Tellier v. Edwards
| Decision Date | 25 August 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 35549,35549 |
| Citation | 56 Wn.2d 652,354 P.2d 925 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Paul TELLIER, Plaintiff, v. Robert A. EDWARDS, Defendant and Relator, Superior Court of the State of Washington for King County, The Honorable Donald L. Gaines, Judge, Respondent. |
Kahin, Carmody & Horswill, Pinckney M. Rohrback, Seattle, for relator.
McCutcheon, Soderland & Wells, Robert C. Wells, Seattle, for respondent.
This is an original petition for a writ of prohibition. The relator seeks to restrain the trial judge from entertaining further procedings in the cause and from entering an order denying relator's motion to quash service of process.
On March 10, 1957, the parties to this suit were involved in an automobile accident in Seattle. At that time, the relator was a resident of the state of Washington and subject to service of process in this state until January 16, 1958, when he removed to Los Angeles.
Prior to 1957, RCW 46.64.040 provided that a nonresident by exercising the privilege extended to him of driving upon the state highways thereby appointed the secretary of state 'to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful summons and processes against him growing out of any accident' occurring within the state. By the Laws of 1957, chapter 75, § 1, p. 310, RCW 46.64.040 was amended by the addition of the following provision:
'* * * Likewise each resident of this state who, while operating a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state, is involved in any accident, collision or liability and thereafter within three years departs from this state appoints the secretary of state of the state of Washington as his lawful attorney for services of summons as provided in this section for nonresidents. * * *'
It is the contention of the relator that this provision cannot apply to him because it did not become law until June 12, 1957, over two months after the accident.
It is true that a statute ordinarily operates prospectively unless it is remedial in nature or the legislature indicates that it is to operate retrospectively. In re Wind's Estate, 32 Wash.2d 64, 200 P.2d 748. A statute is remedial and has a retroactive application when it relates to practice, procedure, or remedies, and does not affect a substantive or vested right. Nelson v. Department of Labor and Industries, 9 Wash.2d 621, 115 P.2d 1014; and cases cited; Bodine v. Department of Labor and Industries, 29 Wash.2d 879, 190 P.2d 89. See, also, 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, 505, § 482; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 421, p. 996. The reason for this rule is that a party does not have a vested right in any particular form of procedure. White v. Powers, 89 Wash. 502, 154 P. 820. Service of process is a matter of procedure.
The justification for such substituted service upon former residents is the same as...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Chovan v. EI Du Pont De Nemours & Company
...v. Grimes, 9 Terry 122, 48 Del. 122, 99 A.2d 255 (1953); Davis v. Jones, 247 Iowa 1031, 78 N.W.2d 6 (1956); contra, Tellier v. Edwards, 56 Wash.2d 652, 354 P.2d 925 (1960); Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, 114 N.E.2d 686 These cases may be distinguished from the instant case in that the non......
-
Krueger v. Rheem Mfg. Co.
...v. Grimes, 9 Terry 122, 48 Del. 122, 99 A.2d 255 (1953); Davis v. Jones, 247 Iowa 1031, 78 N.W.2d 6 (1965); contra, Tellier v. Edwards, 56 Wash.2d 621, 354 P.2d 925 (1960); Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, 114 N.E.2d 686 'These cases may be distinguished from the instant case in that the no......
-
Harmon v. Eudaily
...v. Rudy, 16 Ohio St.2d 70, 242 N.E.2d 658 (1968); Walke v. Dallas, Inc., 209 Va. 32, 161 S.E.2d 722 (1968); Tellier v. Edwards, 56 Wash.2d 652, 354 P.2d 925 (1960). See also Myers v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 429 Pa. 177, 240 A.2d 505 Defendant argues that Delaware adheres to the minority (non......
-
Martin v. Triol
...Martin v. Meier, supra, 111 Wash.2d at 476, 760 P.2d 925.48 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. at 356, 47 S.Ct. at 633.49 Tellier v. Edwards, 56 Wash.2d 652, 654, 354 P.2d 925 (1960) (quoting Hess v. Pawloski, supra).50 RCW 4.16.180 provides: "[I]f after such cause of action shall have accrued, suc......