Teal v. Terrell

• Decision Date: 12 January 1883
• Docket Number: Case No. 1252.
• Parties: ANNA TEAL ET ALS. v. C. L. TERRELL ET ALS.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

58 Tex. 257

ANNA TEAL ET ALS.

v.C. L. TERRELL ET ALS.

Case No. 1252.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Jan. 12, 1883.

APPEAL from Victoria. Tried below before the Hon. H. Clay Pleasants.

Suit in trespass to try title, brought by Terrell and others, who claimed under Louisa Sevier, against Anna Teal and others, who claimed under Peter Teal, deceased. The defense was the plea of not guilty and the limitation of ten years.

The land in controversy was originally granted to John B. Sideck. The plaintiffs derived title under conveyances from Mrs. Sevier. The record of a suit between Mrs. Sevier and Mrs. Teal was in evidence, and Mrs. Teal, by her pleadings in that suit, admitted that Mrs. Sevier was the daughter of John B. Sideck, and the fact was also proven by parol.

In 1830 a grant of land, called the “square league,” was made by the Mexican authorities to John B. Sideck. In 1834 a league was granted to him as a colonist, and this was called the “long league.” It has its front upon the San Antonio river, within the front of the “square league,” and runs back diagonally across it, as shown by the plat.

TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE TABLE

The parties to this suit, or those under whom they claim, had all been upon the land embraced by these grants since 1845 or 1846. In 1856 Mrs. Sevier and her husband sued Anna Teal, widow and administratrix of Peter Teal, in trespass to try title for the long league. Mrs. Teal answered, in substance, that John B. Sideck acquired the land sued for by the deeds (or grants) of 1830 and 1834, which two deeds embraced and covered the land in dispute; that in 1832 Sideck donated the land to Peter Teal and to his (Sideck's) daughter Louisa, the plaintiff in that suit. She also averred that Sideck adopted Peter Teal as his son and heir at law, and that at Sideck's death Teal was entitled to a child's part of his estate; and she prayed that Teal's title to the undivided half of the lands embraced by the deeds might be confirmed; and for partition between the heirs of Teal and Mrs. Sevier, one-half to each.

This suit in 1869 resulted in a decree allowing Teal's estate one-half of the square league, and one-half of that part of the long league which fell within the square league; but saying nothing about that part of the long league which might be found outside of the square league lines. The cause was carried to the supreme court, where the decree was affirmed, but the actual partition was not made till 1872. Up to the time of the survey for this partition, none of the parties knew where the lines of the square league crossed the long league; but Sevier testified that it was believed that Mrs. Teal's residence was within the limits of the square league. When the survey was made it was found that Mrs. Teal's house was outside of the square league, and upon the upper of the inner quarters of the long league, while the houses of the plaintiffs Terrell and Stevenson were found to be on that part of the square league which was set apart to Mrs. Teal. There were some negotiations, and Mrs. Teal proposed to buy the ground her house stood on, but Terrell declined to sell. There was no evidence of any claim on her part adverse to the tenant in common until after this time. In her testimony she said that Peter Teal claimed the land as the adopted son of Sideck, and that she knew nothing of the location of the back line of the square league until after the survey was made in the former suit. At the time the survey was made it seems that her actual possession was only her house, etc. She testified to a field used for more than ten years before the war, which field seems to have been partly within and partly without the square league; but she testified that it went down during the war.

This suit (which is for that part of the two inner quarters of the long league which lie outside of the square league) was commenced January 31, 1879.

The charge complained of will be found in the opinion. Judgment for plaintiffs.

Lackey & Kleberg, for appellants.

I. When title to land is not shown entirely by deed or other written evidence of title, it is error to charge the jury that a party has shown title to property in controversy. Gilkey v. Peeler, 22 Tex., 668;Rogers v. Broadnax, 24 Tex., 543.

II. The proof did not authorize the third instruction given, for there was no priority shown or claimed between the appellants and appellees.

III. The entry of one upon land, under claim of right thereto, as cotenant, is an adverse entry, if in fact such relationship did not exist, and was not recognized by the person who had the legal title; and if possession be continued under such entry for the period prescribed to bar the right of the real owner, then, under the statute of limitations, such possessor has title to the extent of his actual possession.

IV. An entry upon land by one claiming the same, but having no right thereto, accompanied with an actual possession of a part of the land, is an ouster of the owner to the extent of the actual possession; and where an actual ouster exists, limitation will run even in favor of a tenant in common against his cotenant. Tyler on Ejectment and Adverse Enjoyment, 83, 84; Freeman on Cotenancy and Partition, sec. 221.

V. An exclusive possession of a part owner of a common estate is, to the extent of the land embraced by it, as inconsistent with the common title as the occupation of the whole would be. Freeman on Cotenancy and Partition, sec. 228; Carpenter v. Webster, 27 Cal., 549.

VI. When the common right to enjoy a property, or any part of a property, held in cotenancy, is denied by the exclusive possession of one of the cotenants, limitation runs in favor of the possessor to the extent of his actual possession (Freeman on Cotenancy and Partition, sec. 228); a fortiori will the holding be adverse when by a stranger to the legal title.

VII. The...