Teelon v. State
| Decision Date | 29 March 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 44382,44382 |
| Citation | 268 N.Y.S.2d 611,49 Misc.2d 754 |
| Parties | Sally Ann TEELON and Arnold W. Teelon, Claimants, v. The STATE of New York. Claim |
| Court | New York Court of Claims |
Herman E. Gottfried, Margaretville, for claimants.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., Stanton M. Drazen, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel, for the State.
Pursuant to Section 30 of the Highway Law, the State of New York, on June 9, 1964, appropriated land purportedly owned by the claimants located in the Town of Guilford, County of Chenango, all as shown on Map No. 33, Parcel No. 49, of Rockdale-Mt. Upton, State Highway No. 667, Chenango County.
The Court adopts as accurate the description of the appropriated land as shown on the official map filed in the office of the Clerk of Chenango County.
Parcel No. 49 of Map No. 33 consisted of a strip fee taking along the entire front of claimants' lot, being 125 feet on the west; 53 feet on the north; 126 feet on the east and 52 feet on the south, containing 6458 square feet and containing all of the front lawn.
Prior to the appropriation the claimant owned an improved residential lot located on the west side of Route 8.
Claimants' lot was rectangular in shape with frontage of 125 feet and a depth of 325 feet. Prior to the appropriation the developed portion of the property was approximately 100 feet deep, then there was a drop of about 15 feet to the rear or undeveloped portion of the property. Chief improvements consisted of a 10 47 mobile home and a detached frame garage building. The mobile home was resting on a cinder block and railroad tie foundation and the foundation was sealed or enclosed with Homosote panels attached to 2 4 framing. The home contained a kitchen, bath, living room and bedroom. In addition, a concrete patio area had been constructed adjacent to the mobile home.
The detached garage was set on a concrete foundation and had a poured concrete floor. A folding stairway provided access to a storage area or attic.
The State contended that the mobile home was neither realty or a fixture and that by removing it from the site subsequent to the appropriation, claimants effectively estopped themselves from contesting the validity of the State's categorization. The reasoning in Gurwitz v. State, 27 Misc.2d 731, 211 N.Y.S.2d 641, 1961, affd. 15 App.Div.2d 712, 223 N.Y.S.2d 558, 1962, might tend to give some support to the State's argument. Since the taking in the present case, however, did not extend to cover the site of the mobile home, the claimants were under no obligation to either abandon the property or to treat it as not having been appropriated in a taking of the land upon which it was situated.
A mobile home might be easier to move and removal might be less likely to result in damage to the structure or to the land, as would be the case with an ordinary residential structure. This fact is, of course, important in determining the after-taking value, and in this case would tend to mitigate consequential damages. It by no means compels a finding that the mobile home did not constitute real property.
The Court is familiar with commonly accepted rules or standards utilized or applied in decisions dealing with landlord-tenant, vendor-vendee and certain other situations in which the categorization of property as realty or personalty has been decisive. It is clear, however, that such rules and standards, although well adapted to the issues in those cases, may not be adequate in dealing with problems incident to eminent domain proceedings. See Tinnerholm v. State, 15 Misc.2d 311, 179 N.Y.S.2d 582; City of Buffalo v. Michael, 16 N.Y.2d 88, 262 N.Y.S.2d 441, 209 N.E.2d 776.
Despite this well recognized problem, such rules, insofar as they may be relevant in the present case, favor the claimants. Thus, conceding as one must that intent is...
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Frontier Park v. ASSESSOR
...would have been different if the condemnee did not also own the land on which the home was located (see, Teelon v State of New York, 49 Misc 2d 754). While said decision indicated such land ownership was an important factor, it also referred to the improvement of the property by a driveway,......