Teague v. Damascus
Decision Date | 21 March 1960 |
Docket Number | No. 1798.,1798. |
Parties | Richard TEAGUE, Plaintiff, v. Michael DAMASCUS and Helen M. Damascus, husband and wife; Charles Baldwin and Beatrice Baldwin, husband and wife; Peter D. Lambros and Demitra Lambros, husband and wife; Helen Damascus, a widow; Anastasia Damascus, a widow; and Ray N. Adams and Jane Doe Adams, husband and wife, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Washington |
Etter & Connelly, Spokane, Wash., for plaintiff.
MacGillivray, Jones, Clarke & Jones, Spokane, Wash., for defendants Baldwin.
Cashatt, Williams, Conelly & Rekofke, Spokane, Wash., for defendants Damascus and Lambros.
Murphy, Bantz & Hemovich, Spokane, Wash., for defendants Adams.
This action was originally commenced by the plaintiff Richard Teague against certain defendants on March 11, 1959. An amended complaint was filed January 19, 1960, adding additional defendants, Helen Damascus, a widow, who was a resident of the State of Oregon, and Peter D. Lambros and Demitra Lambros, husband and wife, who were residents of the State of Montana.
In the allegations of the amended complaint the plaintiff asserts that all of the defendants, including the defendants added in the amended complaint, were and are joint owners and operators of the real property and bathing resort involved in this action, located in Spokane County, Washington, and the owners and operators of property commonly known as Liberty Lake Park.
The plaintiff alleges his residence to be in the State of Texas. The remaining defendants are residents of the State of Washington, thus placing the jurisdiction of the action in the District Court here. There are two questions, however, for determination. One of them is determined in this opinion and the other one awaits a further determination.
The defendants, Helen Damascus and Peter D. Lambros and Demitra Lambros, his wife, have moved the Court for a dismissal of this action and to quash service pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., on the grounds that the attempted service of process on said defendants was without authority of law, that the defendants have not been properly served with process, and being non-residents of the State of Washington they could not be reached with process from this Court.
Rule 4(d) (7) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
The plaintiff claims lawful service on the defendants made under RCW 4.28.185. This statute is also referred to as Chapter 131, Laws of 1959, passed by the Washington State Legislature with an effective date of June 11, 1959.
That statute provides in substance that any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of the State of Washington, submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Washington as to any cause of action arising from the doing of certain enumerated acts. The acts enumerated include transaction of any business within the State of Washington, or commission of a tortious act therein, or the ownership, use or possession of any property within the State. The act further provides that service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by personally serving the defendant outside of the State of Washington with the same force and effect as though personally served within the state.
The act complained of against the defendants occurred on August 17, 1958, at which time the defendants are alleged to have operated a bathing resort known as Liberty Lake Park, and to have negligently maintained it to the injury and detriment of the plaintiff. The statute above referred to was passed by the Washington State Legislature and became effective on June 11, 1959, or almost ten months after the negligent acts alleged in plaintiff's amended complaint.
The question therefore is whether service pursuant to RCW 4.28.185 does constitute service within the State of Washington, and whether that statute can be given retroactive effect.
Counsel for the defendant argues, in support of his motion to dismiss, that the rationale of the case of Hammack v. Monroe Street Lumber Co., Wash., 339 P.2d 684, 688, should control. In that case it was held that an amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Statutes (Laws 1939, c. 41, § 2; Laws 1957, c. 70, § 23) permitting an injured workman to elect whether he may sue a third party tortfeasor, who is also under the Act, or makes claim under the Workmen's Compensation laws, was held not to be retroactive. In answer to the contention that the statute was merely one of remedy, the court said, quoting an earlier case Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235, 111 N.E. 837:
Counsel for the defendants in their able brief set forth a number of cases which are to the effect that statutes speak prospectively and not retroactively. This rule has been applied in construing the nonresident motorist service statutes, and amendments thereto.
The statute in question we find was adopted from and copies an earlier Illinois statute. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington is committed to the proposition that a statute adopted from another state or country is presumed to have been taken with the construction there placed upon it. In re North River Logging Co., 15 Wash.2d 204, at page 208, 130 P.2d 64, at page 66:
The State of Washington is not adverse to giving retroactive effect to a statute. Sorensen v. Western Hotels, Inc., 155 Wash.Dec. 688 at 692, 1960, 349 P.2d 232, at page 235:
"We there recognized the rule that legislative acts will generally be given prospective, and not retroactive, effect; however, we applied the exception: that a legislative act will be given retroactive effect when that intention is expressed or clearly implied."
The intention is expressed or clearly implied in the adoption of RCW 4.28.185 that the State Legislature intended that statute to have a retroactive effect. It was transplanted bodily from the Illinois Statutes. In the adoption of the statute, therefore, the legislature is presumed to have intended to adopt the statutory construction giving it retroactive effect as...
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