Teasley v. Bradley
| Decision Date | 09 April 1900 |
| Citation | 35 S.E. 782,110 Ga. 497 |
| Parties | TEASLEY v. BRADLEY et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The statute of limitations does not begin to run in favor of one occupying towards another the position of a continuing and confidential agent for the purpose of collecting, investing and taking care of funds of the latter; his duties as to the same being, in substance, those of a steward or factor, and running on from year to year until such agent has rendered an account, accompanied by an offer to settle, or there has been, by the principal, a demand for a settlement and a refusal to pay by the agent, or there has been an express repudiation of the agency, or until there has been such a change in the relations of the parties as would warrant the inference that the confidential agency had in fact ceased. In the latter event, the law would presume a demand after the lapse of a reasonable time, and from such time the statute would begin to run. (a) Applying the rule above announced to the allegations of the present petition, it was not open to a demurrer alleging that the plaintiff's cause of action or any portion thereof, was barred by the statute of limitations, or that the same had become stale. (b) The first amendment to the plaintiff's petition was but an amplification of the allegations in the original petition which set forth the relations existing between the plaintiff and the defendant as to the management by the latter of the former's estate. (c) The evidence introduced in behalf of the plaintiff tended to establish the allegations of the petition, and authorized a recovery of at least a portion of the amount sued for. There was, therefore, no error in refusing to grant a nonsuit. (d) Certain portions of the charge, which were complained of, were substantially in accord with the rule above laid down.
2. An agent who merely collects money for another is accountable for the same at once, and the statute of limitations begins to run against the principal certainly from the time when he knows the agent has made the collection.
3. Money loaned with no agreement as to time of repayment is, in law, due immediately, and the statute of limitations begins to run at once against the lender.
4. Since the passage of the uniform procedure act of 1887 (Civ. Code, § 4833), a petition which sets forth a legal cause of action, though using terms appropriate to an equitable proceeding, in so far as the same does not seek any extraordinary relief, is not demurrable on the ground that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy by bringing an action at law.
5. One who, with the acquiescence of an heir at law, takes possession, without administration, of the estate of the deceased, and thus receives the share of such heir in that estate upon an agreement to manage and invest the same for the latter's benefit, is accountable directly to the heir for the same, and cannot defeat a suit brought against him by the heir by setting up that the right of action was in the administrator of the decedent.
6. An admission of liability contained in an offer to settle, brought about by a simple demand for settlement, is not inadmissible on the ground that such admission was "made with a view to a compromise," when there is nothing whatever to indicate that there has been any effort to compromise, and when it cannot be inferred, from the circumstances under which the offer was made, that there has been such an effort.
7. It is always proper to overrule a "speaking demurrer."
8. In the trial of an action for account and settlement, a paper embracing a calculation made by one other than the defendant, and with the making of which he had nothing to do, is not admissible in evidence against him.
9. Where, in the trial of an action for account and settlement, the defendant pleads payment, and introduces evidence in support of this defense, the court should not fail to call the jury's attention thereto; the more especially when failing to do so leaves standing no defense except the statute of limitations, and the charge relating to this defense was not free from error.
10. Such of the other questions raised in the record as will probably arise on another trial are dealt with in the opinion.
Error from superior court, Hart county; S. Reese, Judge.
Action by Laura Sadler against Isham A. Teasley. Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. On the death of plaintiff, R. P. Bradley and others, her administrators, were substituted. Reversed.
T. W. Teasley and Asbury G. McCurry, for plaintiff in error.
W. L. Hodges, O. C. Brown, and J. N. Worley, for defendant in error.
On February 17, 1898, Laura Sadler brought suit against Isham A. Teasley, alleging in her petition, substantially, the following: Plaintiff, Cyntha, Martha, and Mary Sadler were the children of James and Priscilla Sadler. Martha married the defendant. Their mother having died, their father married a rich widow, and in 1863 moved to her home, and left his plantation and personalty thereon under the control and management of defendant, with the understanding that he was to manage the same for the benefit of those interested. On April 16, 1866, James Sadler, in consideration of love and affection, conveyed the plantation, consisting of 311 acres, to plaintiff, Cyntha, and Martha. Plaintiff and Cyntha lived with defendant on the place until 1874, when Cyntha died, leaving her estate "in the custody and control" of defendant. Plaintiff, at the solicitation of defendant, lived in his family from the date of his marriage until a recent date, a period of 44 years, during all that time performing labor, manual and otherwise, in and about the household, and living meanwhile in a most frugal manner. Plaintiff trusted defendant with the absolute control and management of all her property, and turned over to him during the years 1869, 1872, 1874, and 1877 sums of money aggregating $1,700, upon his statement that he would take the money, and loan it at a good rate of interest; and in like manner, for a like purpose, plaintiff turned over to defendant $300 in 1873,--all of which he received in trust for plaintiff, stating he would render a just and true account when called upon, which he has failed to do. Defendant had control of two places in which plaintiff was interested, and from one of these, in which she inherited an interest from her father, collected in 1872 and 1873 rent belonging to plaintiff amounting to $15 each year, and from 1874 to 1876, inclusive, he collected $25 per year, and from the other place he collected plaintiff's interest in the rents from 1873 to 1897, inclusive, amounting to $100 per year; he having agreed to manage the farm, collect the rents, hold them in trust for the parties interested, and render a just and true account when demanded, which he has failed to do. Defendant has loaned the different sums belonging to plaintiff at a high rate of interest, and collected the same. In August, 1897, plaintiff demanded of defendant that he pay over to her the amount due her, which he refused to do. The prayer of the petition was for an accounting, and judgment in favor of plaintiff for such an amount as should be found due. By amendment plaintiff alleged: Defendant was her continuous general agent to invest, keep, control, and reinvest all funds and property of hers that went into his possession without accounting to plaintiff until a demand was made. No such demand was made until 1897. Plaintiff "actually or constructively received" her interest in the estate of her deceased sister, Cyntha, and afterwards turned the same over to defendant, to be dealt with in the same manner as her other property in his hands. To the petition and amendment the defendant filed demurrers, both general and special. The court overruled the demurrers, and this is one of the errors assigned. The answer of the defendant denied all allegations seeking to charge him with any liability, set up the statute of limitations as a defense, and alleged that on a fair settlement it will appear that he owes the plaintiff nothing; that the amount due by plaintiff for board, medical attention, and other living expenses, all of which were provided by defendant, and other charges against plaintiff, which were paid by defendant at the request of plaintiff, would more than equal any claim that plaintiff had against him; that defendant never occupied any trust relation to plaintiff, and the only relation existing between them was that of debtor and creditor, which arose as each sum due plaintiff was collected, and that the transactions between plaintiff and defendant amounted at most to nothing more than either the loan of money or an agency to collect and pay over. The case coming on for trial, at the conclusion of the evidence introduced by plaintiff defendant made a motion for a nonsuit, which the court overruled, and this is one of the errors assigned. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant made a motion for a new trial; which being overruled, he excepted. After the writ of error was sued out, and before the case was called here, the plaintiff died, and the administrators on her estate were made parties in this court.
1. As long as a person who is in possession of the property of another, using the same for the owner's benefit recognizes the latter's ownership, no lapse of time will bar the owner from asserting his title as against the person in possession. Before any lapse of time will be a bar to the owner, it must appear that the person in possession has given notice, or there must be circumstances shown which would be equivalent to notice, to the owner that the person in possession claims adversely to him. In such a case the statute will begin to...
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