Teague v. State
| Decision Date | 14 December 1988 |
| Citation | 772 S.W.2d 915 |
| Parties | Raymond Eugene TEAGUE, Appellant, v. STATE of Tennessee, Appellee. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals |
William P. Redick, Jr., Nashville, for appellant.
W.J. Michael Cody, Atty. Gen. & Reporter, Gordon W. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Gary D. Gerbitz, Dist. Atty. Gen., Jerry Sloan, Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Chattanooga, for appellee.
The petitioner, Raymond Eugene Teague, was convicted of murder in the first degree by a jury of his peers. The jury subsequently sentenced the petitioner to the extreme penalty of death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Tennessee Supreme Court on direct appeal. State v. Teague, 645 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn.1983), appeal after remand, 680 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn.1984). The United States Supreme Court denied the petitioner's application for the writ of certiorari. Teague v. Tennessee, 473 U.S. 911, 105 S.Ct. 3538, 87 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985).
On November 1, 1985, the petitioner instituted a post-conviction proceeding. The petitioner sought to have his conviction for carrying a weapon for the purpose of going armed and murder first degree set aside and vacated. The petitioner also asked the trial court to consider newly discovered evidence "by way of a proceeding in the nature of a writ of Error Coram Nobis pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-26-105." The trial court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing.
The petitioner raises a multitude of issues for our review. He contends his convictions and death sentence should be set aside and vacated because (a) evidence discovered subsequent to the petitioner's conviction, which was not known prior to trial, may have resulted in a different judgment had it been presented at trial, (b) the State asserted in the guilt stage that the appellant committed another crime, namely, the murder of John Mark Edmonds, but the State did not introduce evidence of this fact, (c) the petitioner's conviction in the John Mark Edmonds' case, which the jury found as an aggravating circumstance, is invalid and could not be used as an aggravating circumstance, (d) the assistant district attorney general misled the jury concerning its ultimate responsibility for determining the appropriateness of a death sentence, (e) the assistant district attorney general diminished the significance of factors in mitigation not specified in T.C.A. § 39-2-203(j), (f) a question was posed by the assistant district attorney general in the presence of the jury which assumed non-existent, highly prejudicial facts in relation to a subject which had been improperly presented at the previous sentencing hearing, (g) the assistant district attorney general elicited testimony concerning the petitioner's silence after he had been arrested and given the Miranda warnings, (h) the assistant district attorney general failed to provide the defendant with relevant, exculpatory evidence, namely, an offer made by the police to Jimmy Cook for his cooperation in the prosecution, (i) the trial judge committed error of prejudicial dimensions when instructing the jury regarding aggravating circumstances, (j) the instructions given by the trial judge shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense, (k) defense counsel failed to adequately question prospective jurors who were successfully challenged for cause because of their opposition to the death penalty, (1) defense counsel failed to examine prospective jurors in a manner which would reveal if a juror would automatically impose the sentence of death regardless of circumstances, (m) the trial court erred in refusing to approve compensation for investigative services, (n) the trial court erred in refusing to grant a continuance for the purpose of developing the factual investigation of the case, (o) the trial court erred by indicating a general hostility to witnesses favorable to the petitioner, (p) the trial court erred in excluding relevant, material and admissible evidence which was favorable to the petitioner, (q) the death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it mandatorily requires the jury to impose the death sentence if the jury cannot say that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, (r) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, (s) the method of execution, namely electrocution, amounts to infliction of wanton and unnecessary torture, (t) the death penalty, as applied in Tennessee, is discriminatory on the basis of gender, and (u) no significant proportionality review was applied in this case or in other cases in which the death penalty is imposed.
The facts surrounding the death of Terri Teague are set forth in the prior opinions of our Supreme Court in State v. Teague, 645 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn.1983) and State v. Teague, 680 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 911, 105 S.Ct. 3538, 87 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985). Our discussion will be limited to a summary of the prior proceedings unless a discussion of the facts are essential to an issue raised by the petitioner.
On the 19th day of September, 1979, the Hamilton County Grand Jury indicted the petitioner for murder first degree. The indictment alleged the petitioner murdered John Mark Edmonds. Before he was tried for this offense, his ex-wife, Teresa (Terri) Lynn Teague, was murdered. On the 25th day of April, 1980, the petitioner was again indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for murder first degree. The indictment alleged the petitioner murdered Mrs. Teague, his former wife.
The State elected to try the Terri Teague murder case first. On the 22nd day of November, 1980, the petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to the extreme penalty of death. The jury found two aggravating circumstances: (a) the murder of Mrs. Teague was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind, T.C.A. § 39-2-203(i)(5), and (b) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant, or another. T.C.A. § 39-2-203(i)(6). The petitioner appealed his conviction and death sentence as of right to the Supreme Court following the denial of his motion for a new trial. See T.C.A. § 39-2-205(a).
While the petitioner's appeal was pending in the Tennessee Supreme Court, the John Mark Edmonds murder case was set for trial. The day before the trial was to commence, the assistant district attorney generals, who were to prosecute the petitioner, advised defense counsel they were willing to recommend a sentence of ten (10) years in the state penitentiary if the petitioner desired to dispose of the prosecution without a trial. The following day the petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of accessory before the fact of murder in the second degree. He was sentenced to a term of ten (10) years in the State penitentiary pursuant to the plea bargain agreement.
The Tennessee Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the petitioner's conviction for murder in the first degree in the Teague case. However, the Court set aside the death sentence and remanded the cause to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. The Court held it was prejudicial error for the State to introduce, over the objection of the petitioner, an arrest warrant, issued on June 1, 1978, which charged the petitioner with conspiring to murder James Lowe, Jr. The warrant stated on its face that it had been dismissed on the recommendation of the State approximately two years prior to Mrs. Teague's death.
The trial court granted a change of venue to Rutherford County after remand. On the 25th day of August, 1983, the petitioner was again sentenced to the extreme penalty of death. The jury again found two aggravating circumstances: (a) the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, T.C.A. § 39-2-203(i)(2), and (b) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another. T.C.A. § 39-2-203(i)(6).
The petitioner appealed the death sentence. See T.C.A. § 39-2-205(a). The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence. State v. Teague, 680 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn.1984). The United States Supreme Court denied the petitioner's application for the writ of certiorari. Teague v. Tennessee, 473 U.S. 911, 105 S.Ct. 3538, 87 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985).
The petitioner subsequently instituted this post-conviction proceeding.
The petitioner contends in his brief that the petitioner attacked his conviction and death sentence in the trial court by (a) a proceeding in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-26-105, and (b) a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-30-101 to 40-30-124 (Supp.1988). While the technical record contains a petition for post-conviction relief, it does not contain a separate petition for the writ of error coram nobis. However, the following allegations appear in the petition for post-conviction relief:
9. The Petitioner respectfully asks this court through a proceeding in the nature of a Writ of Error Coram Nobis pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-26-105 to vacate and set aside the conviction and sentence imposed against this Petitioner on these indictments due to the fact that this court has inherent power to set aside a judgment, previously entered before, which was procured by fraud and misrepresentation.
The Petitioner submits that the conviction imposed upon him was, in fact, procured by fraud and misrepresentation and not due to any criminal acts of culpability on his part or by his commission.
The petitioner would submit this contention based upon proof to be submitted...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Nichols
...(Tenn.1989) (Caldwell error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Taylor, 771 S.W.2d 387, 396 (Tenn.1989); Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d 915, 926 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988). IX. Jury Defendant Nichols next asserts that the jury instructions given by the trial court were deficient or erroneo......
-
State v. Bush
...remorse. The failure of defense counsel to make a contemporaneous objection waives consideration of the issue on appeal. See Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d 915, 926 (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn.1989); State v. Killebrew, 760 S.W.2d 228, 235 (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm. to appeal ......
-
State v. Draper
...S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988); Price v. Mercury Supply Co., 682 S.W.2d 924, 929 n. 5 (Tenn.App.1984). See Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d 915, 924 n. 14 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 210, 107 L.Ed.2d 163 (1989).10 State v. Roberts, supra; State v. Dobbins, ......
-
Rhoden v. State
...it was not (a) included in the motion for a new trial, Tenn.R.App.P. 3(e) or (b) raised on direct appeal. See Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d 915, 923-924 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 210, 107 S.Ct. 163 (1989); Strouth v. State, 755 S.W.2d 819, 832 (Tenn.Crim.App.......