts that section 78A-7-118(8) infringes his state constitutional right to an appeal and runs afoul of other provisions of the state and federal constitutions. We reject Mitchell's challenges and uphold the constitutionality of this statute.

I

¶3 In 2015, Jeffrey Mark Mitchell was found guilty of three class B misdemeanors in the Taylorsville City Justice Court. He then exercised his statutory right to appeal his convictions under Utah Code section 78A-7-118(4), which provides that "[a] defendant convicted and sentenced in justice court is entitled to a hearing de novo in the district court."

¶4 In the district court, Mitchell was acquitted of one misdemeanor and reconvicted of the other two. Thereafter, he requested new counsel to file a motion for a new trial. This request was denied. He then filed a pro se motion for a new trial, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. This motion was also denied. Mitchell was then sentenced to two concurrent fifteen-day jail terms, but the court suspended the sentence and put him on probation for a year.

¶5 By statute, Mitchell had exhausted his right to an appeal following the district court's decision. See UTAH CODE § 78A-7-118(8) (stating that "[t]he decision of the district court" on appeal from justice court "is final and may not be appealed unless the district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance"). He nonetheless filed an appeal in the court of appeals.

¶6 That court issued a sua sponte motion for summary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-7-118(8). Mitchell responded, arguing that a dismissal of his case under section 78A-7-118(8) would deprive him of both his state right to appeal and his federal right to due process. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that it lacked jurisdiction "because [Mitchell's] case originated in a justice court and the district court did not rule on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance."

¶7 Mitchell then sought certiorari review of the court of appeals' decision, asserting that section 78A-7-118(8) is unconstitutional as applied to him. We granted certiorari to consider "[w]hether the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals erred in dismissing Petitioner's appeal pursuant to" that section.

II

¶8 Mitchell claims that the Utah Constitution guarantees him a right to appeal beyond the non-appealable de novo trial allowed under Utah Code section 78A-7-118(8). Such retrial was the precise form of appeal contemplated by the 1896 Utah Constitution for cases initiated in the predecessor to our modern justice court (justice of the peace court). See UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 9 (repealed 1984); City of Monticello v. Christensen , 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990) (noting that "[t]he right of appeal from a justice of the peace to the district court referred to in article VIII, section 9 was a trial de novo because justice courts have never been courts of record"). But Mitchell nonetheless asserts that the preservation of the non-appealable de novo trial mechanism infringes his state constitutional right to an appeal and also falls short as a matter of uniform operation of laws and federal due process.

¶9 In support of that view, Mitchell relies heavily on amendments made to article VIII of the Utah Constitution in 1984. Those amendments eliminated the specific provision identifying a de novo trial as the mechanism for appeal from a judgment of the justice court. And Mitchell claims that they sustain his view that a de novo trial is no longer an adequate appeal under the constitution.

¶10 We rejected a constitutional challenge to the process contemplated in section 78A-7-118(8) in Christensen . There, we held that a non-appealable de novo review in district court is sufficient. Christensen , 788 P.2d at 517–19.

¶11 Mitchell acknowledged Christensen in his jurisdictional briefing in the court of appeals. But he argued that he was nonetheless denied his state right to appeal and federal right to due process because he did not have "a meaningful appeal in the district court" in light of the alleged ineffective assistance of his counsel during that appeal. The court of appeals rejected Mitchell's arguments and dismissed his case for lack of jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-7-118(8).

¶12 Because Mitchell neither challenged Christensen 's holding that the de novo appeal process vindicates the right to appeal nor raised a uniform operations argument in the court of appeals, the constitutional claims that Mitchell now raises in this court were largely unpreserved in the court of appeals. And Taylorsville easily could have defended the court of appeals' decision on that basis. Yet Taylorsville has failed to advance an objection on preservation grounds. Instead it briefed all of the issues on the merits.

¶13 This leaves us in an unusual position. On one hand, Mitchell failed to preserve the bulk of his constitutional claims¹ in his briefing in the court of appeals. But on the other hand, Taylorsville failed to object to the lack of preservation. Both sides, in that sense, have forfeited their stake in whether we should reach the merits. And that leaves us with substantial discretion as to how to proceed—on whether to reach the merits (because Taylorsville briefed them and failed to object to the lack of preservation) or decline to do so (due to Mitchell's lack of preservation). See State v. Johnson , 2017 UT 76, ¶ 12, 416 P.3d 443.

¶14 Our discretion here is informed by one additional consideration—fairness to the lower court. See Patterson v. Patterson , 2011 UT 68, ¶ 16, 266 P.3d 828. The law of preservation protects more than just the interests of the parties. It also protects the interests of lower courts whose decisions we review. And those interests would be undermined if we reversed a lower court on a ground presented for the first time on appeal or certiorari. Id . ; see also State v. Applegate , 39 Or.App. 17, 591 P.2d 371, 373 (1979).

¶15 This concern is not implicated, however, where our ultimate decision is to affirm the lower court. And that is our chosen course here. We reach the merits of the questions presented in light of three sets of considerations: (a) both parties have waived their stake in the matter, (b) we are affirming the lower court across the board, and (c) a decision on the merits will bring clarity and closure to important issues fully briefed by the parties.

¶16 We explain the basis of our decision on the merits below. First we consider Mitchell's assertion that Utah Code section 78A-7-118(8) infringes his constitutional right to an "appeal" under articles I and VIII of the Utah Constitution—a claim we rejected in Christensen . We reject this claim as unsupported by the original meaning of the governing provisions of the Utah Constitution and also as a matter of stare decisis . Next we consider Mitchell's assertion that Utah Code section 78-7-118(8) runs afoul of the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution. We reject this claim on the ground that Mitchell has failed to carry his burden of establishing a lack of uniform operation under our case law. Last we consider Mitchell's federal due process argument. We conclude that there is no due process problem here even if we accept the premise of Mitchell's due process analysis.

A. Right to Appeal

¶17 Mitchell's first claim is his assertion that Utah Code section 78A-7-118(8) infringes his state constitutional right to an appeal. The "right to appeal in all cases" is guaranteed under article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. And that right is reinforced in article VIII, section 5, which provides for an "appeal of right" in all matters (except those "filed originally with the Supreme Court") from a "court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction."

¶18 Mitchell concedes that a non-appealable de novo trial in district court was the "appeal" from a judgment of a justice court contemplated under the founding Utah Constitution. That document expressly provided for "[a]ppeals ... from the final judgment of justices of the peace ... to the District Courts" whose "decision[s] ... on such appeals" were "final[ ] except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute." See UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 9 (repealed 1984). Because justice of the peace courts and justice courts "have never been courts of record," the only recourse from a decision of such courts, both historically and through the present day, has been through a de novo trial in the district court.² With this in mind, Mitchell cannot and does not assert that a non-appealable de novo trial...