In re North River Logging Co.

• Decision Date: 23 October 1942
• Docket Number: 28876.
• Citation: 15 Wn.2d 204,130 P.2d 64
• Parties: In re NORTH RIVER LOGGING CO.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

130 P.2d 64

15 Wn.2d 204

In re NORTH RIVER LOGGING CO.

No. 28876.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 23, 1942

Department 1.

Proceedings by employees of the North River Logging Company for unemployment compensation. From a judgment confirming an order of the Commissioner of Unemployment and Placement affirming a decision of the appeal tribunal denying petitioners' claims, they appeal.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Grays Harbor County; Wm. E. Campbell judge.

Oscar A. Zabel and Philip J. Poth, both of Seattle, for appcilants.

Smith Troy and George W. Wilkins, both of Olympia, for respondent.

BLAKE Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of the superior court confirming an order of the commissioner of unemployment and placement. By his order, the commissioner affirmed the decision of the appeal tribunal denying appellants' claims for compensation on the ground that the unemployment, with respect to which rights to benefits were asserted, was 'due to a stoppage of work * * * because of a labor dispute * * *,' in contemplation of § 5, chapter 162 Laws of 1937, p. 581, as amended, Rem.Rev.Stat.Supp. § 9998-105(e).

The facts as found by the appeal tribunal (whose findings are binding on the courts in the absence of fraud or arbitrary or capricious conduct, Rem.Rev.Stat.Supp. § 9998-106(i); In re St. Paul & Tacoma Lbr. Co., 7 Wash.2d 580, 110 P.2d 877) may be summarized as follows:

In 1940, the North River Logging Company was operating a logging project, in connection with which it employed from forty to seventy men. The employees were all members of International Wood Workers of America (C. I. O.), Local 3-2, which had a contract with the company providing for a five-day week, observance of legal holidays, and time and a half for work performed on Sundays and holidays.

September 2, 1940, was Labor Day, and, in accordance with the terms of the contract, operations were shut down. Thursday, September 5th, it became noised about that the company intended to do certain loading and maintenance work on Saturday, the 7th, to make up for time lost by the observance of Labor Day. Having learned of this, the business agent of the union, Denee Dyer, called up Herman Hobi, camp foreman for the company, 'to remind him that under their working agreement the men were entitled to the higher rate for Saturday work. Hobi told Dyer, but in stronger words, to mind his own business * * *.'

On Friday, the 6th, the rigging and maintenance crews were ordered to report for work the following day on a 'straight time' basis. They were advised that, unless they reported and worked on that basis, the company 'would shut the operation down for the rest of the year.' The next morning, Dyer appeared at the entrance to the company's property, intercepted the men, and advised them not to work unless they were assured of the overtime rate. Hobi appeared on the scene and reiterated his determination to pay only straight time, and, in the event the men refused to work on that basis, to shut down operations for the rest of the year. The men, with one exception, refused to work.

On the following Monday, the 9th, all the employees, including the filer and cutting crew, who had not been called for Saturday reported for work. They found the camp shut down. The union then filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board, charging that the employees were locked out. A field examiner for the board made an investigation and effected a settlement of the dispute, under which the company agreed to reinstate all employees as of September 6th and resume operations on October 14th.

In the meantime, the representatives of the logging company and about seventy other employers had been negotiating with delegates from Local 2 and other union officials affiliated with the Southern and Northern Washington District Councils of the International Woodworkers of America in an effort to arrive at a uniform working agreement. On or about September 16th, Dyer called on Hobi and submitted an agreement which Local 2 had with another operator, asking that the company agree to it and resume operations under it. Hobi declined, saying that he would await the result of the 'twin-district' negotiations above referred to. The company, however, was not asked to sign that agreement because Local 2 refused to ratify it.

There can be no question that the claimants were at all times ready, able, and willing to work on and after September 9th. It cannot be denied that their unemployment between that date and October 14th was involuntary as a matter of fact. The question for our determination, however, is whether their unemployment was involuntary in contemplation of Rem.rev.Stat.Supp. § 9998-105(e), which provides that: 'An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: * * * For any week with respect to which the commissioner finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed.' (Italics ours. There are two provisos to the section with which we are not presently concerned.)

Under a well-established canon of statutory construction, the foregoing section makes an exception to the generally declared purpose of the act to provide compensation in all cases of involuntary unemployment. In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306, 13 S.E.2d 544. For the rule is that: 'Where a statute expresses first a general intent, and afterwards an inconsistent particular intent, the latter will be taken as an exception from the former and both will stand.' 1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, 2d Ed., [15 Wn.2d 208] p. 513, § 268; Rodgers v. United States, 185 U.S. 83, 22 S.Ct. 582, 46 L.Ed. 816; Crane v. Reeder, 22 Mich. 322.

So, the question for determination, as it finally resolves itself, is whether or not a lockout is a labor dispute in contemplation of Rem.Rev.Stat.Supp. § 9998-105(e). For it is clear that the shutdown from September 9th to October 14th was a lockout in the generally accepted definition of the terms: A suspension of operations by the employer resulting from a dispute with his employees over wages, hours, or working conditions. That a lockout is a labor dispute in contemplation of the unemployment compensation act, we think equally clear for several reasons:

First. Viewed in its social and economic aspects, the lockout is a weapon in the hands of the employers which is a counterpart to the weapon of strike held by the workers. 'A strike is cessation of work by employees in an effort to get for the employees more desirable terms. A lock out is a cessation of the furnishing of work to employees in an effort to get for the employer more desirable terms.' Iron Molders' Union...