Tebow v. Dougherty
Decision Date | 29 June 1907 |
Parties | TEBOW v. DOUGHERTY et al. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Testator first devised to his wife and her heirs one half of all his property to hold, use, and manage during her life, remainder to testator's son, if he survived her. Testator then devised to the son and his heirs the other half of the property to have, hold, use, and manage in his discretion "during his natural life," and in case the wife survived the son at his death the property so devised to him should belong to her. Held that, under Rev. St. 1879, § 4008, requiring all courts concerned in the execution of wills to have due regard to the directions of the will and the true intent of the testator, the will should be construed as giving to the widow and son each a free-hold estate for the life of the one who might first die, with cross-determinable fees in remainder; the one to be enlarged into a fee simple in the survivor.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Nodaway County; J. W. Alexander, Special Judge.
Suit by Isaac E. Tebow against Sylvester Dougherty and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
This action was instituted by the respondent in the circuit court of Nodaway county against the appellants, seeking to quiet title and to ascertain and determine the rights and interest of the parties to the land in controversy, which necessitates the construction of the last will and testament of William W. Dougherty, deceased. The pleadings were in proper form, and the cause was tried and submitted to the court upon the following agreed statement of facts:
The cause was by the court taken under advisement until the November term, 1904, at which time it found for the plaintiff and rendered judgment accordingly. In due time defendants filed their motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, each of which was by the court overruled, to which action of the court the defendants duly excepted and timely appealed the cause to this court.
H. S. Kelley, for appellant. George Robb Ellison, for respondent.
WOODSON, J. (after stating the facts).
There is but one question presented by this record, and that is one of law. The contention of the appellants is this, that the will gave to the widow and son each a life estate in the one half of the property of the testator, and a contingent remainder in and to the other half, and when the contingency failed the heirs of the life tenant took the remainder in fee; while, upon the other hand, the respondent contends that the will disposed of the entire estate and gave to the widow and to the son each a base fee in an undivided one-half thereof, with a provision in the will that the estate so devised to each should terminate and be divested from the one who died first, and transferred to and invested in the survivor, and the widow having died first, the devise to her was by her death terminated, and, by the terms of the will, transferred and vested in the son in fee simple, and as the happening of the contingency, which might have terminated his estate, has become impossible by the death of the widow, he then took the land devised to her, at her death discharged of the contingency, and became the owner of an absolute fee-simple title thereto, instead of a base fee, which he owned prior to her death, and that his warranty deed of December 20, 1883, conveyed to the Lyles a perfect title in fee to the half interest so devised in the first instance to her and then to him by a conditional limitation.
In the construction of a will, the paramount question with the court always is, what disposition did the testator intend to make of his property? That intention should be the court's guiding star and should not be lost sight of for a moment while construing his will. In order to throw light upon his intention, we have the right to look at the conditions and circumstances surrounding the testator at the time he executed the will in conjunction with the provisions of the will itself. The testator, William W. Dougherty, died seized in fee...
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