Teel v. Yost

• Decision Date: 06 October 1891
• Citation: 128 N.Y. 387,28 N.E. 353
• Parties: TEEL v. YOST.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

128 N.Y. 387

28 N.E. 353

TEEL

v.YOST.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 6, 1891.

Appeal from superior court of New York city, general term.

Action by Lewis M. Teel against Abraham Yost on a judgment by confession entered against defendant in a Pennsylvania court of common pleas. From a judgment affirming a judgment in plaintiff's favor, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The judgment was confessed by the prothonotary of the court of common pleas in which the judgment was entered, and the record of the judgment was as follows: ‘Continuance Docket. Entry of December term, 1877. Lewis M. Teel vs. Abraham Yost, d. s. b., $2,268.00. And now Jan'y 14, 1878, a single bill, under the hand and seal of the defendant, dated Jan'y 12, 1878, wherein he promises to pay to the plaintiff or order, one year after date, twenty-two hundred and sixty-eight dollars, containing a clause authorizing the entry of judgment, waiving stay of execution, with ten per cent. for collection fees, is produced hereto, to have judgment entered thereon. Wherefore judgment.’

Lemuel Skidmore, for appellant.

Samuel B. Rogers, for respondent.

RUGER, C. J.

This was an action upon a judgment, and the question involved is whether the record in evidence constituted a valid judgment, in another state, by confession. In the case of such a judgment it is, of course, unnecessary that any process should be issued or served, declaration filed, or personal appearance entered by the defendant; as these proceedings are totally inconsistent with the nature of a judgment by confession. The appearance by an attorney, under a written power from the party, authorizing his consent to a judgment, is the legal equivalent of the process and proceedings usually taken in an action in invitum. In all such cases it is simply a question as to what the principal has authorized to be done in his name, and does not involve any of the questions arising in an action in invitum against resident or non-resident defendants. The jadgment sued upon purported to have been rendered by the court of common pleas of the state of Pennsylvania on the 14th day of January, 1878, in favor of the plaintiff, Lewis M. Teel, and against the defendant, Abraham Yost, for $2,268, d. s. b., or as upon debt without process. It was entered upon an instrument, filed in the records of the court, reading as follows: ‘South Bethlehem, January 12th, 1878. $2,268. One year after date I promise to pay Lewis M. Yost twenty-two hundred and sixty-eight dollars, without defalcation, for value received. And I do hereby authorize any attorney of any court of record in Pennsylvania or elsewhere to confess judgment therefor, and release of errors, and I do hereby waive all stay of execution from and after the maturity of the above note. Witness my hand and seal the day and date above written, with ten per cent. allowed for collection fees, with interest from date. ABRAHAM YOST. [L. S.] Witness present: GEO. ZIEGENFUSS.’

This instrument is usually called a ‘judgment note,’-an obligation quite common in the state of Pennsylvania. The parties to the note were both residents of that state, and had been so for a long time previous to and after the rendition of the judgment, and the court of common pleas was a court of general jurisdiction in that state, of which the prothonotary was clerk, and had charge of its records, and authority to enter judgments by confession. If the court in Pennsylvania had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and the subject-matter of the action, whatever course it might afterwards have pursued in determining the rights of the parties, they cannot be heard now to relitigate the questions considered in that action. As to such matter, upon the principle of res adjudicata, the judgment is binding and conclusive upon the parties. If this was a valid judgment under the laws of the state where it was rendered, it must, under the constitution of the United States and the laws of congress, be accorded the same force and effect in this state that it had in the state where rendered. Section 1, art. 4, Const. U. S.; Rev. St. U. S. § 905.

The rule laid down in Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend. 453, was ‘that the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, in any state in the Union, is equally conclusive upon the parties in all the other states as in the state in which it was rendered.This, however, is subject to two qualifications: First, if it appears by the record that the defendant was not served with process, and did not appear in person or by attorney, such judgment is void; and, second, if it appears by the record that the defendant appeared by attorney, the defendant may disprove the authority of such attorney to appear for him.’ This case has been quite uniformly cited and approved as a leading case in subsequent cases in this state. Under the authority of this rule, we do not see how the defendant could have been seriously prejudiced by the want of notice of the proceedings leading to the judgment, as it was competent for him to show in defense of this action that the power of attorney upon which the judgment proceeded was a forgery, and conferred no authority upon any one to appear for him and confess judgment thereon; but no such proof was given or offered upon the trial. The presumption, therefore, is that the note was the genuine obligation of the defendant, and gave actual authority to the prothonotary, or any other attorney, to consent to the judgment authorized by it.

Several objections are raised to the recovery in this action, some of them going to the form of the judgment, and others assailing the jurisdiction of the court to render it; but we are of the opinion that none of them are well founded. It was found by the trial court, as a question of fact, that said ‘judgment was duly rendered and entered according to the laws of Penusylvania. It is, and was by the laws of Pennsylvania, a valid, binding adjudication, in personam, against the defendant herein, and entitled, by the laws of said state, to have the same faith and credit given to it as if it had been entered upon a verdict after a trial in which the defendant had appeared.’ A finding of law to the same effect was made by the court, and it is upon exceptions to these two findings that the questions in the case arise. These findings were amply supported by the evidence, and unless, therefore, it appears that some error of law was committed by the court on the trial, the judgment must be sustained. The evidence leave no room for doubt but that this was considered in form and substance a valid judgment, in personam, in the state where it was rendered, and constituted a ‘judgment,’ within the meaning of the acts of congress requiring faith and credit to be given to it in other states. The reasons for this conclusion are so well stated in the opinions of the supreme court of that state that we shall content ourselves with reference to two reported cases only.

It was said in the case of Helvete v. Rapp, 7 Serg. & R. 306: ‘The evident and sole intention of the legislature in conferring the power of entering a judgment on the judgment bond, without the intervention of an attorney, was to exempt the obligor from the payment of costs to an attorney. This act was passed on the 24th of February, 1806. It provided that the prothonotary of any court of record, on the application of the original holder, or his assignee, of a bond, note, or other instrument, on which judgment is confessed, or containing a warrant of attorney to confess a judgment, shall enter judgment against the person or persons who executed the same, for the amount which, from the face of the instrument, appears to be due, without the agency of any attorney, or declaration filed, particularly entering on his docket the date and time of the writing, which shall have the same force and effect as it a declaration had been filed, and judgment had been confessed by an attorney, or given in open court in term time. * * * There being no literal form directed, and no precedent to guide the prothonotary in the exercise of this new duty, each has adopted his own mode. They are as various as their faces, and many of them scarcely present a feature to inform a purchaser or designate a judgment. But here is a substantial entry of a judgment bond, containing all that is necessary to give information. It is entered on the docket in the form of an action, as a judgment bond; the names of the parties; the amount due; the date and time of the writing. It states the entry of a judgment bond, and seal of the defendant. The judgment bond is filed of record, entered the 17th of May, 1815. What is entered? A judgment on the bond filed. No man could be deceived by this mode of entry; for, however inartificial it may be, however defective in the technical words of a judgment, none who called for information would be led into error. The docket entry gave full information. It might have been more formal, but still it is the entry of a judgment entered by the prothonotary, who was authorized to make the entry.’

The head-note in the case of Com. v. Conard, 1 Rawle, 249, reads that ‘a prothonotary complies substantially with the directions of the act of assembly of the 24th February, 1806, when, in entering judgment on a bond with warrant of attorney, upon the application of the party he enters on his docket the names of the obligor and obligee in the form of an action as parties, the date of the bond and warrant of attorney, the penal sum, the real debt, the time of entering the judgment, and the date of the judgment on the margin of the record.’ These clear and explicit announcements by the highest courts of the state, of the force and effect given to such judgments in that state, are entitled to the highest respect, and cannot, without ignoring the requirements of comity and propriety prevailing among sister states, be disregarded by the courts of other states. It should, in any event,...