Teets v. Miller
| Decision Date | 03 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–1118,14–1118 |
| Citation | 237 W.Va. 473,788 S.E.2d 1 |
| Parties | J. Michael Teets, Commissioner; William E. Keplinger, Jr., Commissioner; and The Hardy County Commission, Respondents Below, Petitioners v. Wendy J. Miller, John A. Elmore, B. Wayne Thompson, Ovid Need, and Bonnie L. Haggerty, Petitioners Below, Respondents |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
John A. Kessler, David R. Pogue, Carey, Scott, Douglas & Kessler, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for Petitioners, J. Michael Teets, Commissioner, William E. Keplinger, Jr., Commissioner.
John W. Cooper, Cooper and Preston, PLLC, Parsons, West Virginia, Attorney for Petitioner, Hardy County Commission.
J. David Judy, III, Judy & Judy, Moorefield, West Virginia, Attorney for the Respondents.
Ancil G. Ramey, Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Bridget M. Cohee, Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, Martinsburg, West Virginia, Attorneys for Petitioner, Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, Former Attorneys for Petitioner, Hardy County Commission.
Ketchum
, Chief Justice:
The action underlying this appeal was brought by Wendy J. Miller,1 John A. Elmore, B. Wayne Thompson, Ovid Need, and Bonnie Haggerty, citizens of Hardy County (collectively “Hardy County Citizens”), respondents herein, seeking to remove two commissioners serving on the Hardy County Commission (“Commission” or “the Commission”), and to void the Commission's purchase of a building and its imposition of a Special Emergency Ambulance Service Fee (“Ambulance Fee”). The action was bifurcated, and this appeal pertains only to the portion of the proceedings below held in the Circuit Court of Hardy County seeking to void the building purchase and the Ambulance Fee.2 In this appeal, the Commission and two of its commissioners, J. Michael Teets (“Commissioner Teets”) and William E. Keplinger, Jr. (“Commissioner Keplinger”), seek review of two orders issued by the circuit court. In those orders, the circuit court found both the building purchase and the Ambulance Fee were invalid because the Commission violated the Open Governmental Proceedings Act, W. Va. Code § 6–9A–1 et seq.
, and, alternatively, because the Commission failed to provide proper notice of special meetings pursuant to W. Va. Code § 7–1–2 (1923), which failure deprived the Commission of jurisdiction over the challenged acts. Based upon those findings, the circuit court, inter alia , granted the Hardy County Citizens' motion for injunctive relief and expressly prohibited the Commission from voting, in an open meeting with proper notice, to validate its purchase of the building and also prohibited the Commission from instituting an Ambulance Fee “unless and until ambulance service is not otherwise available to all residents of Hardy County”; granted the Hardy County Citizens' motion for attorney's fees and directed the Commission to pay $112,000 for said fees, plus interest, to counsel for the plaintiffs; rendered judgment against Commissioner Teets and Commissioner Keplinger, jointly and severally, in an amount equal to that paid for the building purchase, which was $1,130,000, plus interest; and denied a motion by the Commission to join as parties to the litigation the sellers of the building.
Also before this Court is Steptoe & Johnson, LLC, former counsel to the Commission in the proceedings below. Steptoe & Johnson seeks review of a separate order issued by the circuit court that found Steptoe & Johnson had a disqualifying conflict in regard to this action, and further compelled Steptoe & Johnson to refund certain attorney's fees earned by the firm.
We find that, pursuant to W. Va. Code § 7–15–18 (1975)
, the Commission was not required to comply with the Open Governmental Proceedings Act or W. Va. Code § 7–1–2 under the particular circumstances presented herein. Therefore, we reverse all three of the circuit court's orders appealed in this action.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Because the circuit court agreed to proceed on the record created before the three-judge panel that heard the removal portion of the action, the facts of this case were primarily developed in the removal action with the parties providing limited additional evidence to the circuit court. We begin our recounting of the facts with background information necessary to understand the events that later unfolded and led to the instant litigation.
Emergency ambulance services were provided to residents of Hardy County through a mix of paid and volunteer crews. During the fall of 2011, three crews served the bulk of Hardy County's emergency ambulance needs: Fraley Ambulance Service, Mathias–Baker Rescue Squad, and Wardensville Rescue Squad. On November 20, 2011, the Commission learned that the Mathias–Baker Rescue Squad was experiencing financial difficulties when Mathias–Baker sought funding from the Commission to remain solvent. Although the Commission provided $300,000 to keep Mathias–Baker operating, the troubled rescue squad closed suddenly in October 2012.3 Members of the Mathias–Baker Rescue Squad thereafter provided emergency ambulance services on a volunteer basis, however the volunteer ambulance services ceased in May 2013. Meanwhile, in response to the closure of the Mathias–Baker Rescue Squad, at a Commission meeting held on November 20, 2012, the Commission voted to hire a county medic and to create the Hardy County Emergency Ambulance Authority (“Ambulance Authority”).4
To facilitate our recitation of the remaining course of events in this case, it is helpful to first explain the normal process followed by the Commission in announcing its meetings. This process apparently is in compliance with the “Hardy County Rules for Conducting Public Meetings” as promulgated in 2004. Typically, two weeks prior to each meeting of the Commission, the county clerk places the following announcement, which the Commission refers to as its “Standard Agenda,” in the classified section of the Moorefield Examiner newspaper:
This “Standard Agenda” also is posted on the courthouse door. A second agenda, referred to by the Commission as its “Appointments Sheet,” is placed on the desk of the county clerk. The county clerk and his staff then create a list on the “Appointments Sheet” that includes names of persons wishing to be heard and/or topics to be considered at the upcoming meeting of the Commission. Additions to the “Appointments Sheet” may be made up to the time of the meeting. The Commission explains that, anyone who reads the published notice or who has an interest in a particular meeting may contact the county clerk to obtain a copy of “Standard Agenda” and/or the “Appointments Sheet.” The circuit court observed that, because the “Appointments Sheet” may be supplemented up to the time of the meeting, anyone obtaining an earlier version of the list would not thereby be informed of all persons to be heard and/or topics to be considered at a particular meeting.5
Having established the Commission's general procedure for providing notice of its meetings, we turn to the facts pertaining to the acts taken by the Commission and Commissioners Teets and Keplinger that were challenged below.6 The imposition of the Ambulance Fee was first discussed at a meeting of the Commission held on March 5, 2013, during which the county prosecuting attorney was instructed to “prepare an Ordinance to impose a fee according to § 7–15–15 [sic].”7 Neither the “Standard Agenda” nor the “Appointment Sheet” prepared for the March 5 meeting contained any indication that an Ambulance Fee would be a topic of discussion during the meeting.
The Commission's purchase of a building was first addressed at a meeting held on May 21, 2013. There was nothing on either the Standard Agenda or the “Appointment Sheet” prepared for the meeting to indicate that the purchase of a building would be discussed. During the course of the meeting, however, an officer of the Ambulance Authority requested an executive session8 regarding the purchase of property. An executive session was held, but no vote was taken on the matter. It is now known that the property purchase discussed in the executive session was a building that had been owned by the Mathias–Baker Rescue Squad (“Baker building”). At the time the Mathias–Baker Rescue Squad closed, the Baker building was pledged as collateral to secure numerous notes held by the Capon Valley Bank. The Capon Valley Bank had foreclosed and planned to sell the Baker building by public auction. The CEO of Capon Valley Bank testified that, on two separate occasions prior to the sale, all three Hardy County Commissioners met with bank representatives to discuss purchasing the Baker building. The meetings dealt primarily with procedure. The Commissioners wanted to know what the ...
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Monongalia Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Am. Fed'n of Teachers—W. Va.
...("As a rule, when both a specific and a general statute apply to a given case, the specific statute governs.").Teets v. Miller , 237 W.Va. 473, ––––, 788 S.E.2d 1, 12 (2016). In the case sub judice , the various RESA provisions provide the more specific law in that they specifically address......