Telthorster v. Tennell

• Decision Date: 27 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-0074.,01-0074.
• Citation: 92 S.W.3d 457
• Parties: Mark Andrew TELTHORSTER, Petitioner, v. Ollie Lee TENNELL, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

92 S.W.3d 457

Mark Andrew TELTHORSTER, Petitioner, v. Ollie Lee TENNELL, Respondent.

No. 01-0074.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued December 15, 2001.

Decided June 27, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William S. Helfand, Kevin D. Jewell, Mangenheim, Bateman & Helfand, P.L.L.C., Steven Jon Knight, Chamberlain Hrdlicka White Williams & Martin, Houston, for Petitioner.

Matthew J.M. Prebeg, Glover, Lewis & Prebeg, Houston, for Respondent.

Justice O'NEILL delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice PHILLIPS, Justice OWE N, Justice HANKINSON, Justice JEFFERSON, and Justice RODRIGUEZ joined.

In this official-immunity case, we must determine the good-faith standard to apply when a suspect sues a police officer for injuries sustained during an arrest. In City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex.1994), we held that an officer pursuing a suspect acts in good faith if a reasonably prudent officer could have believed that the pursuit should have been continued, taking into account both the need for immediate police intervention and the risk of harm to the public. In Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 466-67 (Tex.1997), we extended that test to an officer's high-speed emergency response and elaborated on Chambers' need and risk elements by announcing specific factors that officers must consider to show that they acted in good faith.

Here, we must decide whether the Wadewitz particularized need/risk assessment is required when a suspect sues for injuries sustained during an arrest. We conclude that it is not, because the public-safety concerns underlying that assessment are not implicated. When a suspect sues for injuries sustained during an arrest official immunity's good-faith element requires the defendant to show that a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that the disputed conduct was justified based on the information the officer possessed when the conduct occurred. To controvert, the nonmovant must show that no reasonable officer under similar circumstances could have believed that the facts were such that they justified the disputed conduct. Applying this standard, we hold that the officer-defendant in this case is entitled to official immunity because he conclusively proved, and the plaintiff failed to controvert, that he acted in good faith. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and render judgment that the plaintiff take nothing.

I Background

Officers Rob Bailey and Mark Telthorster of the Navasota Police Department were on routine patrol when they observed Ollie Tennell commit traffic violations, including failure to properly signal a turn. The officers activated their sirens in an effort to pull Tennell over, but he accelerated and refused to stop. A high-speed pursuit ensued until Tennell finally stopped at his home in the City of Bryan. Tennell pulled up to his house and beeped his horn, apparently to attract the attention of those inside. Both officers drew their guns. Officer Bailey ordered Tennell to step out of his truck, and Tennell complied. While Officer Telthorster kept his gun drawn, Officer Bailey holstered his weapon, grabbed Tennell's upper right arm, and placed Tennell face-down on the ground. Officer Telthorster approached from behind to help Bailey handcuff Tennell, who appeared to Telthorster to be struggling with Officer Bailey. With his gun still drawn, Telthorster cuffed Tennell's left hand. Officer Telthorster was attempting to bring Tennell's hands together when his gun accidentally discharged and a bullet ricocheted off Officer Bailey's hand and grazed Tennell's back. Although Tennell turned out to be unarmed, Officer Telthorster testified that during the seconds before his gun discharged he was unable to determine with certainty whether Tennell was concealing a weapon.

Tennell sued Officer Telthorster and the City of Navasota for his back injury, alleging that Telthorster was negligent in handling his gun and that the city was vicariously liable for his negligence. Tennell also alleged that Telthorster acted with malice because he knew his actions involved an extreme degree of risk, but he nevertheless proceeded in conscious indifference to the rights of others. The city was subsequently nonsuited and is not a party here. Officer Telthorster moved for summary judgment, asserting official immunity. The trial court granted Telthorster's motion, and Tennell appealed.

The only issue before the court of appeals was whether Officer Telthorster conclusively established that he acted in good faith during the attempted arrest. The court of appeals applied the particularized need/risk standard that we announced in Chambers and elaborated on in Wadewitz. The court held that Telthorster's summary judgment proof failed to conclusively establish his good faith and therefore he was not entitled to summary judgment on his official-immunity defense. 84 S.W.3d 1. We granted review to consider the good-faith standard that applies when a suspect sues for injuries sustained during an arrest.

II Good Faith

Official immunity is an affirmative defense that shields governmental employees from personal liability so that they are encouraged to vigorously perform their official duties. Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex.1994). A governmental employee is entitled to official immunity for (1) the performance of discretionary duties (2) that are within the scope of the employee's authority, (3) provided that the employee acts in good faith. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 653; see also DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650, 651-52 (Tex.1995); Kassen, 887 S.W.2d at 8-9; K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589, 597 (Tex. 1994). To obtain summary judgment on the basis of official immunity, a governmental employee must conclusively establish each of these elements. See University of Houston v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex.2000). In deciding whether an employee's summary judgment proof conclusively establishes the official-immunity defense, we must determine whether there are disputed facts material to its elements. In this case, the parties do not dispute that at the time of the incident Officer Telthorster was performing a discretionary duty within the scope of his employment. But they do dispute whether he was acting in good faith.

In Chambers, we considered in some detail official immunity's good-faith element. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656-57. Chambers involved a high-speed police pursuit that resulted in the death of a passenger who was riding with the fleeing suspect. Id. at 652. We sought to articulate a good-faith standard that would strike the proper balance between two competing interests: the threat of severely hampering police officers' discretion by imposing civil liability for their mistakes, and the rights of bystanders and other innocent parties that may be trampled by an officer's gross disregard for public safety. Id. at 656 (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)). We held that an officer acts in good faith in a pursuit case if: a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that the need to immediately apprehend the suspect outweighed a clear risk of harm to the public in continuing the pursuit.

Id. (emphasis added). This test's "could have believed" aspect requires an officer to prove only that a "reasonably prudent officer might have believed that the pursuit should have been continued." Id. at 656-57. If the officer meets this burden, the nonmovant must present evidence that "`no reasonable person in the [officer's] position could have thought the facts were such that they justified [the officer's] acts.'" Id. at 657 (quoting Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.1993)).

In Wadewitz, we adhered to Chambers' general good-faith framework. 951 S.W.2d at 467. But we elaborated on the need and risk elements and applied them to an emergency-response situation involving a police officer who, in responding to an emergency call, collided with a third-party motorist. Id. We articulated specific factors for courts to consider in determining whether an officer sufficiently assessed both need and risk for the purpose of establishing good faith:

The "need" aspect of the test refers to the urgency of the circumstances requiring police intervention.... [N]eed is determined by factors such as the seriousness of the crime or accident to which the officer responds, whether the officer's immediate presence is necessary to prevent injury or loss of life or to apprehend a suspect, and what alternative courses of action, if any, are available to achieve a comparable result. The "risk" aspect of good faith, on the other hand, refers to the countervailing public safety concerns: the nature and severity of harm that the officer's actions could cause (including injuries to bystanders as well as the possibility that an accident would prevent the officer from reaching the scene of the emergency), the likelihood that any harm would occur, and whether any risk of harm would be clear to a reasonably prudent officer.

Id. In Clark, we applied these factors to assess an officer's good faith in a high-speed police pursuit. 38 S.W.3d at 581-83. We did so because "pursuing a suspect and responding to an emergency involve the same general risk to the public — collision with a third party." Id. at 583. We held that a police officer's summary judgment proof does not offer a suitable basis for determining good faith unless it sufficiently assesses the Wadewitz need/risk factors. Id. at 584-85.

III Good Faith in this Case

The parties here agree that, as in high-speed pursuit and emergency-response cases, a police officer accomplishing an arrest is entitled to official immunity's protection if its three elements are established. But they disagree, and we have never considered, how the good-faith element should be...