Teasley v. State
| Decision Date | 07 October 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 26622,26622 |
| Parties | Paul TEASLEY v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The charge to the jury included the required essentials of act and intent.
2. The general grounds of the motion for new trial were properly overruled.
3. The evidence authorized a charge on accident and it was error to decline the written request therefor.
4. Likewise, the evidence authorized a charge as to insanity and its refusal was error.
5. The evidence also authorized a charge relating to involuntary manslaughter which should have been given upon request.
6, 7. It is not necessary to rule upon the remaining enumerations of error since the matters are not likely to recur upon another trial.
John A. Darsey, Commerce, for appellant.
Nat Hancock, Dist. Atty., Jefferson, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Courtney Wilder Stanton, David L. G. King, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
Paul Teasley appeals to this court from the judgment of conviction and sentence to life imprisonment for murder and also from the denial of his motion for new trial. He was indicted by the grand jury of Barrow County and tried in the superior court of that county for the slaying of Ellen Ann Greer.
1. One of the enumerations of error insists that it was error to refuse to charge a request that 'A crime is a violation of a statute of this State in which there shall be a union of joint operation of act, or omission to act, and intention, or criminal negligence.' The language of this request is that of Code Ann. § 26-601 (Ga.L.1968, pp. 1249, 1269). There is no merit in this enumeration since the request was amply covered in the general instructions given to the jury.
2. There is no merit in the enumeration urging that the general grounds of a motion for new trial were erroneously overruled. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict of guilty of murder.
What happened on the occasion of the homicide was narrated by a large number of witnesses, yet their testimony is remarkedly free from substantial conflict. Salient facts and circumstances are those which follow.
The deceased, apparently a paramour of the appellant, on Christmas Eve night drove in an automobile with the appellant and her two small children to his house, where he called his wife out to the front yard. She testified that she had never seen her husband * * *' She then asked the deceased, * * *'
Thereafter, the witnesses all testified that several shots were fired from the automobile.
A daughter summoned the police telling the officer, 'Someone has got to help, I think daddy has gone crazy.'
By this time the appellant and the deceased had entered the house. The deceased had noticeable bruises and cuts on her hands and head, as did he. The witnesses testified that the appellant at that time was in a highly excited condition, going from room to room, mumbling and talking incoherently.
The appellant was armed with two pistols and upon the arrival of a police officer, he fired, the bullet striking the wall near the officer. During this period members of his family were seeking to calm and restrain him. They testified as to his long illness of hypertension, severe headaches, and blackouts.
The deceased, who was in the den, had intermittently been calling upon the appellant to help her. In response to this and at his request, members of his family from time to time checked on her condition, each time finding her alive.
About this time the appellant desired to open a metal box, which was in the den, to get some of its contents which included other firearms and ammunition. When it could not be unlocked, he fired one of his pistols so as to break the lock. The evidence does not show whether the bullet ricocheted from striking the metal box.
A pathologist, who examined the deceased's body, testified that her death was caused by a bullet entering her neck and chest cavity and lodging in her skull. As to whether it appeared that this bullet had previously struck a metal object such as the box, he testified that * * *' However on cross examination this witness acknowledged that he did not mean to say
When the shot was fired at the box, the deceased was lying on the floor in the same room and only a few feet from the box.
Witnesses testified that they made a search of the room seeking to find evidence of the bullet's entry but did not find anything as to this.
An officer testified that the bullet found in the deceased's body was fired from one of the pistols which the appellant had in his possession on this occasion.
After shooting off the lock, the appellant continued in his highly excited demeanor but finally acceded to the request of one of the police officers to accompany him. Thereupon he handed his weapons to the police and rode with the officers to jail.
On the way to the police car he 'blacked out' and fell to the ground.
In the meantime, an ambulance had reached the appellant's home where it was found that the deceased had died.
While the foregoing testimony as to what occurred at the time of the homicide may be subject to various deductions, it was adequate to authorize the jury to find that the victim was killed from a shot fired from the appellant's pistol by a bullet passing through her neck and chest cavity while she was lying on the floor and that it had not struck anything before entering her body.
Therefore the evidence was such that the jury could conclude that the appellant killed the deceased as a result of malice and not by accident, involuntary manslaughter or by reason of insanity, and therefore was guilty of murder.
3. The appellant enumerates as error the failure of the trial court to charge on...
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McIver v. State
...in poor visibility, as in Drake , 221 Ga. at 348 (2), 144 S.E.2d 519, or a box located too close to a person, as in Teasley v. State , 228 Ga. 107, 184 S.E.2d 179 (1971), with fatal consequences not intended by the shooter. Such evidence also may include a showing that the defendant had no ......
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McIver v. State
...of all the elements of the reckless conduct statute. And in such cases, an instruction on OCGA § 16-5-3 (b) is appropriate. For example, in Teasley, during a chaotic Christmas encounter between Teasley, his wife, his girlfriend, and the police, the girlfriend was struck and killed by a bull......
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Avery v. State
...to create an issue of fact as to defendant's mental capacity and to authorize a charge on the law of insanity. See Teasley v. State, 228 Ga. 107, 184 S.E.2d 179. While the court properly charged this defense, the sole reference to the burden of persuasion was stated as follows: 'Ladies and ......
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Redd v. State, 53512
...intent. Fleming v. State, 74 Ga.App. 864(3), 41 S.E.2d 824; Bennett v. State, 49 Ga.App. 804(4), 176 S.E. 148. See also Teasley v. State, 228 Ga. 107, 184 S.E.2d 179." Coleman v. State, 137 Ga.App. 689(6), 224 S.E.2d 878 (1976). Of course, the judge was not required to charge as to intent; ......