Teeter v. Teeter

• Decision Date: 26 June 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-1409,84-1409
• Citation: 18 Ohio St.3d 76,18 OBR 106,479 N.E.2d 890
• Parties: , 18 O.B.R. 106 TEETER, Appellee, v. TEETER, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 76

18 Ohio St.3d 76

479 N.E.2d 890, 18 O.B.R. 106

TEETER, Appellee, v. TEETER, Appellant.

No. 84-1409.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

June 26, 1985.

Appellee, Shirley L. Teeter, initiated this case in the Court of Common Pleas of Carroll County by filing a complaint for divorce against appellant, Joseph J. Teeter. The case was tried to the court on August 18, 1983. After the trial, counsel submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for the judge's consideration. On October 18, 1983, the trial court awarded appellee a divorce from appellant and subsequently divided the marital assets between the parties. One of the assets the court included in the marital estate was appellant's Air Force retirement pension. Appellant was receiving his Air Force retirement benefits at the time of the divorce and the court ordered that one-half of those benefits be paid to appellee " * * * until [the] death of the said Shirley L. Teeter or the said Joseph J. Teeter, whichever shall first occur."

A unanimous court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Gary L. Willen, Minerva, for appellee.

Johnson & Johnson Co., L.P.A., and Michael C. Johnson, New Philadelphia, for appellant.

PER CURIAM.

The first issue in this case is whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding appellee more than one-half of all marital assets, including one-half of appellant's military retirement pension. ¹

After a divorce has been granted, the trial court is required to equitably divide and distribute the marital estate between the parties, and to consider whether an award of alimony would be appropriate. See Wolfe v. Wolfe (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 399, 414, 350 N.E.2d 413 . Trial courts are vested with broad discretion in determining the appropriate scope of these property awards. Berish v. Berish (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 318, 319, 432 N.E.2d 183 . Although its discretion is not unlimited, the trial court has authority to do what is equitable, and its judgment should not be reversed unless it has abused its discretion. Cherry v. Cherry (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 348, 355, 421 N.E.2d 1293 . An abuse of discretion connotes more than just an error in judgment, it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140.

Our review of the record reveals that the trial court considered the relative earning abilities of the parties, and their liabilities and assets. The court then entered a division of property order under which appellant received household goods, a stereo, guns, a camper, proceeds of the sale of Christmas trees in 1982, proceeds of the sale of a car and cash. The value of these assets was about $11,700. Appellee received household goods, jewelry, a camper, three cars, a mink coat, proceeds from the sale of Christmas trees in 1981 and cash. The value of these assets was $13,650. In addition, appellant was given the option to purchase certain real estate and the trial court awarded each party one-half of appellant's Air Force pension benefits.

Upon consideration of the foregoing, we find that the trial court's division of property order was not unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Thus, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in this respect.

The second issue in this case is whether the court of appeals erred by reviewing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that were not adopted by the trial court.

Appellant, in the court of appeals, argued that the trial court erred by failing to consider an alleged $2,000 Christmas Club account in making its division of property order. The appellate court dismissed this argument by stating: "Each party submitted proposed findings of fact * * *. In his proposed findings, the appellant made no mention of a Christmas Club. In his proposed division of property, he made no mention of a Christmas Club. ...